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Viewing cable 08BAGHDAD3060, IRAQ VICE PRESIDENT AL-MAHDI - LACK OF STRATEGY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BAGHDAD3060 2008-09-23 14:39 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO9558
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3060 2671439
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231439Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9553
NONE
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 003060 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ENRG EAIR EINV EAGR PREL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ VICE PRESIDENT AL-MAHDI - LACK OF STRATEGY 
SLOWED PROJECTS 
 
REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 2770 
     B. B. BAGHDAD 3007 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Iraqi Vice Predident Adel Abdul Al-Mahdi 
told EMIN on September 16 that progress in the energy sector 
was impaired by a lack of overall strategy, but is now moving 
ahead with large contracts.  Problems in the Nasariyah water 
supply plant were gradually being addressed, he added. 
Al-Mahdi expressed enthusiasm for the Nasariyah airport.  He 
is also keen to revitalize agriculture, noting it employs 
25-30 percent of the labor force.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) In an initial courtesy call, EMIN Marc M. Wall met 
Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Al-Mahdi on September 16. 
Dr. Zuhair A.G. Humadi, Senior Advisor for the Vice 
President, also joined the meeting. 
 
Strategies Still Lacking 
------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Vice President Al-Mahdi said he looked forward to 
working with EMIN and had teams for specific issues to work 
with the Embassy.  EMIN noted Iraq's achievements over the 
last two years.  Al-Mahdi responded, "We have made great 
progress on security, but now we need to make progress on the 
economy.  The money is there, but we lack strategies for 
different sectors."  In the energy sector, the lack of an 
overall strategy has created delays.  "That is why it took so 
long to issue big contracts in the oil and electricity 
sector," he noted.  "We are very late, including some 
contracts pending since 2006."  The Vice President and his 
advisor Dr. Humadi agreed on the need to move forward on the 
GE turbine deal.  (See Reftel A.) 
 
Investment Ideas 
---------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The Vice President noted that, "We organized two 
good conferences in Dubai and Cairo on investment."  EMIN 
said that the Embassy was very interested in helping the 
Government of Iraq (GOI) attract more private investment. 
There may be sector specific areas in particular where the 
Embassy could provide assistance. 
 
Nasariyah Water Supply Problems 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) EMIN raised the issue of the Nasariyah water supply 
project, the subject of a letter from Ambassador Crocker to 
Al-Mahdi on July 24, 2008.  (Al-Mahdi was born in Nasariyah.) 
 Al-Mahdi responded that problems with the water plant were 
gradually resolving.  The facility was getting staffed up and 
spare parts were now available.  Unreliable electricity 
remained a problem with the facility, however, as it is in 
much of the country. (Note: The USG is providing support for 
equipment that has failed since turnover.  End Note.)  Other 
water projects also needed attention and follow-up. 
 
Nasariyah Airport 
----------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Vice President Al-Mahdi was enthusiastic about the 
Nasariyah Airport project and was pleased with the close 
assistance of the U.S. Embassy's Transportation Attache's 
office.  "Not just because it is in my hometown, but because 
it is an important project," he stated.  The initial cost 
will be $75 million.  It will have a cargo area and help 
revitalize infrastructure in the province.  Al-Mahdi also 
wants to improve Basra airport.  "There is tourism potential 
there, with many historic sites, including the ancient city 
of Ur." (Comment: At this time, there are no formal plans for 
an airport in Nasiriyah.  The Transportation Attach,s 
Office has recommended a feasibility study to determine if an 
airport would be economically viable: a master plan for the 
airport should be produced prior to development of the 
airport.  There is approximately $360,000 in the GOI's 
proposed FY09 budget to begin such a study. End Comment.) 
 
Agriculture Sector Needs Help 
----------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Al-Mahdi noted that the agriculture sector employs 
25-30 percent of Iraq's population.  "We must take care of 
this sector, otherwise, people will join the urban 
unemployed," he stated.  Iraq currently does not have food 
self-sufficiency, importing around 70 percent of its food. 
EMIN noted the continued assistance of USAID and the 
Agriculture Attache to help the GOI with this sector. 
CROCKER