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S E C R E T TOKYO 002148 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EMBASSY COLOMBO PLEASE PASS TO A/S BOUCHER 
DEPT FOR SCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018 
TAGS: PREL KNNP XD ZK JA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER'S 
VISIT TO TOKYO 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and, to a 
lesser extent, Central Asia are all actively on the Japanese 
radar screen.  We are very glad you were able to reschedule 
your visit to Tokyo to discuss these pressing issues with 
your Japanese counterparts.  On Afghanistan, you will find a 
government that is wrestling with how to do more in order to 
fulfill commitments to the Afghan people and the 
international community to make a ""substantial"" commitment, 
while at the same time fending off political attacks from a 
recently empowered and aggressive opposition party.  On 
India, Japan is also coming to grips with how to support it's 
strongest ally, the United States, and an always close 
friend, India, while remaining true to long-standing 
non-proliferation imperatives.  Foreign Minister Koumura and 
Director General Inomata, who you will meet, will have just 
returned from a three-day visit to New Delhi.  On Pakistan, 
Japan has recently announced an increase in aid in the hopes 
of encouraging the growth of democracy and a more vibrant 
economy.  And in Central Asia, Japanese attempts to counter 
Chinese and Russian inroads, while modest, closely align with 
our efforts to develop southward-looking economies with more 
options for trade and exchange.  Your counterparts from four 
different bureaus are looking forward to sharing their views 
with you and to listening to what you have to tell them about 
U.S. thinking on these critical issues.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------- 
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Many of the issues you will be discussing in Tokyo are 
closely tied to and complicated by a domestic political 
struggle now taking place between the majority Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and the opposition Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ).  Until last summer, the LDP and its coalition 
partner, the New Komeito Party, controlled both the upper and 
lower houses of the Diet.  The opposition was largely ignored 
and whatever initiatives the LDP leadership decided to pursue 
were easily enacted. 
 
¶3. (C) All that changed in July 2007, when the LDP lost its 
majority control of the upper house after mishandling the 
loss of over 50 millin records of individuals' pension 
contributions.  Although the LDP and New Komeito, with a 
two-thirds majority in the lower house, can still enact 
legislation over the disapproval of the upper house (and in 
fact did so to reauthorize Japan's participation in the 
Operation Enduring Freedom Maritime Interdiction Operation), 
doing so is not taken lightly in the Japanese political 
context.  The bottom line is that with its newfound political 
clout, and its desire to bring down the LDP and seize control 
of the government, the DPJ is now mounting serious opposition 
to many LDP initiatives, such as continued support for OEF 
and for the continued deployment of Air Self Defense Force 
assets in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 
¶4. (C) Even for issues that have not yet come up for 
widespread public debate, such as the U.S.-India civil 
nuclear agreement, the LDP and the New Komeito are now very 
shy about forcing things, fearing that DPJ opposition on 
issues such as deployment of forces abroad or weakening the 
NPT regime will resonate with voters in the next lower house 
election.  The Komeito, which is the political wing of a 
pacifist Buddist sect, is particularly opposed to any 
overseas dispatch of Japanese forces.  Since their support is 
key to LDP power, they have an effective veto over Fukuda's 
policies. 
 
¶5. (C) The LDP's declining popularity led Prime Minister 
Fukuda to shuffle his cabinet last week in the hopes of 
strengthening the party's hand for upcoming elections. 
However, the fallout of all of this is that you will find a 
Japanese government whose hands are nearly tied on several 
foreign policy initiatives that are of critical importance to 
us. 
 
----------- 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
 
¶6. (S) It is fair to say that Afghanistan is Issue Number One 
for the recently appointed second cabinet of Prime Minister 
Fukuda.  Under pressure from us and, to a lesser extent, 
other ISAF partners, the Japanese government is in the final 
stages of compiling a package of new financial and personnel 
support measures for Afghanistan.  The new assistance is 
provided in response to a direct request from the President 
to PM Fukuda at the G-8 Summit last month for Japan to expand 
its presence in Afghanistan.  The President told Prime 
Minister Fukuda on July 6 that Japan needed to provide 
""substantial"" assistance to Afghanistan, underscoring that a 
symbolic contribution would not be adequate or welcome.  He 
specifically requested that Japan dispatch two squadrons of 
CH-47 heavy lift helicopters or take leadership of a PRT. 
Citing his weak domestic political base, however, the Prime 
Minister told the President it would be impossible to send a 
major Self-Defense Force (SDF) ground component to 
Afghanistan and that his government would fall if he pushed 
the Afghan aid issue too hard. 
 
