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UNCLAS STATE 091332 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CA EUN FR GM IT JA PTER RS TBIO UK
SUBJECT: AFTER-ACTION REPORT FOR DEMETER'S RESILIENCE, THE 
G8 FOOD DEFENSE EXERCISE 
 
REF: A. STATE 14591 
     ¶B. STATE 39260 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary: Following the recommendations of the G8 
Bioterrorism Experts (BTEX) Group in 2005, a series of G8 
workshops dealing with decontamination, food defense and 
public health/law enforcement cooperation was organized. 
"Demeter,s Resilience" was the second G8 food defense event 
and was held May 27-29, 2008 at the U.S. National Center for 
Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) in Minneapolis, Minnesota 
(reftels).  The exercise was designed to stimulate national 
and international cooperation and communication in 
identifying, responding to and recovering from a terrorist 
attack on the food supply.  The NCPFD, a DHS Center of 
Excellence, designed the exercise scenario and facilitated 
the exercise.  Exercise participation was lively and robust, 
although not all G8 nations attended.  The After-action 
Report (para 4) contains further details on the exercise 
format, scenario, emerging themes and key recommendations. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) U.S. Delegation: The U.S. delegation consisted of 
Lindsey Hillesheim (State), John Guzewich (FDA), Perfecto 
Santiago (USDA), Robert Hooks (DHS), and Bill Zinnikas (FBI). 
 The U.S. also sent several additional observers from FDA, 
USDA, DHS, FBI, and OSTP. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Other Delegations: 
- The Government of Germany,s (GOG) delegation came 
well-prepared for the exercise with answers in hand for many 
of the discussion questions.  Their delegation was composed 
of representatives from the Federal Foreign Office, the 
Federal Institute for Risk Assessment, and the Federal 
Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection. 
Since Germany is organized as a federal system like the U.S., 
much of the detection and response tasks fall to the Landers 
(similar to states).  Thus GOG emphasized the importance of 
robust local public health and food safety systems and the 
need to coordinate these systems across a federal 
organization. 
- In addition to several observers, the Government of 
Canada,s (GOC) official delegation was robust and balanced 
including representatives from the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade Canada, Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 
Health Canada, and the Department of Public Safety.  The GOC 
food defense response system is similar to the U.S. system, 
thus providing significant opportunities to share best 
practices. 
- Her Majesty,s Government,s (HMG) delegation, while 
missing a foreign affairs representative, was very active 
during the exercise and included officials from the Health 
Protection Agency, Food Standards Agency, and the Centre for 
the National Protection of Infrastructure.  Participants from 
the G8 other delegations  found many of the lessons 
identified by HMG as a result of the Sudan Red recall in 2005 
to be particularly useful, including the use of "scoping 
meetings" that include experts from industry to map out how 
an ingredient was distributed. 
           - The Government of Japan (GOJ) sent only one 
person from the Cabinet Office,s Consumer Safety Division. 
This small delegation was surprising given that GOJ holds the 
G8 presidency and gave approval for the exercise to be held 
and hosted by the USG. 
-  The Government of France (GOF) sent technical experts from 
the Ministries of Health, and of Agriculture and Fishery. 
Due to the lack of foreign affairs and law enforcement 
officials, a complete picture of GOF,s response to a 
terrorist attack on the food supply is not possible. 
- The Governments of the Russian Federation and Italy did not 
send delegations. 
- The European Commission and the World Health Organization 
both sent observers to the exercise. 
 
¶4.  (U) The following "After-action Report for Demeter,s 
Resilience" includes input and comments from the countries 
present at the exercise.  A formatted version of the 
After-action Report has already been shared with participants 
and G8 BTEX points of contact. 
 
Begin text of After-action Report. 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Demeter,s Resilience was a three-day exercise on food supply 
protection for the G8 nations with fifty participants from 
Japan, Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and United 
States.  The exercise aimed to strengthen coordination, 
cooperation, and communication between G8 nations in the 
event of an intentional attack on the food supply.  In 
addition, the World Health Organization and the European 
Commission along with a private industry representative 
participated in the exercise.  The exercise was hosted by The 
National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) at 
the University of Minnesota. 
 
