VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0682/01 2350850
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADCB19FF MSI1581-695)
R 220850Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9088
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0089
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0173
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0043
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1199
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

UNCLAS NICOSIA 000682 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION AND CABLE MISNUMBERED 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/PGI 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL ECON CY
SUBJECT: NEW ARRIVALS CHANGING CYPRUS'S BI-COMMUNAL 
CHARACTER 
 
REF: A. 07 NICOSIA 15 
     ¶B. 07 NICOSIA 52 
     ¶C. 07 NICOSIA 124 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) Summary:  An island long accustomed to exporting 
human capital, Cyprus has witnessed an unprecedented wave of 
immigration in the last ten years, altering the historically 
bi-communal (Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot) demographic balance 
and potentially affecting the Republic's political landscape 
longer-term.  These new minorities outnumber the country's 
"official" Armenian, Maronite and Latin minorities (Reftels) 
by a significant margin; reputable media report a legal 
migrant population in Cyprus of over 100,000 and estimate the 
illegal population at 60,000.  Of the largest communities, 
the Filipinos and Sri Lankans have focused on improving their 
short-term economic lot and shown little interest in 
politics, while the Pontian Greeks, who in many cases hold EU 
passports and enjoy limited voting rights, have put down 
roots and begun to organize politically.  Part I of a 
two-installment series, this telegram focuses on these new 
arrivals while Part II will discuss non-Cypriot EU citizen 
residents (other than Pontians) and additional immigrant 
groups.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
The Overall Migrant Picture 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) At the time of Cyprus's 1960 independence from Great 
Britain, the island's 580,000 population was 79 percent 
Greek-Cypriot, 18 percent Turkish-Cypriot, and three percent 
"other" -- British expats, mainly.  Out-migration of citizens 
from both communities had begun before independence, mainly 
for economic reason, but spiked after the commencement of 
inter-communal fighting in 1963, with Turkish Cypriots 
perceiving threats to their physical security and limited 
opportunities to make a living.  After 1974, significant 
numbers of Turkish mainlanders -- the so-called "settlers" -- 
relocated to Cyprus, many for personal economic reasons but 
some due to Turkey's political decision to repopulate the 
north with ethnic Turks.  By the mid-nineties, the island's 
population, while having grown substantially over 35 years, 
remained predominantly bi-communal, or at least bi-ethnic. 
 
¶3. (U) With the government-controlled area's continuing 
economic boom and the commencement of European Union 
accession negotiations with Cyprus in 1998, emigration waned 
and foreigners began seeing Cyprus as a more attractive 
destination.  Further, full EU accession in 2004 meant EU 
citizens could relocate freely to Cyprus.  According to an 
August 3 article in the reputable English-language daily 
"Cyprus Mail," some 50,000 non-Cypriot EU citizens and 60,000 
foreigners from other nations legally reside on the island; 
the illegal population is estimated at 50-60,000.  (Note: 
official figures from 2005 place the total population of the 
government-controlled area at over 780,000.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Cyprus's Filipinos -- Domestic Helpers, Disinterested 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4. (SBU)  One of the most visible "new minorities" in Cyprus 
are the Filipinos.  Esther Beatty, formerly the president of 
the Philippine Association in Nicosia, estimates their 
numbers at 11,000, 90 percent of whom are women aged 25 to 
¶45.  Most work as domestic servants, while others are 
employed in restaurants or as crew on Cypriot-flagged 
vessels.  By nature, the Filipino community is quite 
fragmented, owing to differences in members' native tongues, 
religious denomination, and home island.  Yet contacts claim 
they still "watch out for their own."  This social safety net 
sometimes fails, however.  Rita Superman, director of the 
Cyprus Police's Anti-Trafficking Unit, noted that Filipinos 
comprised the single largest group of trafficking victims in 
2007 (nine out of 40 identified victims). 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to Beatty, most resident Filipinos do not 
gravitate towards political activism.  Even long-term 
residents, who may have acquired citizenship via marriage to 
Cypriot men, tend to keep their political beliefs to 
themselves in order to preserve family harmony.  Most 
Filipino community leaders have shied away from aligning 
themselves with any Cypriot political party or movement, 
fearing that such allegiance might harm them were political 
 
winds to change somehow.  Beatty acknowledged that, should 
Cypriot residency regulations change in order to harmonize 
with EU directives -- allowing more Filipinos to become legal 
long-term residents and eventually, citizens -- they 
conceivably could become a more potent political force.  "At 
this point, however, they're just not interested," she 
concluded. 
 
