VZCZCXRO2837
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0684/01 2310957
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 180957Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3220
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1666
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2298

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PHNOM PENH 000684 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP AND DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2018 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV CB
SUBJECT: UNSRSG FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA: CAMBODIANS 
FRUSTRATED BUT "WINDOW STILL OPEN" 
 
REF: A. PHNOM PENH 444 
     ¶B. 07 PHNOM PENH 1514 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Janet Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  An upcoming U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC) 
vote on whether to extend the mandate of the UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for human rights in 
Cambodian (SRSG) prompted the recent visit of Japanese MFA 
officials from Tokyo and Geneva with the delegation reporting 
that their attempts to discuss an extended Special Procedure 
mandate failed.  During August 14 discussions, RGC Human 
Rights Committee Director General Om Yientieng was said to 
have been hung up on his dislike for current SRSG Yash Ghai, 
whom Cambodian government officials have criticized for being 
too harsh and inaccurate in his assessments of human rights 
in Cambodia (Refs A and B).  Cambodian MFA Secretary of State 
Ouch Borith also expressed an aversion to Yash Ghai but the 
Japanese delegation reported that with Ouch Borith it seemed 
that the "window is still open" for a continued Cambodia 
country mandate.  Japanese MFA Geneva-based Counselor Osamu 
Yamanaka indicated that Japan would be supportive of changing 
the mandate to a Special Rapporteur role explaining that this 
change would be in line with the HRC's general movement 
toward standardizing country-specific mandates; would help 
the Cambodians make a break with the mind-set of past bad 
relations with SRSGs; and would set the stage for Cambodia to 
have some input in the choosing of the individual to fulfill 
the role thereby giving the Cambodian government some 
ownership of the process and outcome.  Japan will also 
support the establishment of milestones that would determine 
the end point of a Cambodia country-specific mandate in order 
to give the RGC a sense that there is "a light at the end of 
the tunnel."  Post believes the current human rights 
situation in Cambodia necessitates a continued 
country-specific mandate, and that a Special Rapporteur role 
and a new person to fill it may be the fresh start needed for 
a constructive mandate.  However, the benchmarks that the 
Japanese propose need to be reviewed to determine whether 
they would address the most serious Cambodia human rights 
concerns.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) During an August 15 meeting with Emboffs, Japanese 
MFA Director of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 
Division Mitsuko Shino and Geneva-based Counselor Osamu 
Yamanaka reported that they held extensive meetings with 
Cambodian MFA Secretary of State Ouch Borith and Human Rights 
Committee Director General Om Yientieng discussing the 
September 2008 U.N. HRC vote on whether to extend the SRSG 
mandate for Cambodia.  Both Cambodian government officials 
expressed to the Japanese delegation their disdain for the 
current SRSG Yash Ghai who has been publicly criticized by 
Prime Minister Hun Sen and other Cambodian government 
officials for being too harsh and inaccurate in his reporting 
on the Cambodian human rights situation.  Shino recounted Om 
Yientieng's emotional and frustrated fixation on SRSG Yash 
Ghai when the specific topic of the future of the SRSG 
mandate was broached and said that, as a result, the 
conversation about the RGC's official position on the mandate 
did not go further.  However, Shino said she believes that 
the Cambodians have a sense of resignation about the SRSG 
mandate, to the point that she believes that the Cambodians 
may not do much to oppose it.  In particular, Shino said she 
felt that Ouch Borith was leaving the window open for the 
extension of the mandate though he did not expressly state 
this. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Director Mitsuko Shino told Emboffs that the RGC 
officials stated Cambodia is not acknowledged enough for its 
human rights progress, especially in light of its standing as 
a young democracy.  They said they believe Cambodia is doing 
the best that it can, and are frustrated that too much is 
asked of Cambodia.  Yamanaka said that Ouch Borith talked 
about examples of advancement such as the RGC's willingness 
to discuss corruption issues and the progress of the Khmer 
Rouge Tribunal (KRT).  Yamanaka said that the RGC was willing 
to take the Japanese delegation on a visit to an area of one 
of the more contested land cases, and that Ouch Borith was 
enthusiastic about Cambodian police taking up the FBI's offer 
of investigation assistance in the recent killing of 
opposition newspaper journalist Khem Sambo. 
 
¶4.  (C) Shino indicated that the Japanese government is in 
favor of changing the SRSG mandate to one of a special 
rapporteur.  SRSGs and special rapporteurs generally have the 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000684  002 OF 003 
 
 
same monitoring and reporting mandates, and are both 
considered to fall into the group of HRC Special Procedures 
that also includes independent experts.  However, SRSGs are 
appointed by the Secretary-General but for rapporteurs the 
appointment procedure is carried out by the HRC.  For special 
rapporteurs, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) prepares an eligible candidate list and 
submits it to an HRC consultative group for shortlisting; the 
consultative group presents the shortlist to the HRC 
president at least one month before the beginning of the 
session in which the HRC would consider the selection of the 
mandate holder; the president then presents the shortlist to 
the HRC; the HRC reviews candidates and appoints a mandate 
holder.  (Note:  Nine countries and territories have special 
procedure mandates: Burundi, Cambodia, DPRK, Haiti, Liberia, 
Burma, the "Palestinian territories occupied since 1967" (as 
the rapporteur mandate is named by the HRC), Somalia, and 
Sudan.  Of these, Cambodia has the only SRSG mandate; four 
have special rapporteur mandates; four have independent 
expert mandates.  In 2007 and 2008, the country mandates of 
Belarus, Cuba and the Democratic Republic of Congo were 
discontinued.  End note.) 
 