The exercise provided nations an opportunity to discuss roles 
and responsibilities of various stakeholders in event of a 
terrorist attack, and enhance strategies for working together 
to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack on the food 
supply.  In addition, Country representatives shared insights 
on preparedness planning and lessons learned from previous 
experiences. 
 
Key recommendations resulting from this exercise include: 
¶1. Establish and maintain key functional contacts in areas 
relevant to food defense. 
¶2. Establish a mechanism or leverage an existing one to 
develop complementary risk communication messages during a 
widespread outbreak. 
¶3. Foster collaboration between countries to address gaps in 
knowledge and capabilities in food-related surveillance, 
diagnostics, decontamination procedures, and risk assessments 
of threat agents. 
¶4. Foster and develop relationships among stakeholders within 
and between countries as these informal networks can enhance 
the communications between nations and between sectors 
relevant to food defense, as well as strengthen the 
collective capacity of G8 nations to anticipate, prevent, 
respond to, and recover from intentional contamination of the 
food supply. 
 
EXERCISE DESIGN AND FORMAT 
 
In 2004 and 2005, G8 leaders committed to defending against 
bioterrorism by; strengthening national and international 
biosurveillance capabilities, increasing protection of the 
global food supply, and improving bioterrorism investigation, 
response and mitigation capabilities.  In 2005 the G8 
Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX) agreed on a work plan that 
included the development of a food defense tabletop exercise. 
 
Demeter,s Resilience served to initiate a dialogue between 
G8 member nations on communication mechanisms during an 
intentional bioterrorist attack upon the G8 food supply.  The 
exercise provided an opportunity for G8 nations to strengthen 
lines of communication, which may enhance prevention, 
mitigation and recovery efforts on food system events.  The 
simulated attack was based around a hypothetical food product 
that is widely exported to and/or imported from all G8 
nations. 
 
Demeter,s Resilience was intended to accomplish the 
following primary objectives: 
-- Examine food defense communication and coordination 
procedures within and among G8 countries in response to a 
terrorist attack on the food supply. 
-- Discuss the roles and responsibilities of the various 
ministries, organizations, and sectors in responding to a 
terrorist threat or attack on the food supply (e.g. law 
enforcement, foreign affairs, food/agriculture/public health 
agencies, and the private sector). 
-- Through facilitated discussion and simulation, examine G8 
countries, responses to a bioterrorism incident targeted at 
the food supply system. 
 
Demeter,s Resilience took place on May 27-29, 2008, and was 
hosted by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense 
(NCFPD) at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota.  Established in 2003 and led by the University of 
Minnesota, the NCFPD is a Department of Homeland Security 
Center of Excellence.  The Center is a consortium of 
academic, public sector, and private sector partners tasked 
with developing technologies and strategies to prevent, 
respond, and recover from intentional contamination of the 
food system in order to mitigate the public health and 
economic impact of the event. 
 
In addition to the time participants spent engaged in the 
exercise itself, an informal evening reception and lunches 
allowed participants to interact outside of the structured 
exercise.  These informal events strengthened the personal 
relationships and communication networks of exercise 
participants.   Besides the interactions among participants 
physically present at the exercise, World Health Organization 
(WHO) representatives participated via a web link from the 
WHO,s global Strategic Health Operations Center (SHOC) in 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
To familiarize participants with other countries, response 
plans and capabilities, each country provided an overview of 
how response to food safety and/or food defense events was 
organized in their respective country. 
 
Demeter,s Resilience employed a fictitious scenario and 
scenario elements or information--including descriptions, 
timelines, and instructions--were provided by the exercise 
facilitators to stimulate participant activity. The scenario 
ensured necessary events occurred so that all objectives were 
met. The exercise was divided into four distinct phases 
representing significant periods in a food defense event: 
notification, identification, investigation, and recovery - 
followed by an interactive discussion session to capture key 
features, lessons learned, and identify opportunities for 
further work. Each phase began with an overview of key events 
and communications occurring within the phase. Following the 
phase overview and facilitator instructions, participants 
reviewed the situation and engaged in group discussions 
within and between G8 countries regarding an appropriate 
response. 
 
