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FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0383
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0445
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0019
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6553
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2675
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE VIENNA 0003
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0270

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND EUR/CARC GEORGIA COORDINATION 
GROUP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BR
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: BRAZILIAN VIEWS ON SITUATION 
 
REF: A. STATE 91894 
     ¶B. STATE 90980 
     ¶C. STATE 90978 
     ¶D. STATE 89769 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen Liston, Reason: 1.5 d. 
 
¶1.  (C)  Post has held a series of discussions with the 
Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE) using the 
points and themes contained in reftels.  Consistent with its 
normal practice, the Brazilian government has avoided taking 
a strong position on a situation distant from Brazil's 
borders, although privately Brazilian officials are concerned 
both by the violence and the apparent ineffectiveness of the 
UN.  MRE officials have stated clearly that there is no 
chance Brazil will recognize the independence of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia unless such recognition were to be consistent 
with a Security Council Resolution.  While Brazil will 
continue to avoid public condemnation of Russia's 
disproportionate use of force, MRE views the Russian action 
as excessive and contrary to Russia's interest in integrating 
with its European neighbors.  Brazil will continue to support 
a peaceful resolution of the conflict, consistent with UNSCRs 
and will also maintain its support for Georgia's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The MRE also showed a willingness to accept Russian 
linkage of Georgia to Kosovo.  While they accepted post's 
explanation that there are such key differences as the UN 
resolutions affirming Georgian sovereignty while leaving 
Kosovo's status open and the fact that Russian meddling in 
Georgia predates the Kosovo crisis, some perception remains 
that the U.S. and Europe gave Russia greater pretext to 
intervene in Georgia by recognizing Kosovo independence. 
 
¶3.  (C)  COMMENT: Concurrent with MRE's concern about Russian 
actions, the Brazilian government continues its efforts to 
develop a "Strategic Partnership" with Russia.  The Lula 
administration views Russia as having many similar attributes 
to Brazil; both are large developing countries with vast 
natural resources.  Partnership (and presumed equality) with 
Russia will help lift Brazil to what it would perceive as the 
first rank of developing countries and solidify a status as a 
major world power which Brazil views as its destiny.  Given 
these perceived Brazilian interests, Brazil will continue to 
expand its relationship with Russia but will view such 
enhancement as entirely separated from events in Georgia. 
When asked if the Georgia situation had been considered 
before the spectacularly ill-timed announcement this week 
that President Medvedev will visit Brazil in November, MRE 
contacts responded that there was no reason why Russia's 
actions should affect an ongoing process of building 
bilateral ties. END COMMENT 
 
KUBISKE