VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #0669/01 2252102
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 122102Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2398
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2018 
TAGS: PGOV MARR SNAR PTER KCRM MASS MOPS PBTS PINR
PM 
SUBJECT: PANAMA:  LEADERS GRAPPLE WITH SECURITY REFORMS 
 
REF: PANAMA 661 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR BARBARA J. STEPHENSON.  REASONS:  1.4 (B) AND 
 (D) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) GOP and opposition leaders are aggressively reaching 
out to Post to brief their views on the Torrijos 
Administration's security reform legislation package as well 
as to gauge USG reactions and interests.  At President 
Torrijos urging following the Ambassador's presentation of 
credentials (REFTEL), First VP and FM Samuel Lewis and 
Minister of Government and Justice Daniel Delgado briefed 
Ambassador on the security reform package on August 8. 
Additionally, Ambassador engaged with Lewis on this topic 
(and others) during their August 10 visit to Lewis' Contadora 
Island home.  Opposition leaders -- mostly critical of these 
proposals, but all suspicious of the Torrijos 
Administration's motives -- are reaching out to determine the 
degree to which the USG was involved in crafting this 
legislative packages. On August 9, Democratic Change (CD) 
presidential candidate Ricardo Martinelli's lead advisor 
Jimmy Papadimitriu sought from POLCOUNS USG views on these 
proposed reforms, and other opposition leaders eager to 
discuss this matter as well.  The GOP's consultations with 
civil society leaders, consultations into which the GOP was 
forced by loud, cranky clamor of criticism that Torrijos was 
striving to "re-militarize," are not going well as key civic 
leaders issue calls to debate these security reforms in the 
National Assembly or the "national dialogue (concertacion 
nacional)."  Furthermore, Torrijos' own chairperson of the 
National Transparency and Anti-Corruption Council, Alma de 
Fletcher, called on August 9 for broader debate and was 
subsequently joined in her call by National Ombudsman 
(Defensor del Pueblo) Ricardo Vargas on August 10.  While it 
runs the risk of complicating U.S. security engagement with 
Panama, this internal security reform debate also holds open 
the opportunity that, if managed and implemented properly, 
Panama and the U.S. may indeed be able to move their 
bilateral relationship to a new level, especially if the 
Merida Initiative can be properly harnessed, particularly in 
areas that show immediate benefit to the Panamanian public 
such as community policing. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Security Reform Package Becomes Political Football 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (C) Before going out of session on June 30, the National 
Assembly granted President Torrijos extraordinary powers to 
craft and enact legislation that would:  create a National 
Aero-Naval Service (SENAN), establish a National Intelligence 
Service (SENIS), form an independent Frontier Service 
(SENAFRONT), and allow the naming of a uniformed officer to 
head the Panamanian National Police (PNP).  While GOP 
officials strive to meet the August 31 deadline for Torrijos 
to use his extraordinary powers, opposition leaders are 
struggling with how to respond to this security reform 
package.  There is nothing unusual about the National 
Assembly delegating legislative authority to the President at 
the end of a session, but delegating authority on sensitive 
security matters is unheard of.  Not only former anti-Noriega 
Civil Crusade (Crusada Civilista) leaders, but also an ever 
broader array of public commentators, NGO leaders, and 
opposition politicians have raised the specter that Torrijos 
is attempting to "re-militarize," something that is 
politically anathema and constitutionally outlawed in Panama. 
 Having surprised the public with the extraordinary powers to 
enact security reform and subsequently been surprised by the 
backlash, the Torrijos Administration acquiesced and launched 
a round of "consultations" with civil society leaders 
beginning on August 4. 
 
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Lewis and Delgado Brief Ambassador 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) "This package of laws is necessary to address the 
growing crime and insecurity on our streets," Delgado told 
Ambassador on August 8 over lunch when briefing GOP plans to 
establish a coast guard, intelligence service, and frontier 
force and to put a uniformed officer in charge of the PNP. 
"People want to see improvement on the streets."  Lewis 
asserted that the "consultations" were going better than 
anticipated.  "There are a lot of misconceptions about what 
is in the proposed laws," Lewis said, "so we have had an 
opportunity to clarify them.  Also, we are receiving very few 
comments or questions."  Lewis added that on August 11 the 
GOP would publish the laws as well as all comments received 
to date as well as open a website and toll-free phone line to 
receiving comments from the general public.  "We have already 
incorporated some of the requested changes," Lewis said. 
Generally, Lewis downplayed the reaction within the 
opposition to these proposals and said he did not foresee 
political difficulties for the Torrijos Administration. 
Asked why the laws had to be enacted by August 31 when the 
extraordinary powers expire, Delgado explained that the laws 
establishing these entities needed to be put in place so that 
the next session of the National Assembly that convenes on 
September 1 would able to deal with the budgetary issues 
involved. 
 
