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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1315, KALMA CAMP UPDATE, AUGUST 29

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1315 2008-08-29 14:26 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1803
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1315/01 2421426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291426Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1755
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001315 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG SHORTLEY/SMALL, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: KALMA CAMP UPDATE, AUGUST 29 
 
1.  (SBU) UNDSS Chief for South Darfur Abdalla Janakat provided 
additional details on the August 25 attack by GOS police forces on 
Kalma Camp.  He told poloff in Nyala August 28 that 60 GoS vehicles 
surrounded the camp on the morning of the August 25 attack.  He said 
IDPs likely had intelligence of GoS plans and had assembled in 
advance of the arrival of the police, reportedly armed with knives 
and sticks.  Janakat said the GoS reported that an IDP shot from 
behind the line of women and children.  He said this shooting, or an 
attack by the IDPs with primitive weapons may have elicited an 
emotional response from the GoS police and shooting broke out.  Some 
IDPs reported to UNAMID that there may have been shooting between 
GoS police forces as some elements within the force reportedly 
turned on their fellow police officers.  UNDSS also heard rumors of 
IDPs from other camps attempting to run to the defense of Kalma camp 
IDPs and being prevented from doing so at GoS checkpoints, however 
this has not been confirmed. 
 
2.  (SBU)  UNAMID's Human Rights Officer and Acting Head of Office 
in South Darfur, Marcel Akpovo, told poloff and USAIDoff on August 
28 that he personally does not subscribe to the "exchange of fire 
theory."  He stated that IDPs may have fired isolated shots, but 
that it was nothing in comparison to the shooting by GoS forces. 
Akpovo stated that the GoS has prevented UNAMID representatives from 
accessing the hospital of the wounded. "This is ironic, because we 
facilitated the evacuation of these individuals and now we cannot 
see them," stated Akpovo.  According to Akpovo, UNAMID force 
protection should be commended for providing the space for this 
evacuation, and it presents a good example of the humanitarian 
community (in this case MSF) working with the hybrid peacekeeping 
force.  Akpovo also repeated the UNDSS story of one GoS policeman 
changing sides during the fighting.  Akpovo emphasized that the GoS 
entry into the camp violates a number of different agreements 
including the DPA, which create demilitarized zones around IDP camps 
and prevented GoS forces from entering IDP camps without permission. 
 Like other UNAMID officials, Akpovo stated that a permanent UNAMID 
police presence is needed in the camps. 
 
3.  (SBU)  On August 29, SLM/MM leaders in South Darfur claimed to 
poloff that the Kalma camp "massacre" was planned by the GoS, 
including the Minister of Defense and Intelligence Chief, several 
weeks in advance.  According to their latest information from 
"respected sources in the camp," 46 IDPs were killed and 110 others 
were injured.  (The SLM MM leaders stated that, according to their 
sources, these are confirmed dead, as "14 women were buried in one 
grave, 16 children and elderly in another, and 16 men in another.") 
The General Secretary of SLM/MM in south Darfur, Omar Muhammad 
Ibrahim, said that the IDP camps are a continual reminder to the GoS 
of their "criminal behavior" in Darfur, which resulted in this 
massive displacement. According to Ibrahim, GoS entry into the camp 
is a direct violation of the DPA.   Ibrahim and his colleagues 
repeated several times that "the top leadership in Khartoum" is 
involved in the attack.  The head political secretary for SLM/MM in 
South Darfur, Dr. Issam Hama, told poloff that food security in 
Kalma is in jeopardy, as no INGOs except for MSF Holland and ICRC 
have been allowed in the camp for the last three days.  SLM/MM 
leaders stated that Minnawi has no representatives in Kalma, as they 
were "ejected" and moved to Otash and Al-Salaam camp eight months 
after the signing of the DPA.  These leaders predicted that this is 
only the first move by the GoS to "destroy the camps and get rid of 
the IDPS." 
 
GoS entered camp and IDPS approached police, possibly with knives or 
blunt weapons. 
 
4.  (SBU) Also on August 29, the South Darfur Minister of 
Agriculture (SPLM), Omer Abdel Rahman Adam, told poloff that he is 
awaiting First Vice President Salva Kiir's approval of his 
resignation. Adam said that although he has not/not resigned, he has 
"fed something to the press that he will resign."  (Note:  This 
conflicts with many press reports announcing that he has already 
resigned.  End Note.)  Adam stated that six NCP Ministers have 
already submitted their resignation to the S. Darfur Wali.  The 
following members are: 
 
- Ibrahim Abdallah Muhamad, State Advisor 
- Salah Muhammad Al-Fadul, State Advisor 
- Fatima At-Tahir Kunjong, Commisioner in Presidency 
- Abd Raouf Muhammad Abdullah, Commisioner of East Jebel Marra 
- Muhammad Ahmed Basi, MP 
- Haroun Adam Abu Sada, MP 
 
5.  (SBU) Adam showed the written resignation letter of the NCP 
officials to poloff.  A full text of the letter will be sent to 
AF/SPG, but states "events which have occurred since 2002, the last 
being in Kalma, have resulted in a great loss of innocent life."  It 
 
KHARTOUM 00001315  002 OF 002 
 
 
notes that as Fur government ministers, this "creates a shame on us, 
as we in the government are killing our people."  It acknowledges 
the large gap that has been created between the GoS and the people 
of Darfur and states "for this reason it is not possible for us to 
stay in our positions."  The letter ends asking the Wali to accept 
this letter of resignation. 
 
6.  (SBU) Adam stated that the governor will not accept this letter 
of resignation.  Adam said that although he understands the 
officials' motives, he wishes that they would have done this in 
coordination with other political parties and ethnic groups.  "This 
is just not a Fur issue or a personal issue, but something that 
requires coordination," said Adam.  Adam noted that he is 
coordinating with political opposition parties and non-signatory 
groups and that several parties including Umma and DUP have 
indicated that they may withdraw their ministers.  Adam said that if 
approved by Kiir, there will be a withdrawal of all SPLM ministers 
(and other opposition groups) in the state governments of South 
Darfur.  Adam stated that he has been in communication with Abdul 
Wahid Nur, Abdul Shafie, and other non-signatory rebel leaders. 
Adam said that he has had a number of heated discussions with the 
Governor and Deputy Governor, and that the latter admonished him: 
"We know you will be meeting with a U.S. official, and we don't want 
you to tell him all that is going on." 
 
7.  (SBU) On August 29, USAID off met Worldvision officials who 
stated that a food distribution is scheduled for September 1.  They 
said the status of food security in the camp is not known. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: The resignation of six state ministers, if it 
actually goes forward, represents a serious political statement 
against the regime.  If additional ministers join them, this could 
become particularly embarrassing for Khartoum.  Given the Darfur 
initiative agreement between the Umma and the NCP, however, it seems 
unlikely that any Umma ministers will resign, though emotions are 
obviously running very high in Nyala, and these ministers may ignore 
their party leadership.  Seen in this light, the Kalma Camp attack 
has served to galvanize local feelings against the NCP regime, 
uniting Darfurians regardless of party affiliation.  Post will be 
watching closely to see if NGOs and UNAMID are allowed continued 
access to Kalma Camp in the coming days. 
 
ASQUINO