VZCZCXRO1635
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1312/01 2421122
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291122Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1747
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001312 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On August 26 and 27, six senior leaders of UNAMID 
separately discussed UNAMID deployment issues with poloffs.  Most 
officials dismissed 80% deployment by December 31 as unrealistic, 
but predicted this goal may be reached by March 2009 if UNAMID 
completes upgrades to Darfur's airports allowing 24-hour access to 
UNAMID. These officials also discussed a "light deployment plan," 
phase IV security, staffing difficulties, and equipment and 
transportation issues.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Polchief and poloff met the following UNAMID officials in 
El-Fasher headquarters on August 26-27: 
 
- Acting Deputy Director of Mission Support Wolfgang Weiszegger, 
 
- Chief of Plans, J5 Colonel NMT Stafford 
 
- Chief of Staff John Alstrom 
 
- Deputy Joint Special Representative (D/JSR) for Operations and 
Management Hocine Medili 
 
- Director of Public Information Kamal Saiki 
 
- Political Officer to JSR Adada, Adam Day 
 
 
DEPLOYMENT GOALS 
- - - - - - - - - 
¶3.  (SBU)  Chief of Staff Almstrom was the most optimistic official 
about deployment, stating that UNAMID has a "reasonable chance" of 
reaching its 80% deployment goal by the end of 2008.  DJSR for 
Operations and Management, Hocine Medili, was less confident saying, 
"we might not reach 80% by the end of the year, but we will not miss 
it by many months." Other officials hinted that TCCs (Troop 
Contributing Countries) may back away from their commitments, as 
their deployment dates are pushed farther back.  Both Weiszegger, 
the Director of Mission Support and Day, Adada's chief political 
officer, stated that Thai troops may withdraw as their deployment 
date is delayed and visa/passport issues plague some TCCs. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The J5 Chief of Planning portrayed deployment as dependent 
on the arrival of contingent-owned equipment (COE) and the 
completion of necessary engineering work.  "The military planner is 
the last person in the chain," noted Stafford, and added that the 
slow movement of COE "is the killer."  Stafford cited the lengthy 
distance between Port Sudan and Darfur, the poor road 
infrastructure, and the extreme weather in Sudan all as significant 
challenges in COE transportation.  Stafford said that there are at 
least four new camps being built in each sector, also putting a 
major strain on resources.  (Note: Stafford provided an electronic 
copy of a UNAMID Force Deployment Brief to poloffs.  This document 
will be sent to AF/SPG, USUN, and the office of the special envoy on 
Monday, September 1.  End Note.) 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Adam Day cautioned that UNAMID "fudged the numbers" to 
reach its 80% deployment goal by the end of 2008. Day warned that 
this goal focuses on troops and not police, and that as the Kalma 
camp attack demonstrated, Darfur's insecurity requires law 
enforcement as much as peacekeeping. 
 
LIGHT DEPLOYMENT 
- - - - - - - - - 
¶6.  (SBU)  Several UNAMID officials proposed deploying troops with 
minimum COE to the super camps as part of a "light deployment" or 
"rapid deployment" plan.  These troops would be flown to Darfur via 
airlift, bringing just enough equipment for self-protection.  Upon 
arrival, these troops would then focus on camp force protection as 
they wait for the arrival of their remaining COE.  More troops would 
arrive at fewer locations, but "if applied, the goal of reaching 80% 
deployment by the end of 2008 might be possible," stated Medili. 
Medili stated that this is an "in-house" concept that has not yet 
been presented to troop contributing countries.  Weiszegger noted 
that deploying troops in this manner will ultimately be a "military 
decision that may take some convincing."  Military planner Stafford 
appeared pessimistic about this approach, noting that it could make 
many troops very vulnerable and "is probably not viable." 
 
NIGHT FLIGHTS AND AIRPORT UPGRADES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶7.  (SBU)  Public Information Officer Saiki stated that the GOS and 
UNAMID reached agreement "in principle" on allowing UNAMID night 
flights, "though it does come with a price tag."  Almstrom also 
separately reported that negotiations over upgrades to the 
El-Geneina airport are ongoing and would soon allow access to the 
airport.  (Note:  Almstrom said he was not aware whether night 
 
KHARTOUM 00001312  002 OF 004 
 
 
flights were ongoing at the El-Fasher and Nyala airports.  End 
Note.) Medili stated that while the airport upgrades will require an 
investment of money and time,  the more complicating factor will be 
coordinating with the Sudanese Civil Aviation authority as it will 
maintain control of Darfur's airports and provide all of the 
Sudanese personnel needed to run an airport (e.g. flight control 
traffic managers, runway assistants, etc.).  Overtime costs, complex 
staffing schedules, and the availability/willingness of Sudanese 
airport officials to staff the facilities after hours may all be 
more difficult issues than the physical upgrades to the airports. 
Medili stated that the current agreement between the GoS and UNAMID 
allows flights from 7 am until 7 pm and that Sudanese control of the 
airports is for obvious reasons a GOS requirement, as it would be in 
any country.  Medili stated that upgrading the Geneina airport would 
give increased access to all of Darfur. 
 
