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DE RUEHC #4143 2182219
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 052217Z AUG 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 084143 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UNSC UNMIK KPKO PREL YI KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO -- GUIDANCE FOR AUGUST 6 UNSC CONSULTATIONS 
 
¶1.  The Department requests that USUN draw from the following 
points in delivering its statement during the August 6 UNSC 
consultations on the Secretariat's investigation into the 
events of March 17 in Mitrovica. 
 
¶2. Begin Points: 
 
Mr. President: 
 
I thank Assistant Secretary General Mullet for appearing 
before the Council today. 
 
Let me begin by restating my government's profound regret for 
the loss of life of the Ukrainian peacekeeper and the many 
injuries that were suffered by brave UN peacekeeping 
personnel as a result of the violent and illegal attacks on 
UN forces in Mitrovica on March 17. 
 
We have serious concerns about the report which Ambassador 
Mullet has provided us today.  From his briefing it appears 
that the conclusions of the investigation are seriously 
flawed.  Moreover, we find it highly irregular, if not 
inappropriate, to be discussing the report of an 
investigation which none of the Council members has seen. 
The utility of our discussion today is greatly diminished 
because of the second-hand nature of the information before 
us. 
 
Nevertheless, I must clearly state that we strongly disagree 
with the investigation's reported judgments that are critical 
of the UNMIK leadership's decision-making and planning 
regarding the operation to retake control of the Mitrovica 
courthouse.  The UNMIK authorities are not present to account 
for themselves.  If they were the Council would hear a very 
different and more credible version of events. 
 
Let me briefly review the events leading up to the attacks on 
UNMIK at the Mitrovica courthouse.  Prior to March 17, 
Northern Kosovo saw a steady increase in political tension 
and violence.  On February 19, organized Kosovo Serb gangs 
torched UN customs and border checkpoints.  The challenges 
facing UNMIK's leaders at that time were clear and mounting. 
We are left to wonder how the report treats the pattern of 
threatening and violent behavior in Northern Kosovo and in 
Mitrovica specifically during the period prior to March 17. 
 
Starting on February 18, protesters gathered at the UN 
courthouse in Mitrovica for daily demonstrations. 
 
-- On March 11 they forced their way into the courtyard and 
were turned away. 
 
-- On March 12 they padlocked the courthouse doors. 
 
-- On March 14, they forced their way into and occupied the 
courthouse. 
 
In the days following, UNMIK pursued a negotiated solution. 
It achieved partial success with the departure of a large 
number of protesters.  But it also received credible reports 
that Serb hardliners were planning further provocations and 
violence and that Serbia had facilitated the arrival of 
additional numbers of protesters prepared to use violence 
against UNMIK personnel.  Again, we are left to wonder if the 
investigation addressed these credible reports. 
 
On March 17 UNMIK sought to peacefully but finally restore 
order at the UN courthouse. Is it the contention of the 
investigators that UNMIK was acting outside of its mandate in 
seeking to resolve the impasse at the Courthouse?  Should 
UNMIK have allowed the violence to continue and escalate? 
 
 
UNMIK subsequently arrested the remaining demonstrators. 
Upon UNMIK's departure from the courthouse, Kosovo Serbs 
attacked them with lethal force.  They were attacked with 
AK-47s and pistols. Approximately 30 fragmentation hand 
grenades were thrown at them. They were firebombed repeatedly 
with Molotov cocktails.  This was not an emotional response 
from an unruly mob, but rather a carefully planned and 
orchestrated attack.  How can it be, we wonder, that the 
investigators apparently concluded that this premeditated 
violence is the responsibility of UNMIK? 
 
The events outlined here were recorded in a series of 
videotapes taken by KFOR.  These videos do not lie:  they 
clearly show a concerted, deliberate, and prepared attack on 
international forces. Did DPKO review this information and 
thoroughly review it with military and security analysts 
prior to issuing its report? 
 
These are not academic questions.  The events in Mitrovica 
continue to have critical implications for the situation in 
Kosovo.  Illegal Serb authorities continue to flout UNSCR 
1244, intimidate the people of that region and threaten 
violence.  Based on what we have heard thus far, this report, 
should it ever be released, will be an inspiration to 
continue this deeply unhelpful conduct. 
 
We have been through this before.  If the International 
Community fails to respond to violence and intimidation, we 
are doomed to repeat the tragic mistakes that have afflicted 
other peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, including 
UNPROFOR. 
 
Let me stress that the United States did not oppose the 
investigation undertaken by Ssenkandi.  Without access to his 
report, however, we cannot accept its lessons learned.  Most 
importantly, we oppose any conclusions drawn in this 
investigation that would shift responsibility for the tragic 
events of March 17 from the violent criminals who organized 
and instigated the violence, to the brave forces of UNMIK and 
KFOR, who conducted themselves in a professional manner, even 
when under unprovoked attack.  We also call on Council 
members to join us in offering full support to the 
international authorities in Kosovo to vigorously resist any 
further illegal efforts to challenge Kosovo's peace and 
security. 
 
Mr. President, we would like to know what the Secretariat 
plans to do with this report.  If this document is going to 
have any currency at all in guiding policy or procedure 
within UNMIK or any other peacekeeping mission, my government 
will press for a full and intensive review and seek to 
correct what appear to be significant omissions and failures 
in analysis. 
RICE