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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA678, DEMARCHE TO CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA678 2008-08-18 10:40 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKI #0678 2311040
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181040Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8315
INFO RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 4818
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 4668
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000678 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PTER MOPS RW UG CG
SUBJECT:    DEMARCHE TO CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT ON 
            SECURITY IN THE EAST 
 
REF:        (A) STATE 85414; (B) KINSHASA 630 
 
1.  (U) Per instructions ref (A), Ambassador met August 14 with 
National Security Advisor Lufunda Kaumba and Deputy Interior 
Minister Joseph Mpango Okundo.  Interior Minister Denis Kalume 
dropped out at the last minute and sent his deputy (Mpango Okundo) 
instead.  Also present were DCM Brock and Goma TDY poloff Rankin. 
(Note:  Kalume and Kaumba were both invited because the GDRC's 
political effort to combat/contain insurgent groups in the east has 
been effectively divided between the Amani process and the Nairobi 
process.  Kalume, as chair of the Amani Process Steering Committee, 
is the appropriate contact for matters relating to the CNDP, while 
Presidential advisors Kaumba and Ambassador Seraphin Ngwej, who is 
currently on vacation, are the appropriate contacts for all matters 
regarding the FDLR.  End note.) 
 
2.  (SBU) Ambassador went over talking points as contained ref (A). 
Kaumba, who spoke more often, more forcefully, and with greater 
nuance (but without anger) than Mpango Okundo, made the case that 
collaboration between the GDRC and the FDLR was at best illogical as 
the presence of the FDLR in Congolese territory had resulted in 
great prejudice and suffering to the populations in the east of the 
DRC.  He acknowledged that some Congolese officials at lower levels 
may be "in collusion" with the FDLR but denied emphatically that 
this was the case with individuals at the policy level.  Ambassador 
and DCM referred to the persistence of perceptions that GDRC is not 
really interested in removing the FDLR from areas where it operates 
with impunity and called on GDRC to step up its efforts to 
demobilize more FDLR troops.  Ambassador and DCM also mentioned that 
the view in Kigali regarding the July 31 ceremony in Kisiki in which 
65 FDLR/RUD troops had laid down there weapons was derisory. 
 
3.  (SBU) Unperturbed, Kaumba attributed the lack of progress with 
the FDLR to inadequate funding from the international community, 
which would have to foot the bill for setting up a processing camp 
with minimal living standards so that the FDLR would have an 
incentive to leave the bush.  He also noted that he is planning a 
scouting trip of a few FDLR leaders to Rwanda so they could see for 
themselves that the conditions in that country are ripe for their 
return.  When they reported back to the rank and file still in the 
bush, he said, a great number of FDLR soldiers would rush to 
demobilize and return to Rwanda.  Kaumba also acknowledged that many 
FDLR would not choose to repatriate to Rwanda; they would not come 
out of the bush until offered a safe place to resettle.  He called 
for the holding of a conference with third nations (several European 
countries, plus Zambia, Tanzania and Morocco were mentioned) in 
attendance to offer resettlement slots for FDLR troops unwilling to 
repatriate. 
 
4.  (SBU) Comment:  Very little was achieved as a result of this 
demarche other than, perhaps, to convey that we are not fully 
convinced that the GDRC is as innocent as it says it is in regard to 
"collusion" with the FDLR.  Kaumba's point about the lack of funding 
to entice FDLR soldiers from leaving the bush, where they can at 
least make a living through artisanal mining or other informal 
economic activities, is hard to challenge.  End comment. 
 
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