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DE RUEHAN #0606/01 2520716
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FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1569
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000606 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO AND AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON ASEC CN
SUBJECT:  Comorans Disagree On How (And If) To Talk 
 
REF:  ANTAN 591 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY:  After two weeks of intense mediation efforts by 
African Union Special Envoy Madeira, the Comorans are scarcely 
closer to sitting down to plan for inter-island talks.  President 
Sambi showed his cards September 5, indicating to diplomats he will 
hold a referendum to "fix institutional problems" if his political 
opponents refuse to talk.  END SUMMARY. 
 
President Sambi, "Referendum" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU) President Sambi thanked African Union Special Envoy Madeira 
September 5 for his mediation efforts and reaffirmed his will to 
honor his promise to the international community to convene an 
Inter-Comoran Dialogue.  S/E Madeira explained the Technical 
Preparatory Committee concept (REFTEL) and reported that the three 
island executives and National Assembly had agreed in principle.  He 
emphasized that Moheli, Grande Comore, and the National Assembly 
feared Sambi would seek to extend his mandate beyond May, 2010, thus 
slowing progress. 
 
¶3. (SBU) President Sambi asserted, in plain language, that he will 
not seek to remain in office beyond the end of his term, "I do not 
have the authority to do this job and thus have no interest in 
staying in office beyond my mandate."  The President reiterated the 
GOC position that the constitution -- with four presidents, four 
cabinets, four assemblies -- prevented him from governing 
effectively.  He complained that the island presidents of Moheli and 
Grande Comore, and the National Assembly, have long demanded 
dialogue -- but now that it is time to talk, they refuse.  President 
Sambi said if his "opponents" refuse to participate in preparations 
for the Inter-Comoran Dialogue, he will avail himself of his right 
to hold a referendum on the constitution, "the international 
community supports Comoros' democracy, so I will take the decision 
directly to the people."  (NOTE:  The French Charge (protect) 
confided that the Minister of Institutional Reform (who has been 
conspicuously absent in our many meetings) has been busy drafting a 
new constitution for months.  END NOTE). 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Apart from S/E Madeira's report, the assembled diplomats 
were in listening mode during the short meeting.  The only exception 
was the South African Ambassador, who has previously been outspoken 
against constitutional revision and on this occasion made a veiled 
reference to the consequences in terms of international aid if 
Comoros departs from the AU-agreed process. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The meeting with President Sambi included the Ministers of 
Justice, Defense, and Land Reform.  The international delegation 
included the AU, Arab League, United Nations, United States, France, 
South Africa, and Libya.  The Chinese Ambassador was ill and La 
Francophonie's non-resident representative left last week. 
 
Foreign Minister Jaffar, "AU Is Witness" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6. (SBU) The night before our meeting with President Sambi,  Foreign 
Minister Jaffar was at pains to insist that the AU and international 
community be "witnesses" to the good will and faith of the Union 
Government for making every effort to convene the Inter-Comoran 
Dialogue.  He expressed no surprise that Moheli, Grande Comore and 
the National Assembly were hesitant about convening the Technical 
Preparatory Committee.  FM Jaffar noted the GOC's prerogative to 
hold a referendum (foreshadowing Sambi), but insisted that it was 
not their current intention. 
 
"Opposition" Suspicious and Hesitant 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (SBU) During the week of September 1, S/E Madeira continued to 
shuttle among the Comoros stakeholders, accompanied by international 
community representatives from South Africa, Arab League, United 
Nations, France, and United States.  A sign posted at the tiny 
airport in Moheli not so subtly greeted the delegation: "Welcome to 
Moheli, it's our turn in 2010."  While accepting S/E Madeira's 
demarche on a preparatory committee, the Moheli island president and 
assembled politicians made clear they would just as soon accept the 
status quo, with no talks and no improved governance, to assure 
their turn in the rotation in 2010. Still, as a gesture to the AU, 
they agreed to send two representative to the Moroni technical 
committees.  Our message was easily received in Anjouan, where 
Sambi's candidate won the June island president election. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Grande Comore's island president and the President of the 
National Assembly, openly in an "opposition" bloc with Moheli, 
mounted the most resistance to Madeira's plan.  They requested 
various written guarantees, expressing fear and hesitating to commit 
to talks.  S/E Madeira insisted, "you are to sit down together to 
discuss what it is you need to discuss."  At week's end, neither 
Grande Comore nor the National Assembly had officially agreed to 
 
ANTANANARI 00000606  002 OF 002 
 
 
participate in preparatory talks, claiming to be consulting their 
colleagues before replying to Madeira. 
 
Madeira's Mandate 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (SBU)  S/E Madeira hoped to convene the Technical Preparatory 
Committee September 5, put the affair in the hands of the Comorans, 
declare victory and go home.  However, given the obstacles, he will 
return September 8 to continue negotiations with Grande Comore and 
the National Assembly (Comment:  One hoped that his efforts will be 
enlivened by the new motivation that if he fails, Sambi will move 
forward to hold a referendum.  End Comment).  S/E Madeira's mandate 
from the AU Peace and Security Council, embodied in the several AU 
Ministerial Declarations of 2007, is to get the Comorans to sit down 
for inter-island talks.  He is eager to report to Addis Ababa that 
the process remains on track, with the preparatory committee 
convening to develop a budget and plan for a series of meetings 
leading up to the Inter-Comoran Dialogue in early 2009. 
 
COMMENT: 
- - - - - 
 
¶10. (SBU) President Sambi's explicit statements about not prolonging 
his term and about the referendum are both new; and neither has been 
made public.  When EmbOff suggested September 4 to FM Jaffar that a 
public GOC statement -- promising Moheli would get their turn in 
2010 --  would eliminate the biggest obstacle to dialogue, he 
promised nothing.  The Union Government prefers to have S/E Madeira 
do all of their talking for them.  It would appear the opposition 
bloc is playing nicely into Sambi's hands:  by refusing talks (out 
of fear) they give the President the excuse he wants to hold a 
referendum (what they really fear). 
 
¶11. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED:  Sambi is not very popular at present, 
but he would likely try to improve socioeconomic conditions a bit 
before holding his referendum.  Most notably, a new oil supply 
contract appears to be near completion (SEPTEL).  The referendum's 
prospects would be good, the electorate either going to the polls to 
vote yes or not bothering to vote at all.  Just before our September 
5 meeting, 20 "notables" emerged from Sambi's office, just a 
fraction of the hundreds of village elders with whom the President 
is in regular contact.  The opposition bloc has neither the network 
nor the resources to mount much of a "no" campaign, and the 
Mohelians, the Comorans most concerned about the stakes involved, 
are too few to matter in a national election.  END COMMENT. 
 
MARQUARDT