------------------------- 
Sri Lankans Much the Same 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Sri Lankans, numbering approximately 14,000, are 
similarly visible in Cyprus, especially on Sundays, when they 
congregate in parks in the island's larger cities.  According 
to Tiru Chelvam, a translator with the Cypriot Asylum 
Service, 90 percent of his compatriots arrive on Cyprus as 
economic migrants or students, and many file for political 
asylum "defensively" after their labor contracts end.  Most 
Sri Lankans speak at least some English, labor as domestic 
help or construction workers, and practice Catholicism or 
Buddhism.  A majority are Sinhalese, Chelvam continued, as 
Tamils generally migrated to larger European countries where 
they had more work options and did not feel cornered and 
vulnerable to conflict with their Sinhalese compatriots. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Sri Lankan migrants in Cyprus differ from the 
Filipinos in that more are male, but they, too, are poorly 
organized politically, due mainly to their short stays on the 
island and/or abnormal residency status.  They have 
established two welfare organizations that tend to the flock 
and attempt to represent the group before Cypriot 
authorities, but they are poorly funded and many residents 
consider them corrupt.  Even respected leaders like Chelvam, 
who earns a decent wage from his work with the government, 
hopes to go to Canada, "where opportunities for Sri Lankan 
immigrants are better." 
 
------------------------------ 
Pontian Greeks Have One Leg Up 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Pontians, ethnically Greek and hailing 
originally from the Black Sea region, also number around 
15-20,000 and are concentrated mainly in the Paphos region 
southwest of Nicosia.  Pontians are Orthodox and many 
continue to speak a dialect incomprehensible to other Greeks 
in addition to their native Russian or Turkish.  They began 
arriving on the island in 1993; most originally had emigrated 
to Greece, as GoG policy then (and now) was to offer 
citizenship to diaspora persons of "proven" Greek ethnicity. 
Many Pontians, especially those from the post-USSR breakup 
migrant wave, did not integrate smoothly into Greek society 
and a minority turned to criminality and other "anti-social 
behavior."  Perhaps unfairly, Pontians here have a poor 
reputation, with many Cypriots blaming them for a recent 
increase in crime on the island. 
¶9.  (SBU) According to Raoul Tsahidis, the general secretary 
of the Greek Pontian Organization in Cyprus and a 
representative to the World Council of Greeks of Pontus, 
there are approximately 14,000 Pontians in Cyprus holding 
Greek citizenship, and another 3,000 Pontians whose 
applications are pending.  Unlike many other immigrants to 
Cyprus, the Pontians tended to arrive as whole families, and 
their communities are tightly-knit.  Further, they feel the 
island is their home, not a temporary place of employment. 
Labor leader and prominent Pontian Maya Pozidou argued that 
most of her compatriots, contrary to reputation, were 
hard-working and well-educated, and cited an unverified 
statistic that 70 percent of the economy of Paphos depends on 
them.  Most Pontians work in the tourism and construction 
sectors, but the Greek Pontian Organization is trying to 
secure government jobs for its members as well. 
 
¶10. (U) With a designated community representative and some 
grass-roots mobilization, the Pontian Greeks are perhaps the 
most politically well-organized new minority on the island. 
Their main focus has been to secure Greek citizenship for the 
3,000 Pontians in Cyprus whose applications with Athens are 
pending (they also are aggressively courted by Greek 
political parties such as ND and PASOK, which flew thousands 
home to vote in recent Greek elections).  On-island, they 
hope to secure representation in Parliament, either by 
 
electing one of their own via the normal route, or by 
securing a non-voting, community representative slot a la the 
Maronites, Armenians, and Latins (whom they greatly 
outnumber).  They even hope to capture one of Cyprus's six 
European Parliament seats in the EP's June 2009 elections. 
(Note:  unless the Pontians acquire Cypriot, vice Greek 
citizenship, they will not be able to vote or stand in 
Cypriot parliamentary and presidential elections.  Like other 
non-Cypriot EU residents, however, they can participate in 
municipal and EU elections.) 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comprising a significant percentage of the 
government-controlled area's population, Cyprus's non-Cypriot 
communities are already changing the character of the island. 
 While many indeed will return home once their labor 
contracts expire or their asylum claims fail, others, 
especially the Pontians, are here to stay.  Long-term, their 
presence could spur a redefinition of what it means to be 
Cypriot -- with the exception of the Pontians, the others are 
unlikely to self-identify with either the G/C or T/C 
communities, as Cyprus's "official" minorities had to do in 
¶1960.  Such separation of ethnicity from citizenship would 
seem a good thing on an island attempting to reunify. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Of the three groups discussed here, the Pontians 
have the greatest chance of integration into Cyprus's 
close-knit society, owing to their (almost) common language 
and Orthodoxy, and the permanence that comes with their EU 
passports.  Surprisingly, while they identify with G/Cs 
vis-a-vis the Cyprus Problem, they aren't particularly 
nationalist in the mode of overseas Greek Cypriots or members 
of the Greek diaspora; leader Tsahidis compared the "national 
issue" to a football match -- worth watching, but life would 
go on regardless of outcome. 
Cohen