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Viewing cable 08SANTIAGO735, CHILE'S MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS: CENTER-LEFT PARTY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SANTIAGO735 2008-08-12 14:41 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Santiago
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSG #0735/01 2251441
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121441Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3579
UNCLAS SANTIAGO 000735 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV CI
SUBJECT: CHILE'S MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS:  CENTER-LEFT PARTY 
FOR DEMOCRACY (PPD) TO FLEX ITS MUSCLE 
 
REF: SANTIAGO 581 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  Pepe Auth, President of the center-left 
Party for Democracy (PPD), recently told the Ambassador that 
the PPD's growing strength and an outdated formula for 
dividing city council seats among Concertacion candidates led 
his party to join with the Social Radicals (PRSD) in 
presenting a separate slate of city council candidates for 
October's municipal elections, splitting the governing 
Concertacion into two separate lists.  Auth predicted 
Concertacion would do reasonably well in the municipal 
elections, but could lose a few seats to the center-right 
Alianza.  Looking to presidential elections in 2009, 
Chileans' eagerness for a more authoritative leader explains 
the popularity of opposition politician Sebastian Pinera. 
Concertacion will coalesce behind a single candidate well in 
advance of the December 2009 vote.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) The Ambassador, accompanied by E/Pol Counselor and 
Poloff, met with Auth August 6 as part of an on-going effort 
to reach out to all major political parties in advance of the 
October 2008 municipal elections.  Auth was accompanied by 
Ricardo Lagos Weber, PPD Vice President for International 
Affairs and son of former President Ricardo Lagos Escobar. 
 
Growing PPD Strength Behind Separate Candidate Lists 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3.  (SBU) The PPD's decision to run its own list of city 
council candidates for the upcoming municipal elections was 
rooted in a desire to utilize its growing number of members 
interested in running for office; dissatisfaction with the 
way seats are divided among Concertacion members; and a 
belief that progressives could run two slates without hurting 
center-left parties.  In recent years, PPD and the Socialists 
have been gaining strength at the expense of the Christian 
Democrats, which were the original backbone of the 
Concertacion coalition, Auth explained.  Thus, the PPD 
believes the standard formula for distributing Concertacion 
candidates on, for example, a six member city council 
ballot--three Christian Democrats, one PPD, one Socialist, 
and one Social Radical--is now out of step with current 
levels of partisan support.  In addition, the PPD now has a 
larger base of potential candidates for political office than 
in the past, and would like to be able to maximize the number 
competing for political office in the October 2008 municipal 
elections. 
 
4.  (SBU) Lagos Weber asserted that the PPD's decision to run 
a separate list of candidates for upcoming municipal 
elections was "not as foolish as some of our friends say." 
Lagos and Auth maintain that two lists of center-left city 
council candidates (one put forward by PPD and the Social 
Radicals, the other by the Socialists and Christian 
Democrats) can compete with each other for support from 
progressive voters without advantaging the center-right 
Alianza coalition.  However, when it comes to mayoral races, 
where there is only one winner, putting forward two 
Concertacion candidates does threaten to split the 
progressive vote to the advantage of Alianza, Auth noted. 
Thus, PPD will join with other Concertacion parties in 
presenting a single mayoral candidate for each municipality. 
(Note:  Recent press reports quote Auth as saying that 
running two Concertacion lists for the 2009 parliamentary 
election, which operates under a binomial electoral system, 
would be "suicide" and that the PPD will cooperate with other 
Concertacion members in developing one slate of candidates. 
End Note.) 
 
