VZCZCXRO3045
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0620/01 2591406
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151406Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1585
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000620 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO AND AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON ASEC CN
SUBJECT:  Comoran Dialogue Depends on Sambi's Leadership 
 
REF:  ANTAN 606 
      ANTAN 591 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY:  The Ambassador called on President Sambi to take 
leadership and reach out to the opposition to make progress toward 
the pending "Inter-Comoran Dialogue".  In bilateral discussions and 
in joint meetings with international community colleagues, the 
Ambassador encouraged Union and "opposition" members to improve 
their communication, which in turn might foster economic progress. 
Sambi reiterated his private promise to step down in 2010 and that 
the Mohelian "turn" as president will be respected.  Getting him to 
say so publicly might provide the key to the heretofore elusive 
solution to their institutional problems.  This week's bilateral 
meeting with the Comorans will be another opportunity to stress the 
importance of their resolving these issues.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Ambassador Asks Sambi to Lead 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU)  The Ambassador encouraged President Sambi to take 
leadership of the stumbling process toward an Inter-Comoran 
Dialogue.  Meeting September 11 in Moroni, the Ambassador suggested 
Sambi make a public statement that he would not extend his mandate 
beyond 2010, allow Moheli its turn next in the rotation, and 
preserve island autonomy (all things the President has assured us in 
private).  President Sambi took on board the Ambassador's points, 
while again complaining at length that the constitution was 
unworkable and he had insufficient power to govern the Comoros.  The 
Ambassador told Sambi the "opposition" could continue to use their 
fears as a pretext to avoiding talks, until the President offered 
his solemn assurances. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  While open to the Ambassador's guidance and insisting he 
preferred dialogue to a referendum, President Sambi referred to 
obscure previous times (one in France) when (in vague terms) he had 
made the guarantees the opposition wanted.  The Ambassador assured 
Sambi his messages to date have been inadequate or too ambiguous, 
that more presidential leadership is needed to create the conditions 
for a true dialogue, and suggested the President use the solemn 
occasion of his Eid address to the nation to specifically reassure 
Comorans of his intentions. 
 
Union Ministers On "Process" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  In separate meetings with the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Justice, and Institutional Reform, the Ambassador called on 
his interlocutors to push President Sambi to lead.  The GOC 
officials spoke from the same script, insisting the constitution was 
unworkable.  They blamed in particular Grande Comore Island 
President Abdouwahab and the National Assembly for obstructing 
effective governance.  Foreign Minister Jaffar, who will lead the 
Comoran delegation for bilateral discussions in Washington this 
week, cleared shared the ambassador's view that more presidential 
leadership is needed; Jaffar encouraged the ambassador to deliver a 
clear message to that effect to the president in their meeting the 
next day, and implied he would do the same. 
 
"Opposition" Remains Distrustful 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  In meetings with Grande Comore's Island President and the 
National Assembly President (the cornerstones of the opposition 
coalition, the latter a Mohelian), the Ambassador allowed them to 
voice concerns while pushing for improved communication with the 
Union.  They remain intransigent, seeking written guarantees from 
the African Union before they will agree to talks with the Union. 
They insisted (again) the constitution "must not be touched" during 
the dialogue, reiterating that Comoros' governance problems are 
rooted in the Sambi government's incompetence and failure to 
implement legislation related to federal responsibilities. 
Nonetheless, the ambassador encouraged them to be open to signals 
and new communication from the president, especially those 
reassuring them on their main concerns (that Sambi will leave in 
2010, when Moheli will get its turn, and that island autonomy will 
be preserved).  The National Assembly president expressed openness 
to any such signals. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  In a new wrinkle, G-C President Abdouwahab said the 
"Technical Committee" was unacceptable and that leaders themselves 
must sit down first to establish principles.  He blamed Sambi for 
not having convened such a meeting, despite multiple suggestions 
that he do so. (NOTE:  African Union S/E Madeira has been pushing 
for technical talks, hoping to be less threatening in order to build 
a little confidence.  END NOTE).  Adbouwahab's argument, in part 
based on his legal background as a magistrate and in part in his 
search for any excuse to avoid talks, included renewed demands for 
written assurances before he would agree to any talks with the Union 
government.  Abdouwahab did not exclude revising the constitution if 
the assembled parties deemed it necessary to do so, but rejected any 
 
ANTANANARI 00000620  002 OF 002 
 
 
Union initiative intended expressly to revise the constitution 
(which he has good reason to suspect).  He also chafed at what he 
perceives as an excessive foreign (read AU) role in conducting a 
dialogue "that is supposed to be between Comorans".  Responding to 
an AU press conference held on September 11 at which Madeira offered 
assurances that Sambi will leave in 2010 and that Moheli's turn is 
assured, Abdouwahad complained, "Sambi knows how to speak.  He does 
not need the AU to do that for him." 
 
S/E Madeira's Final Push 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (SBU)  While in Moroni, the Ambassador also participated with 
African Union Special Envoy Madeira and the international community 
in ongoing talks with the GOC (REFTELS).  The group again advised FM 
Jaffar that the Comorans must take ownership over the dialogue 
process; the AU cannot and will not do it for them.  Before 
departing September 11 (he is unlikely to return until the Comorans 
demonstrate their will to talk by taking basic steps in the 
Technical Preparatory Committee), S/E Madeira made a public 
statement in which he called on President Sambi to lead, in addition 
to the assures noted above. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  The tiny Moroni international community remains closely 
aligned, insisting on Comoran ownership and offering facilitation. 
South Africa (following a fall-out over Mbeki's opposition to the 
Anjouan liberation in March) is again openly supportive of the AU 
initiative; the French are supportive, but only quietly so, for fear 
of being blamed for any future breakdown.  A senior Tanzanian 
delegation was also in town, looking at opening a diplomatic mission 
in Moroni, but curiously was not part of any talks with the AU.) 
Members noted the Union and opposition remain as far apart as they 
were one month ago, despite many meetings and the basic framework 
the AU has established.  S/E Madeira declined to provide his own 
guarantees to the opposition, insisting again, "You must sit down 
with your brothers and decide what you must talk about."  In his 
communications with the Island Presidents of Grande Comore and 
Moheli, and the National Assembly, S/E Madeira emphasized the 
Technical Preparatory Committee must simply establish a budget and 
timeline so at least international partners can offer support (NOTE: 
 When this process does start, the AU, UN and perhaps others will 
foot most of the bills for inter-island flights, hotels, and per 
diem.  END NOTE). 
 
COMMENT: 
- - - - - 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Mistrust continues to prevail in the Comoros.  If 
President Sambi takes our advice to make specific public assurances, 
in his Eid address or elsewhere, the opposition's best excuses for 
delay may be neutralized.  The threat of a referendum, which the 
President has not/not made public but which is well known to 
opposition leaders, may also serve as motivation to bring them to 
the table - although some clearly doubt Sambi's ability, having lost 
almost all of his post-liberation popularity, to muster the majority 
required for a constitutional referendum to pass.  The mutual 
recriminations made indirectly by both sides, via international 
diplomats as conduits, demonstrate Comoran politicians' continuing 
focus on self-interest (mainly the preservation of powers, prestige, 
perks, and salaries under the current system) and inability to seek 
compromise.  Nonetheless, Sambi's explicit (if not yet public) 
commitment to leave office in 2010 (coming less than two months 
after Secretary Rice privately suggested he do so) is an important 
development perhaps providing the key that eventually will unlock a 
solution.  END COMMENT. 
 
MARQUARDT