The exercise was intended to be a safe, open, and stress-free 
environment to allow all participants to openly share their 
perspectives.  Varying viewpoints were encouraged, as there 
are no international standards for handling a terrorist 
attack on the food supply.  Participants were encouraged to 
focus on the communication process, and identify 
opportunities to strengthen communication within and between 
governments. Participants were encouraged to move among 
groups and interact with the experts to ensure thorough, 
thought-provoking discussion and problem resolution. 
 
Exercise participants representing various government 
agencies from six of the eight G8 countries were present. 
Government agencies represented included those in the fields 
of law enforcement, food safety, public health, agriculture 
and foreign affairs.  The World Health Organization and the 
European Commission also had representatives present at the 
exercise.  A representative from industry was also present to 
answer questions about their experiences in responding to 
incidents of contamination occurring in the food supply. 
 
SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
 
An unspecified poultry processing facility in the United 
States is the source of a breaded chicken product designed 
primarily for restaurant distribution both in the United 
States and for export.  The contaminated poultry product is 
shipped from the United States to all G8 member countries 
through various modes of transport.  The product is 
contaminated during production via adulteration of the 
breading mix, resulting in 24 breading batches contaminated 
in a single day.  The contaminant is relative heat stable, 
with little or no organoleptic impact on the finished product 
(i.e. not altering the taste, texture or smell).  Clinical 
presentation of acute gastroenteritis, often accompanied by 
vomiting and diarrhea, occurs after a one day latency period. 
 Severely affected patients developmultiple organ failure 
five days after apparent initial recovery. 
 
Phase one consisted of public health identification and 
notification of the initial illness.  Because shipment times 
and product consumption varied over different countries, 
various numbers of illnesses were reported to the relevant 
agencies at different times.  This phase focused on illness 
reporting within country, and how this information would be 
both handled within the country and relayed internationally. 
The phase ended with a fictional video news clip shown to the 
entire group from "Global News Network" announcing unusual 
and widespread illnesses occurring around the globe. 
 
Phase two consisted of the initial epidemiological 
investigation suggesting a single common source for many of 
those affected during the outbreak.  Some individuals, who 
had previously gone to hospitals with vomiting and diarrhea, 
returned later with multiple organ failure.  This led to a 
large number of hospitalizations, with several patients 
dying. 
 
Phase three began with a video news clip from "World News" in 
which a terrorist organization claimed responsibility for the 
outbreak.  During this phase the specific product responsible 
and the lot and shipment information were also confirmed. 
 
Phase four focused on recovery.  Contaminated product lots 
were retrieved, and decontamination protocols were issued. 
The rate of new illnesses rapidly declined, while new threats 
to the food supply were received. 
 
EMERGING THEMES 
 
Food safety authorities and responsibilities are distributed 
in different ways across countries and investigations into a 
food borne illness outbreak vary by agency, country and 
event.  When an event is recognized as a food safety problem, 
the roles of various agencies involved are fairly well 
defined; however in intentional contamination (e.g. a food 
defense problem), the triggers which initiate a concurrent 
criminal investigation are more difficult to determine. 
 
Recognition of a food borne disease outbreak is driven by the 
characteristics of the illness, rather than actual numbers of 
ill individuals.  Some patterns considered were geography, 
population demographics, as well as exposure information. 
The event characteristics often determine which agencies are 
involved in the investigation, and how soon other agencies 
would be contacted.  While international reporting may vary 
due to legal constraints and uncertainty during an outbreak, 
the effectiveness of international communication channels are 
greatest when utilized as soon as possible after 
identification of an outbreak. 
 
During the course of a food borne disease outbreak there are 
often multiple levels of communication underway.  These often 
include government communications to their affected or 
at-risk populations, within country communications between 
agencies or ministries, bilateral ministerial communications 
between countries, ad hoc communications between scientists, 
and perhaps communication with the media.  Due to the 
multiple levels of communication which occur, it is often 
difficult to achieve consistent risk communication messages. 
In addition, multiple communication messages may be needed to 
reach different cultures or audiences. 
 
