VZCZCXRO0981
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1214/01 2551842
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111842Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2409
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8425
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6570
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2701
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001214 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC AND L 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018 
TAGS: SNAR PREL MOPS BR
SUBJECT: 2008 RECOMMENDATION FOR RENEWAL OF PRESIDENTIAL 
DETERMINATION FOR BRAZIL'S SHOOTDOWN PROGRAM 
 
REF: A. STATE 54183 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 806 
     ¶C. 07 BRASILIA 1868 
     ¶D. BRASILIA 987 
     ¶E. BRASILIA 1079 
     ¶F. BRASILIA 1124 
     ¶G. BRASILIA 1170 
     ¶H. IIR 6 809 0259 08 
     ¶I. IIR 6 809 0267 08 
     ¶J. IIR 6 809 0210 08 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel.  Reason 1.5 d 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY.  In accordance with ref a instructions, Post 
has conducted an extensive review of Brazil's Air Bridge 
Denial (ABD)/Shootdown program.  Following site visits, 
conversations with Brazilian government officials and 
analysis of Brazil's shootdown procedures, (reftels) post has 
a clearer picture of Brazil's institutional controls.  For 
the first time, the Brazilian government has provided us with 
an official written version of its procedures (ref g), 
filling what ref a identified was the crucial gap in our 
confidence in Brazil's safety procedures.  Based on our 
ongoing monitoring of Brazil's program and supplemented by 
Brazil's openess in sharing its procedures, post recommends 
that the Presidential Determination (PD) on the Brazilian 
Shootdown Law be renewed for 2008.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  As noted in refs a and b, Post remains engaged with 
the Government of Brazil to maintain confidence that Brazil's 
safety procedures for its ABD provide protection against 
innocent loss of life in connection with interdiction.  Based 
on evaluations of Brazil's ABD program, the President has 
been able to certify annually since 2004.  Based on post's 
contacts with the Brazilian Air Force and Air Control 
facilities (reftels), it is clear that Brazil's safety 
procedures are at least as strong as in previous years.  In 
each contact we have had with Brazilian officials, we have 
heard the view that there is no chance that an actual 
shootdown will be ordered and that the passage of time makes 
a shootdown less likely as the notion that the shootdown 
authority is not to be used becomes more entrenched. 
 
PROCEDURES 
---------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  As requested in ref a, Mission Brazil has worked 
this year to deepen our knowledge of GOB shootdown 
procedures.  As transmitted in ref g, we now have obtained 
from the Brazilian Air Force an official copy of Brazil's 
procedures which are consistent with those briefed previously 
(most recently described in refs c and h).  One area of 
ambiguity exists in the written procedures: who the 
"competent authority" would be to order the actual 
destruction of an aircraft.  Post has confirmed that only the 
Commander of the Air Force is considered competent to do this 
and that this is understood clearly at all levels of the 
chain of command.  Indeed, Air Force pilots and controllers 
have said privately that they in no way would want 
responsibility for any use of lethal force and are content to 
depend on high level authorization. 
 
¶4.  (C)  In discussing the procedures with the Brazilian Air 
Force, two other salient facts emerged.  First, only a small 
number of pilots are authorized to conduct intercept 
operations and receive special training before receiving such 
authorization.  Second, there is a complete separation 
between controllers of military and civilian air traffic. 
While all controllers work for the Ministry of Defense, for 
operational security reasons, those on the military side have 
separate locations and access to restricted data feeds not 
available to the civilian side.  They are also able to employ 
AWACS aircraft for additional situational awareness.  Given 
this separation, military controllers were unable to imagine 
any circumstances under which a civilian controller could 
become involved in the procedure for ordering a shootdown. 
Similarly, problems in civilian aviation and air traffic 
control cannot impact the safety procedures followed on the 
military side.  These factors show the importance the 
Brazilian Air Force places on safety, particularly concerning 
potential intercept operations. 
 
 
BRASILIA 00001214  002 OF 002 
 
 
VISITS 
------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  During the past year, post has been able to visit 
two (Brasilia and Manaus) of the four regional air control 
centers (CINDACTAS) (refs f,h,k).  These visits each showed 
that CINDACTA staff were well-versed on shootdown procedures. 
 The CINDACTAS themselves were equipped to modern air control 
standards and set up to maintain operational security. 
CINDACTA personnel reaffirmed to Embassy visitors that they 
do not have shootdown authority and, in the exceedingly 
unlikely event an actual shootdown were contemplated, would 
depend on instructions from the Commander of the Air Force to 
be passed by Air Defense Command Headquarters (COMDABRA). 
 
¶6.  (C)  The visit to COMDABRA (ref i) did not result in the 
good fortune to witness an intercept as did last year's 
visit, but command staff were able to provide post 
representatives with a detailed walkthrough of their 
procedures using photos taken during intercepts.  COMDABRA 
staff also provided detailed information to Air Attache on 
response times for various areas of the country and air 
control staffing procedures.  Both during CINDACTA and 
COMDABRA visits, controllers for military traffic told post 
personnel that although there has never been a shootdown 
ordered, the existence of the law has made interdiction of 
illicit trafficking by air more effective. 
 
PROGRAM STATISTICS 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  The Brazilian Air Force is compiling this year's 
statistics on the shootdown program.  Post will forward these 
via septel as soon as they become available. 
 
 
POST RECOMMENDATION 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (C)  As noted in ref b, Brazil has maintained adequate 
safety standards since its shootdown law came into effect. 
After conducting our annual evaluation of Brazil's program, 
we believe that the appropriate safety procedures remain in 
place.  This year's evaluation has been marked by greater 
openess on the part of the Brazilian Air Force, particularly 
by hosting multiple visits to Air Control sites.   Ref a 
noted that the key reason for uncertainty as to Brazilian 
safety standards was that "the USG has no direct knowledge of 
Brazilian procedures."  By providing us with a written 
version of its procedures, Brazil has filled this gap and 
given us greater confidence in recommending PD renewal.  Post 
therefore recommends that the Presidential Determination on 
the Brazilian Shootdown Law be renewed for 2008. 
SOBEL