¶4. (C) In an aside, former Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) 
Lieutenant Colonel Delgado commented that his ministry was 
having difficulty recruiting to fill the ranks of the PNP and 
other public forces.  "The pay and salaries elsewhere are 
something that are difficult to compete with," Delgado 
commented. "Add to that the prospect of getting hassled with 
human rights accusations, and a career in the PNP did not 
look so great."  Delgado went on to say that he was trying to 
make PNP service more appealing by offering barracks-style or 
base-type housing available to families, establishing PNP 
commissary services, and creating officer and enlisted clubs. 
 He laughed at the notion that only golf courses were missing 
from the mix. 
 
¶5. (C) As he was departing the Ambassador's residence, MFA 
Senior Advisor Adolfo Ahumada pulled A/DCM aside and floated 
to him the idea of separating the civilian intelligence 
(SENIS) law from the security reform pacckage and puting it 
out to debate and analysis in the "National Dialogue 
(Concertacion Nacional) process.  Ahumada noted that this 
particular law was drawing the most fire from the broadest 
front in the opposition and the wider civil society. 
 
¶6. (C) Noting that in principle the U.S. did not have 
objections to the GOP's proposed direction on these reforms, 
Ambassador underscored that it was neither here nor there for 
the U.S. to bless Panama's own internal legislative 
undertakings.  The U.S., however, was interested in how these 
reforms would be implemented to strengthen democracy and 
protect human rights while also preserving strong bilateral 
security cooperation.  If the politics of the security reform 
debate became too turbulent, for example, existing security 
cooperation could be jeopardized and efforts to strengthen 
that cooperation under the Merida Initiative would be 
complicated.  The U.S. would work to differentiate between 
on-going security cooperation like PANAMAX, future 
initiatives like the Merida Initiative, and the GOP's own 
security reforms.  If the debate over security reform became 
too toxic though, the U.S. was concerned that it could affect 
existing cooperation by making it too politically sensitive 
to execute effectively.  Ambassador urged Lewis and Delgado 
to consider carefully how they managed the security reform 
debate. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Martinelli's Man Inquires About USG Views 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) "We are going to have to say something about these 
proposed security laws," Martinelli political advisor 
Papadimitriu told POLCOUNS August 9. "Torrijos had made this 
a political issue by trying to use extraordinary powers to 
get this done in an election year."  The central security 
issue on the public's political agenda, Papadimitriu noted, 
was law and order in people's neighborhoods, not border 
security or intercepting drug traffickers.  "You can expect 
us to hit hard on Torrijos' inability to stem the growing 
violence and crime on our streets."  POLCOUNS echoed 
Ambassador's comments that the U.S. sought to preserve its 
security cooperation with Panama and build a basis for 
strengthening that cooperation while strengthening Panama's 
civilian institutions and respect for democracy and human 
rights; Papadimitriu concurred.  "None of these proposed laws 
do anything to help the average citizen though," he 
commented. 
 