On a global scale, it is challenging to develop a common case 
definition.  Several factors contribute to this challenge 
including country differences in data collection and one 
country,s ability, or inability, to utilize another 
country,s investigative data.  There is also variability in 
the degree to which countries would involve the private 
sector and civil organizations at different stages in a 
response. 
 
During an intentional contamination event, the health and 
safety of the public remain the priority of all agencies 
involved.  A claim or suspicion of terrorism shifts 
leadership of the overall investigation to law enforcement, 
but not at the expense of the public health investigation. 
Multiple agencies continue to provide active support for the 
investigation.  Uncertainty as to the route of contamination, 
the contaminating agent, and the scale of the event all 
contribute to the challenge of managing the response to a 
widespread food contamination event.  Law enforcement, food 
safety, and public health working together on a major food 
defense issue is a relatively new paradigm, and, as such, 
there is a recognized need for increasing the knowledge of 
public health, food safety, and law enforcement response 
protocols within each country and between countries. 
 
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Establish and maintain key functional contacts in areas 
relevant to food defense.  A system for up to date 
information for key contacts and for promoting a network 
among key individuals/agencies is needed both within 
countries and across the G8 to ensure a timely and 
coordinated response to a food contamination event.  Existing 
global forums should be utilized and expanded to discuss and 
share lessons identified after an international bioterrorism 
attack on the food supply. 
 
Establish a mechanism, or leverage an existing one, to 
develop complementary risk communication messages during a 
widespread outbreak.  Current global communication channels 
(e.g. WHO INFOSAN and IHR notification) can be strengthened 
to facilitate multi-national communication in the event of a 
terrorist attack on the food supply. The sharing of 
information needs to be fostered, and processes created to 
forewarn countries of upcoming public announcements, as well 
as exchange public messages and risk communication materials. 
 
 
Foster collaboration between countries to address gaps in 
knowledge and capabilities in food-related surveillance, 
diagnostics, decontamination procedures, and risk assessments 
of threat agents.  A process to facilitate collaboration 
among relevant researchers in multiple countries to address 
these gaps should be developed. 
 
Foster and develop relationships among stakeholders within 
and between countries as these informal networks can enhance 
the communications between nations and between sectors 
relevant to food defense, as well as strengthen the 
collective capacity of G8 nations to anticipate, prevent, 
respond to, and recover from intentional contamination of the 
food supply.  Particular attention should be given to 
developing relationships among public health, food safety, 
and law enforcement agencies within countries and to 
understanding the roles, responsibilities, and statutory 
authorities of the various agencies required in responding to 
an intentional contamination of the food supply. Tabletop 
exercises could continue to be integrated to build capacity 
and expand the personal networks of individuals responding to 
during a bioterrorism event. Developing memoranda of 
understanding and agreements between agencies ahead of time 
will avoid confusion during an actual event.  In addition to 
public health, food safety, and law enforcement agencies, 
non-traditional partners, such as private industry 
representatives, consumer organizations, environmental 
agencies and other stakeholders, should also be considered 
for inclusion in training exercises. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Demeter,s Resilience increased participants, awareness of 
G8 member nation,s food safety authorities and protocols in 
G8 member nations for responding to incidents of intentional 
contamination of the food supply.  Exercise discussions 
recognized the need for increased communication and 
information sharing on an international level during a 
bioterrorism attack on the food supply.  The discussions also 
reinforced the need for international communication channels 
to be utilized early during an emerging event. 
 
End text of After-action Report. 
 
¶5.  (U)  Additional Information: Please contact OES/IHB,s 
Lindsey Hillesheim (HillesheimLN@state.gov, 202-647-6922) for 
additional information on this event, including the 
participant list and a formatted version of the report. 
Other inquiries related to G8 BTEX activities should be 
directed to ISN/CTR,s Kendra Chittenden 
(ChittendenKA@state.gov, 202-647-6294). 
RICE