¶5.  (C) Counselor Yamanaka stated that Cambodia could have 
some involvement with the identification process for a 
special rapporteur which may help create RGC buy-in and give 
the RGC some ownership of the mandate.  He added that the 
change to a rapporteur mandate could help the Cambodian 
government make a break with the past, giving the Cambodians 
a fresh start for a constructive relationship.  Additionally, 
Yamanaka stated that the change from an SRSG to a rapporteur 
would be in line with the HRC's current movement to 
standardize country-specific mandates.  He also expressed 
support for a special rapporteur mandate that would be a 
"simplified version" of the current SRSG resolution adopted 
in 1993.  The 1993 resolution is shorter than two and half 
pages but contains lines about Cambodia's transitional period 
and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) mandate, and establishes the presence of the OHCHR 
Cambodia Country Office, then called the U.N. Center for 
Human Rights.  The portion of the resolution establishing the 
SRSG is five lines long, detailing the following 
responsibilities of the SRSG:  a) to maintain contact with 
the Government and people of Cambodia; b) to guide and 
coordinate the U.N. human rights presence in Cambodia; c) to 
assist the Government in the promotion and protection of 
human rights and c) to report to the General Assembly and 
Commission on Human Rights.  Yamanaka stated that the 
Japanese government would support the "de-linking" of the 
issues of the special procedure mandate for Cambodia and the 
OHCHR Cambodia Office. 
 
¶6.  (C) Yamanaka stated that the Japanese government is in 
favor of setting benchmark goals for the Cambodian 
government, the achievement of which would signal the end of 
the necessity for a Cambodia country mandate on human rights. 
 Specifically, Yamanaka suggested benchmarks might be the 
successful conclusion of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, and 
benchmarks based on the principles of the planned ASEAN Human 
Rights Mechanism. 
 
¶7.  (C) According to a OHCHR Cambodia Office source, if there 
is indecision or a lack of consensus on the part of the 
international community come the time of the Cambodia mandate 
vote in September, it is possible that the HRC may vote to 
extend the current SRSG mandate for another year.  If that is 
the case, as an appointee of the Secretary-General, the 
decision as to whether Yash Ghai goes or not is essentially 
up to Yash Ghai himself.  Yamanaka stated that he has heard 
that Yash Ghai has been mostly focused on his constitutional 
consultation work in Nepal and has not been in regular 
contact regarding Cambodia.  There are unconfirmed reports 
that he may wish to resign from his SRSG role but he has not 
yet stated his intentions.  There was even some speculation 
that Yash Ghai may not be able to personally attend the 
September HRC session to present his report due to  his work 
in Nepal.  If this is the case, it may be a signal of his 
further disengagement with the appointment. 
 
Comments 
-------- 
 
¶8.  (C) We agree with many in the Cambodia donor community 
that Yash Ghai is not constructive as the SRSG on human 
rights in Cambodia.  His presence as SRSG is 
counter-prodcutive; for as long as Yash Ghai serves as SRSG, 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000684  003 OF 003 
 
 
there will be no engagement with the Cambodian government. 
Still, there is much to be done on human rights in Cambodia 
and a change to a special rapporteur role is a good way to 
transition into an effective mechanism for addressing human 
rights concerns.  We conclude from the Japanese delegation's 
interaction with RGC officials that discussion about the 
upcoming mandate vote will be a delicate matter. 
Communication that includes the possible "incentives" for a 
special rapporteur mandate might work best:  1) Cambodia 
would be seen as graduating from the need for an SRSG; 2) a 
special rapporteur appointment process would be inclusive of 
Cambodia's input, or at least its consultation; 3) 
collaborative monitoring and reporting may be a way to help 
the RGC and donor community identify development priorities. 
 
¶9. (C) We do not believe that the OHCHR Cambodia Office 
should be de-linked from the special procedure issue.  OHCHR 
has been doing great work in line with its technical 
assistance mandate in Cambodia, and provides necessary 
support for the special procedure mandate.  By de-linking the 
issue of the OHCHR Office, we would be delaying another 
conversation that would have to take place before March 2009 
when the Office's mandate comes up for a vote.  We believe 
that the part of the discussion with the RGC about the Office 
will be less strained -- the OHCHR Cambodia Office has the 
support of some high-level officials such as Deputy Prime 
Minister Sar Kheng. 
 
¶10. (C) Finally, we agree that setting benchmarks may be a 
useful tool; the RGC may be encouraged by the designation of 
certain achievable goals that would indicate the end of the 
need for a special procedure mandate.  They would also 
provide an incentive for Cambodia to meet human rights 
standards.  The successful completion of the KRT is a good 
example of an achievable, meaningful goal.  The planned ASEAN 
Human Rights Mechanism might be another benchmark, though it 
has not yet made public its human rights principles.  Other 
proposed benchmarks should be reviewed in the context of 
Cambodia's human rights situation and compared to the 
principles in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, to which 
Cambodia is a signatory, to ensure that some of Cambodia's 
most severe human rights issues -- such as the lack of rule 
of law, impunity for violent acts, and reduced press freedoms 
-- are addressed. 
MUSSOMELI