Municipal Elections:  Auth Predicts Limited Success for 
Progressives 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
5.  (SBU) Auth predicted that Concertacion will do reasonably 
well in the municipal elections, but may lose seats and will 
not match its better-than-expected 2004 municipal election 
performance.  (Note:  In 2004, polls showed Concertacion and 
Alianza running neck and neck in mayoral races, and some 
observers predicted that Alianza would win a majority of 
mayoral posts for the first time.  Instead, Concertacion and 
Alianza both lost some seats to popular candidates who 
decided to run independent campaigns.  Nonetheless, 
Concertacion remained a substantial six points ahead of 
Alianza, to nearly everyone's surprise.  End Note.)  While 
widespread frustration with Transantiago and what Auth 
described as popular belief that the right will make a very 
strong showing in the municipal elections might suggest 
otherwise, the PPD leader insisted that Concertacion will be 
able to hold its own.  Auth noted that metropolitan Santiago 
residents hold local authorities--both Concertacion and 
Alianza--responsible for the Transantiago debacle because it 
is seen as a municipal issue.  Thus, the deeply unpopular 
 
reform is unlikely to have a major partisan impact on 
municipal elections. 
 
6.  (SBU) At the same time, succeeding in electoral politics 
is largely a matter of managing expectations, Auth observed, 
and the right is playing this game well by saying that they 
expect only to maintain their city council and mayoral seats. 
 Thus, if they wind up with a net gain in municipal 
positions, a real possibility in Auth's assessment, they will 
be seen as triumphing over Concertacion and may be able to 
put a better spin on their results.  However, Auth maintained 
that, in real terms, the more critical issue is not the 
absolute number of mayoral races won by each coalition but 
whether or not the right will be able to maintain control of 
key Santiago-area municipalities, like the City of Santiago, 
as well as lower middle class neighborhoods such as La 
Florida and Recoleta. 
 
Presidential Race:  Chileans Want Political Cooperation, 
Authoritative Leaders 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Turning to Chile's presidential elections in 2009, 
Auth noted Alianza has a real challenge in providing a 
constructive alternative to Concertacion initiatives without 
seeming obstructionist.  Chilean voters do not like conflict, 
he opined, and so merely opposing Bachelet's proposals would 
backfire.  At the same time, Auth stated that the 
Transantiago controversy has had a real impact on Bachelet's 
popularity.  Whereas other government policy changes affect 
people at specific times--e.g. at retirement, upon admission 
to a hospital, etc.--many voters are reminded afresh each day 
of Santiago's public transportation woes as they struggle to 
get to work.  This explains why Bachelet is regarded more 
favorably by rural Chileans (48% approval rating according to 
a recent poll) than by Santiago residents (35% approval 
rating). 
 
8.  (SBU) Auth also predicted the current atmosphere of 
political uncertainty will lead Chileans to choose 
presidential candidates who are authoritative and decisive, 
in contrast to Bachelet's consultative leadership style. 
This rationale explains why opposition presidential contender 
Sebastian Pinera is doing well in polls and suggests that 
former president Eduardo Frei is likely to be the Christian 
Democrats' strongest choice, the PPD leader said.  Lagos 
Weber added that Concertacion might also loosen the purse 
strings--a bring home the bacon strategy--but only if forced 
to do so by rightist populist rhetoric. 
 
9.  (SBU) While the field of potential Concertacion 
presidential contenders is quite open at the moment, Auth 
said he expected the center-left coalition to coalesce around 
a single candidate.  Poll results are likely to be decisive 
in determining who Concertacion's candidate will be, the PPD 
head asserted, reminding Emboffs of presidential candidate 
Soledad Alvear's decision in 2005 to drop out of the 
presidential race when Bachelet gained a substantial lead in 
public surveys. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Auth is known for his political insight, having 
accurately predicted in both 1999 and 2005 that the 
presidential contests would end in run-off elections.  He now 
seems to have applied the same keen analysis to strategizing 
the best way for his party to gain mayoral seats and greater 
political prominence without advantaging Alianza or overly 
alienating his Concertacion allies.  Auth's observation that 
Chileans are yearning for a strong president is consistent 
both with common criticisms of Bachelet and popular 
sentiments toward her potential successors.  Lagos Weber's 
observations regarding doing whatever it takes to 
win--including increasing public spending--may also prove an 
ace in the hole.  End Comment. 
SIMONS