¶7. (S) On July 15-16, DASD for Central Asia Bobby Wilkes 
delivered a second option for Japanese support that included 
C-130 airlift support, USD 200 million for 2009/10 Afghan 
elections, a regional hospital network, and USD 20 billion 
over five years to fund the expansion of the Afghan Security 
Forces.  DASD Wilkes emphasized that, taken together, these 
measures would be considered a ""substantial"" package as 
outlined by the President.  The Japanese government now is in 
the final stages of compiling its own package of Afghan 
support programs, which we expect to be provided formally to 
us in the coming weeks.  While Japanese officials say the 
package contains significant financial and civilian personnel 
components, it is unlikely to include a military component or 
substantial participation in a PRT.  It will be important for 
you to re-enforce the President's and DASD Wilkes message on 
the pressing need for a substantial contribution to 
Afghanistan. Japanese will seize on any ambiguity on our part 
to avoid making hard decisions on Afghan aid. 
 
¶8. (S) Your counterparts will most likely seek to remind you 
that Japan is already the second largest donor to 
Afghanistan, but this fails to take into consideration the 
operating costs of countries which are deploying military 
forces there, not to mention the casualties they are 
suffering.  When these costs are calculated, Japan slips way 
down the list.  One other disappointment has been the very 
slow progress on the Japanese portion of the ring road. 
We've offered to take over construction of their segment 
while giving them the credit for its eventual completion, but 
they are hesitant to accept this offer.  You should mention 
that we look forward to the prompt completion of the project, 
which we believe will enhance security, enable critically 
needed economic growth, and bolster the authority of the 
central government. 
 
------ 
INDIA 
----- 
 
¶9. (C)  Japan has long-standing and friendly ties with India. 
 Former Prime Minister Abe launched a major push to 
strengthen the relationship, which was elevated to the level 
of a ""joint strategic and global partnership"" in 2006, and 
was keen to include India in a ""quad"" relationship with us 
and Australia.  However, under Prime Minister Fukuda, 
Japan-India relations, while still viewed as extremely 
important, have not been pushed quite so hard.  Bilateral 
trade is expanding, but the speed and scope of this expansion 
is limited and remains very small in comparison to India's 
commercial relationship with China, always a factor that the 
Japanese look to.  Prime Minister Fukuda held a brief 
bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Singh last month on the 
sidelines of the G-8 Summit, and Singh is said to be set to 
visit Tokyo later this year.  Foreign Minister Koumura is 
currently visiting New Delhi, where he plans meetings with 
Finance Minister Chidambaram, Minister of Commerce and 
Industry Nath, Minister of Defense Antony, and Minster of 
External Affairs Mukherjee. 
 
¶10. (C) On the subject of the U.S.-India civil nuclear 
agreement, Japan has been cautious and has tried to maintain 
a low profile.  While not wishing to antagonize or oppose its 
most important partner -- us -- or a highly regarded friend 
-- India -- Japan's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation 
makes it extremely wary of approving an agreement that many 
view as weakening the NPT regime.  Again, this is another 
issue that, if seized upon by the opposition or public, could 
create problems for the LDP, particularly with its 
pacifist-oriented partner, the New Komeito.  It is unlikely 
Japan will take any action on its own that would impede 
progress on this agreement, but you should take steps to 
assure Japan concerning the agreement and attempt to 
strengthen, if not their support, then at least their 
""non-opposition."" 
 
-------- 
PAKISTAN 
-------- 
 
¶11. (C) Foreign Minister Koumura most recently visited 
Pakistan on May 2-4, where he announced an increase in 
Japanese yen loan aid to approximately USD 480 million, more 
than double the amount of the previous year.  Japan believes 
the stability and development of Pakistan is directly linked 
to the peace and stability of the Asian region and of the 
international community as a whole, and that fighting 
terrorism, consolidating democracy and achieving sustainable 
economic growth are more important that ever in Pakistan. 
Japan has also been working with the United States to provide 
assistance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but 
progress on Japanese progress has been very slow due to 
security concerns.  Your Japanese counterparts will be very 
interested in where you see Pakistan heading. 
 
------------ 
CENTRAL ASIA 
------------ 
 
¶12. (C) Japan's main interests in Central Asia revolve around 
gaining access to energy resources -- uranium as well as oil 
-- and to competing with China and Russia.  Although DAS 
Feigenbaum has explained to the Japanese that we do not view 
the region through the lens of the ""great game,"" it seems 
that the Japanese still do.  Accordingly, Japan's policies in 
the region are designed to a large extent to avoid forfeiting 
all influence to Russia and China.  Japan's main regional 
mechanism is the ""Central Asia plus Japan"" grouping, which 
has developed an action plan to promote intraregional 
cooperation among the countries of Central Asia.  The third 
senior officials meeting was held last December, and Japan 
was represented at the Deputy Director General level.  Like 
India, Japan's approach to the region has seemingly receded 
from the public view since Prime Minister Fukuda took office. 
 Former Foreign Minister Aso's ""Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity"" focused heavily on providing assistance to the 
developing democracies of the Central Asia.  We have been 
trying, with limited success, to involve Japan in energy 
transmission projects in which hydropower from Central Asian 
countries is moved south to help power the growing economies 
in India and Pakistan, as well as in Afghanistan.  Your visit 
will present an excellent opportunity to discuss with 
counterparts our shared interests in the region and to 
explore ways in which we may work more closely together to 
realize them. 
 
SCHIEFFER