¶8. (C) He said that Democratic Change (CD) and its alliance 
partner Patriotic Union (UP) would hold a conference on 
security on August 11 to analyze Panama's security 
challenges.  Seeing that Martinelli might have a "leadership" 
opportunity to outflank both the governing Revolutionary 
Democratic Party (PRD) that was "enthralled" with the 
prospect at gaining new security powers and the Panamenista 
Party whose default setting was to oppose anything that 
smacked of dictatorship, Papadimitriu said CD would consider 
staking out a measured response on the security reforms.  "We 
could, for example, support establishment of a coast guard 
(SENAN) and a border force (SENAFRONT) as good steps to deal 
with the FARC and drug traffickers while protecting the 
canal," he said.  The creation of an intelligence service 
(SENIS), however, needed to be "anchored in democracy" and 
would need to be debated more fully. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Lewis Sanguine about Security Reform Package 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Lewis reiterated, during Ambassador's visit to Lewis' 
Contadora Island home on July 10, that he did not believe 
that opposition to the security reform package was a 
significant impediment; "People want security and safety." 
Turning to the situation in the Darien he said, "The FARC are 
really being pressured by Uribe. Their chain of command is 
falling apart, so they are acting in a much less disciplined 
fashion, for example, sacking recently a grocery store in 
Bajo Chico.  We need to be able to deal with FARC in a smart 
way as they go through these last throes of their existence." 
 Asked if he had spoken with Torrijos about the briefing two 
days earlier on the security reform package, Lewis confided 
that he had not had an opportunity to do so. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) In acknowledging the threat posed by FARC Elements in 
the Darien (REFTEL), Torrijos opened the door to greater 
security cooperation with the U.S. to address Panama's FARC 
threat, continuing problem with narcotics trafficking and 
other illegal activities, and meeting other shared security 
challenges.  TThe U.S. needs to walk through the open door 
and to engage to build stronger security partnership that is 
anchored in greater regional cooperation while continuing to 
bolster Panama's democracy. 
 
¶11. (C) Torrijos' eagerness to advance on the security front, 
however, is greatly complicated by Panamanian political 
realities, realities further complicated by the Torrijos 
Administration's (mis)steps to date and the tangled history 
of the U.S.-Panamanian bilateral relationship.  But for the 
opposition outcry, Torrijos and the PRD would have blithely 
and blindly charged ahead to enact by fiat security reform 
legislation that has rubbed raw the partially healed wounds 
of the dictatorships of Torrijos' father and Noriega.  The 
"consultations" have been less than robust:  significant 
civil society organizations have been omitted; participants 
have not had an opportunity to review the laws before 
attending; and little time is left for comment after briefing 
the proposed legislation.  Politically tin-earred, Delgado is 
not the ideal conciliator to manage the delicate dance that 
will be required to oversee the security reform debate.  In 
discussing the civil society consultations with the press, 
Delgado unhelpfully commented, "The laws will go because they 
will go."  His vision of a "civilian" police with barracks, 
commissaries, and their own clubs in splendid isolation is 
worrisome and suggests a certain personal nostalgia for his 
old PDF days.  Lewis' involvement therefore is a positive 
development, and the U.S. should strive to strengthen his 
hand in this internal GOP debate.  The proposal to send the 
SENIS law to the "Concertacion" by Ahumada, Lewis' right-hand 
man, may provide the nucleus for a way out of the current 
morass, a formula that appears to appeal to CD's Papadimitriu. 
 
¶12. (C) Widely held public perception that the U.S. is 
intimately involved in Panama's own security reform effort -- 
largely driven by the misplaced speculation that Panama's 
legislative proposals were coordinated with the 
re-establishment of the U.S. Fourth Fleet, Delgado's July 
visit to the Pentagon, the announcement of the Merida 
Initiative, and the annual PANAMAX multi-national exercise 
that began on August 7 -- will complicate and underscore the 
need for effective and careful U.S. engagement.  Post is now 
carrying out extensive missionary work with key opposition 
and NGO leaders to clarifying matters by separating on-going 
security cooperation activities (e.g., PANAMAX), new 
initiatives (e.g., Merida), and the Torrijos Administration's 
security reform package. 
 
¶13.  (C) Post's goals are to: preserve on-going military, 
security, and law enforcement cooperation; lay the groundwork 
for enhancing that cooperation; ensure that, however it 
advances on security, Panama does so anchored in democracy 
and respect for human rights.  Panama clearly expects 
significant U.S. funding assistance to train and equip the 
SENAN and SENAFRONT, but the absence of FY08 FMF funding for 
Panama and the recent disqualification of Panama for 1206 
funding will pose a serious challenge to the U.S. ability to 
foster partnership with these new GOP entities.  Furthermore, 
it will be politically incumbent upon the USG through the 
Merida Initiative to show that it can be a partner in 
addressing effectively and democratically the average 
Panamanian citizen's security needs:  better law enforcement 
and safety.  Doing so -- through community policing programs, 
for example -- will burnish USG and GOP street credibility 
that the U.S. and Panama can indeed take the security 
relationship to the next level without endangering democratic 
institutions or threatening human rights. 
STEPHENSON