VZCZCXRO5980
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #2701/01 2621440
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181440Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3554
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 002701 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM JO
SUBJECT: ASSOCIATIONS LAW AMENDMENTS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 2685 
     ¶B. AMMAN 2633 
     ¶C. AMMAN 2359 
     ¶D. AMMAN 2300 
     ¶E. AMMAN 2062 
     ¶F. AMMAN 1465 
     ¶G. AMMAN 2585 
 
AMMAN 00002701  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Civil society's suggested amendments to 
the Law on Associations are ambitious and far-reaching.  Many 
of them touch on sensitive areas which may produce an adverse 
government reaction.  The amendments would largely take the 
power of government oversight away from cabinet ministers, 
entrusting it instead to an independent registrar.  The 
amendments would enshrine the fundamental rights of civil 
society, and require documented and contestable judicial 
decisions prior to any punitive measures against NGOs. 
Funding from any foreign or domestic source would be allowed, 
as long as the money is reported to the registrar and comes 
from a "legitimate" source.  Penalties for non-compliance 
with the law would be cut in half by the amendments.  We do 
not expect the government to endorse all of the amendments, 
but substantial improvements should be in the offing 
regardless.  Below is a point-by-point comparison of the law 
as endorsed by the King on September 17, and the amendments 
offered by civil society.  Our plan for supporting the 
amendments will be offered septel.  End Summary. 
 
Registration 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The law as passed in July created a Registrar of 
Societies charged with issuing official documentation for 
civil society organizations.  The registrar was also given 
the task of pairing NGOs with relevant ministries to oversee 
their affairs.  The law then gives the "relevant minister" 
significant powers to intervene in the internal affairs of 
civil society.  The registrar's office is envisioned as a 
centralized location for paperwork, but it has no powers over 
civil society.  Those powers are all reserved for the 
"relevant minister."  There is little clarity in the law 
about whether currently registered societies would have to 
renew their paperwork to comply with the new system. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Civil society's proposed amendments expand the 
powers of the registrar significantly, ceding most of the 
authorities of the "relevant minister" to that office.  The 
registrar remains a cabinet appointee, but would report to a 
board of directors chaired by the Minister of Social 
Development.  The registrar would have authority to 
investigate and audit NGOs, prescribe punitive measures where 
necessary, oversee state funding, and in general oversee the 
operations of civil society organizations.  The amendments to 
the registration section would also lower the number of 
necessary founders of an NGO to seven, from the current 
eleven envisioned in the July law.  The amendments 
significantly reduce the government's ability to close down 
NGOs, and require a written justification for the dissolution 
of any association, contestable before the High Court of 
Justice.  The amendments specifically grandfather in all 
existing societies in terms of the registration process; they 
would not have to re-file their paperwork. 
 
Freedom of Operation 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The law as passed in July has no section which 
enshrines the freedom and duties of civil society.  While the 
freedom to form societies is mentioned in Article 16 of 
Jordan's constitution, that freedom is caveated by section 
three of that article, which says that "the establishment of 
societies...and the control of their resources shall be 
regulated by law." 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The amendments proposed by civil society suggest a 
series of freedoms that would be guaranteed to NGOs in 
Jordan, including the freedom to meet, freedom of expression, 
and the "right to participation in public affairs."  This 
section would also affirm the fundamental independence of 
civil society, asserting that it "must not be made dependent 
on the approval of any other official quarter." 
 
Funding 
------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The July law required all funding received from 
foreign sources to be approved by the cabinet, and had no 
standards for approval or rejection of such funding.  NGOs 
were required to deposit their funds in Jordanian banks. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The amendments permit funding from any foreign or 
 
AMMAN 00002701  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
domestic source, as long as the funding organization is 
"legitimate and does not violate public order or morals." 
Additionally, the funds must be designated for a specific 
purpose and fiscal year, the designated purpose of the funds 
must not contradict the stated goals of the organization, and 
funds must not be derived from "criminal proceeds."  Civil 
society would have to report the receipt of any funding to 
the registrar within two weeks.  If the funding source is 
deemed to fall under one of the above proscribed categories, 
the registrar must challenge the association in court in 
order to block the receipt or use of funding. 
 
Oversight 
--------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The law as currently written gives the "relevant 
minister" broad powers to dissolve organizations, replace 
their boards of directors, and impose financial penalties. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Civil society's amendments require a judicial 
decision before any society is dissolved or otherwise 
sanctioned.  Lawsuits demanding the closure of an NGO would 
only be brought by the registrar. 
 
Managerial Questions 
-------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The July law allowed the "relevant minister" to 
dissolve societies which are moribund or unable to muster a 
quota in their boards of directors -- a backhanded reference 
to societies rendered impotent by infighting, which is common 
in Jordan. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Civil society's amendments charge the registrar 
with helping to resolve internal conflicts within the boards 
of NGOs. 
 
Government Support 
------------------ 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The July law creates a fund for civil society, 
under the authority of the Minister for Social Development. 
The fund would disburse money allocated from the general 
budget, a special lottery, and private donations. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Civil society's amendments also envision a fund, 
but one that is controlled by the registrar instead of the 
Minister of Social Development. 
 
Penalties 
--------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The current law prescribes harsh fines for failing 
to properly report funding sources and imprisonment for 
defying the cabinet's disapproval of any foreign funding. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Civil society's amendments omit any mention of 
imprisonment and cut in half most of the maximum fines the 
government can impose. 
 
Tax Exemptions 
-------------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU) The current law has no provisions for any tax 
breaks or other incentives for associations.  Note: Minister 
of Social Development Hala Lattouf indicated to us that tax 
breaks for civil society would be included in an omnibus tax 
law set to be introduced in the October session of parliament 
and would be far harder to pass as part of this particular 
law.  End Note. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Civil society's amendments would exempt NGOs from 
any fees or taxes, including sales tax.  Donations to civil 
society would be deducted from the taxable incomes of 
individual donors. 
 
Comment: Likely Compromises 
--------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Several of the above amendments can easily be 
accepted by the government and parliament as common sense 
changes.  The small changes on the topics of managerial 
disputes, government support, and penalties are the most 
likely to be adopted without further debate.  Further 
negotiations are most likely to focus on the questions of 
registration, oversight, and funding.  For the first two, the 
natural compromise between the government's position and that 
of civil society may well be a return to the original 
proposal, which gave authority over civil society to the 
Minister of Social Development.  The last question, that of 
funding, will be the most difficult issue going forward, and 
 
AMMAN 00002701  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
the one that security-conscious officials in the government 
are most likely to portray as a threat to Jordan's stability. 
Beecroft