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RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 6598
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 2396
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 7276
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS BOGOTA 003603 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SEPT 30-OCT 1 VISIT OF U/S JAMES 
¶K. GLASSMAN TO BOGOTA, COLOMBIA 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (U) With U.S. assistance, Colombia finds itself safer, 
economically stronger, better governed, and more democratic 
than it has been in decades.  Rates of murder, kidnapping, 
and violence nationwide have fallen sharply.  The captures or 
kills of several leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and rising desertions have weakened 
Colombia's largest terrorist group.  More than 45,000 
combatants, mostly former right-wing paramilitaries, have 
laid down their arms, and many are participating in GOC 
reintegration programs.  FARC desertions hit a record 2480 in 
2007, and 1278 have deserted through May 2008.  Still, 
Colombia remains a work in progress.  Consolidating recent 
gains and making further advances on governance, human 
rights, security, and poverty reduction represent the 
greatest challenges for the remainder of the Uribe 
Administration.  Our continued commitment to Colombia will 
help lock in Colombia's democratic security gains, promote 
regional stability, and contribute to a Colombia that 
provides security and opportunity to all of its citizens. 
End Summary. 
 
------------------- 
Democratic Security 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The establishment of greater Colombian government 
territorial control and the demobilization of 32,000 
paramilitaries have created the space for civil society and 
political parties to operate more openly than ever before. 
The GOC maintains a police presence in all 1099 
municipalities for the first time in history.  Increased 
security of roads and highways have allowed for greater 
freedom of movement of people and commerce.  Murders fell 
from over 29,000 in 2002 to less than 17,000 in 2007, and 
kidnappings fell from over 2,800 a year to less than 600 
during the same period.  Local elections in October 2007 
reflected the improved security with over 86,000 candidates 
participating. 
 
¶3. (SBU) During 2008, FARC leader Manuel Marulanda 
("Tirofijo") died, the military killed key FARC Secretariat 
member Raul Reyes in a daring operation in Ecuador, notorious 
FARC commander Nelly Avila Moreno ("Karina") deserted, and 
the military rescued three American hostages, former 
presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, and eleven others. 
These successes have further demoralized the morale of FARC 
rank-and-file morale, leading to increased desertions. The 
military is focusing its efforts on attacking FARC in Meta, 
Tolima, and Valle de Cauca departments.  Colombian National 
Police (CNP) say the FARC's urban terrorist capabilities have 
been weakened, but Colombian security forces remain concerned 
over FARC efforts to launch attacks in urban areas.  The FARC 
recently destroyed the court house in Cali, Colombia's third 
largest city.  FARC collusion with new narcotrafficking 
organizations has increased in many areas of the country, 
especially in Meta and on the Pacific Coast. 
 
------------------------------------- 
GOC Moving Forward with Consolidation 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) In 2004, the GOC created the Center for Coordinated 
and Integrated Action (CCAI), an interagency committee led by 
Vice-Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo and Accion Social 
Director Luis Alfonso Hoyos, to promote short-term social and 
economic development in priority areas where Colombian 
security forces have reestablished security.  Still, the 
presence in post-conflict areas by civilian institutions 
remains weak or nonexistent.  CCAI's creation reflected the 
GOC's recognition that a purely military response to the FARC 
and paramilitary threats was insufficient to solve the 
country's security problems.  Instead, GOC officials 
understood the GOC needed to complement the military effort 
with programs to establish a permanent police and government 
presence in newly secured areas.  CCAI focuses on the 
departments of Meta, Choco, Cesar, Magdalena, Antioquia, and 
Norte de Santander-- which are centers of FARC or other 
terrorist activity. 
 
¶5. (U) Military and civilian officials agree that CCAI is the 
mechanism that will allow the GOC to reestablish state 
presence in conflict and post-conflict zones.  Still, more 
resources and support from across the GOC bureaucracy are 
needed for successful implementation.  CCAI continues to lack 
sufficient staff and budget authority to fully manage its 
vast range of responsibilities, and individual ministries 
resist surrendering control of resources.  Key issues such as 
transitioning responsibility for security from the military 
to the police, developing a viable legal economy, and 
extending health and education services can not be managed by 
the Defense Ministry alone. The Defense Ministry is leading 
an effort to better integrate civilian agencies into the 
process. 
 
¶6. (SBU) CCAI's flagship effort--the Consolidation Plan for 
Macarena (PCIM)--aims to establish permanent GOC control over 
the FARC's old strongholds in the Macarena region of Meta 
department.  With funding from the U.S. Military Group, 
construction began on a Fusion Center (CFI)--PCIM's 
civilian-military headquarters--in early September after a 
year-long delay due to CCAI organizational issues.  The CFI 
is set for completion by late October, and will provide a 
secure site for GOC civilian staff.  The delay led to backups 
in staffing the Center, especially from the Prosecutor 
General's Office (Fiscalia).  CFI staff are meant to be the 
on-the-ground implementers in Meta, but the Center will 
require more robust support from civilian agencies (legal, 
judicial and agricultural) if it is to respond to community 
demands for more civilian services and development in the 
near term. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
FARC Demobilization and Deserters on the Rise 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Ministry of Defense's $21 million budget for 
humanitarian aid, rewards, and public outreach continue to 
promote FARC desertions.  FARC desertions hit a record 2480 
in 2007, and 1278 have deserted through May 2008.  Still, 
Colombia's constitutional prohibition against granting 
amnesty or a pardon to individuals alleged to have committed 
gross human rights abuses complicate GOC efforts to persuade 
senior FARC commanders to demobilize.  On June 13, Uribe 
announced that the GOC would not extradite FARC members who 
freed hostages and would facilitate their passage to a third 
country.  Several senior FARC members have reportedly voiced 
interest in demobilizing with some of the FARC's hostages if 
they are assured they would not serve any jail time.  French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy told Uribe in New York on September 
22 that France would accept the FARC members who desert with 
hostages. 
 
¶8. (U) Sustained, targeted Colombian military 
pressure--coupled with the demobilization program--have also 
improved the "quality" of FARC deserters.  The deaths of FARC 
Secretariat members Manuel Marulanda, Ivan Rios, and Raul 
Reyes in recent months, along with the desertion of FARC 47th 
Front leader Karina, have hit FARC morale and encouraged 
further desertions.  In September, Karina entered the Justice 
and Peace Law process as provided for in Decree 1059 which 
offers FARC deserters similar legal benefits (reduced jail 
times) to those given to demobilized paramilitaries.  MOD 
officials told us Karina would be charged for seven crimes 
against humanity. 
 
---------------------------------- 
GOC Revamps Reintegration Programs 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The High Commissioner for Reintegration Office (ACR) 
has assisted 37,137 demobilized individuals: 29,776 
collective and 7361 individual.  Eighty percent of the 
demobilized were former paramilitaries, and 20% were 
individual deserters from the FARC, ELN, and other terrorist 
groups.  Still, the ACR is revising its focus to respond to 
new challenges.   ACR lifted its 18-24 month limit on program 
participation, and has conditioned receipt of benefits on 
participation in its programs to ensure compliance and 
provide the guidance demobilized individuals need to 
reintegrate into society.  The ACR is also reviewing criteria 
for participation to ensure that demobilized "properly 
graduate" the program instead of being prematurely being 
 
ejected.  The ACR is working with the Colombian National 
Police (CNP) to monitor crimes against--and committed 
by--demobilized.  It is also trying to locate 3,000 
individual deserters and 1,864 paramilitaries who did not 
register in the reintegration program. 
 
¶10. (SBU) ACR officials told us they have committed $38 
million on reintegration programs since October 2007, and 
will maintain its "equal treatment" policy for all 
demobilized groups.  In addition, the program will dedicate 
more resources to psycho-social services, community outreach, 
education, and employment generation.   Demobilized receive 
approximately $80-$213 monthly payments--as well as a monthly 
transportation  stipend of $42-$58--as long as they complete 
80% of psycho-social programs, 60% of education programs, and 
80% of vocational preparation classes. 
 
------------------------------- 
Anti-FARC Marches Show Progress 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) On February 4, a non-partisan Colombian student group 
organized marches against kidnapping and the FARC in 148 
cities around the world.  Over one million marched against 
the FARC in Bogota, and millions more around the country. 
While marches against the FARC had occurred before, this was 
the largest in Colombia's history.  The students used the 
website Facebook to organize the events throughout Colombia 
and around the world.  The march in Bogota drew the support 
of politicians from across the political spectrum.  On July 
20, marches again took place throughout Colombia against the 
FARC. The turnout in Bogota did not compare to the earlier 
march, but marches took place even in non-urban areas that 
traditionally supported the FARC, such as Vista Hermosa and 
La Macarena in Meta Department. 
 
-------------------- 
MLK Fellowship Program 
---------------------- 
 
¶12. (U) In 2005, the Embassy launched the Martin Luther King 
(MLK) English Language Fellows Program with a view to 
expanding access of disadvantaged minority youth, such as 
Afro-Colombians and indigenous, to academic and economic 
opportunities.  The MLK Fellows Program started in Bogota as 
a pilot project and subsequently expanded to the cities of 
Cali, Medellin and Quibdo.  In its two years of existence, 
the program has developed the English language and leadership 
skills of 87 minority students selected for their leadership 
potential and interest in admissions to post-graduate 
studying in the U.S.  This program reflects the USG's 
commitment to reaching out to diverse populations of 
Colombia.  Ensuring follow on opportunities for the MLK 
fellows such as post-graduate studies, internships and job 
opportunities in Colombia is essential to the program's 
success. 
NICHOLS