 
PHASE IV SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PLANNING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶8.  (SBU)  All contacts stated that the approximately 300 
non-essential staff were evacuated in July when UNAMID moved to 
phase IV security have returned to their positions in El-Fasher. 
Alstrom emphasized that this move to phase IV security would have 
occurred without the July ICC proceedings as the number of security 
incidents in the first six months of 2008 is already greater than 
all of 2007. However, he emphasized that despite their  return, 
phase IV security is still in place and all employees are instructed 
to have a "go-bag" ready. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Almstrom noted that Phase IV security and the potential 
for a formal ICC indictment against Bashir create an unpredictable 
situation.  Almstrom commented, "You wonder what is the right thing 
to do, and I can tell you I'm not sleeping well at night thinking 
about a dark scenario where [following an ICC indictment] the GoS 
cuts off supply flights, and UNAMID runs out food and water within 
three days for its personnel." Medili noted that the Phase IV 
security will result in increased transportation costs for private 
Sudanese transportation contractors, as "risk is translated into 
financial terms." Day separately stated that Phase IV security will 
particularly affect the deployment of full police units "as staff 
ceilings have been put in place that will affect the civilian and 
police side."  (Note:  On August 28, DJSR rejected this assertion 
saying that Phase IV security was not related to staff ceilings. 
Post will continue to look into this discrepancy.  End Note.)  Day 
noted that it is very difficult for the mission to drop from Phase 
IV security to a lower level.  Describing it "as a distraction," Day 
noted that this security level is essentially the opposite from 
deployment. 
 
STAFFING AND U.S. LIAISON OFFICERS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶10.  (SBU)  Almstrom stated that current staffing for political and 
civil affairs positions stands at 50%.  Almstrom added that the UN 
bureaucracy, while bringing necessary standards into the hiring 
process, is incredibly slow with "many bureaucratic hurdles." 
Almstrom stated that visa issuance "is getting better" for UNAMID 
personnel.  He noted that the GoS appears to not/not be 
discriminating against visa applications form Western countries. 
Weiszegger differed with Almstrom, saying that the one exception to 
GoS cooperation on visas is for Australian, Canadian, and American 
military liaison officers.  Almstrom stated that Western military 
observers/liaisons would be a great asset to UNAMID. Weiszegger 
agreed with Almstrom saying that although the GoS has been more 
responsive on many visas, it has not responded to visa requests for 
Canadian, Australian, and American force protection and military 
liaison positions.  "They are probably taking a closer look into 
their backgrounds," speculated Weiszegger.  Day stated that visas 
would be much easier to obtain for these military liaisons if "we 
forget to put their ranks on the visa applications as we did for the 
first two US liaison officers."  (Comment: Day said he would pursue 
this with Alstrom, and Alstrom himself promised to follow up on the 
issue and get back to us. End comment.) 
 
¶11.  (SBU) DJSR Medili also emphasized the difficulty of recruitment 
and retention saying that it is important to create conditions in 
UNAMID camps and facilities so that civilian UN/AU staff will accept 
jobs and stay in them.  He said that 70 new job offers were recently 
declined, "as candidates e-mail people they know here and they hear 
about the poor conditions." In an earlier meeting, Day separately 
told poloff that UNAMID needs an infusion of American talent at the 
senior-level of UNAMID. . Day commented, "I'm the only American 
around here, and it shows - I spend two hours every day editing 
reports."  Day noted that there is a plan to bring on several 
editors to help with this task in the long-term.  Day stated that 
competent and experienced American logistics and transportation 
 
KHARTOUM 00001312  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
managers seconded to UNAMID would be a big addition to the hybrid 
force.  Day also revealed that some talented Americans have been 
declined for important positions, as the UN bureaucracy reverse 
discriminates against Westerners and the "African character of the 
mission" is used in hiring decisions. 
 
PAE 
- - - 
¶12.  (SBU)  DJSR Medili stated that PAE's contract for ongoing 
projects will officially end on September 14.  After this date, PAE 
will only be allowed to start de-demobilizing and transitioning its 
projects to UNAMID.  "De-mobilization does not mean leaving the 
hand-over process unfinished," noted Medili.  PAE is currently 
working double shifts trying to complete its ongoing work. 
According to Medili, PAE complaints of GoS restrictions on PAE 
flights and visas are exaggerated, as a large number of PAE flights 
clog Darfur's limited airport capacity and some of their requests 
for visas came very late (e.g. for a soil stabilization expert.) 
Medili noted that UNAMID will attempt to directly hire approximately 
500 PAE national staff when the company closes all of its operations 
in Sudan. Stafford described the end of PAE's contract as "a serious 
loss" and "body blow."  Adam Day stated that since PAE now provides 
security for its own construction sites, UNAMID will lose more 
operational capacity when it takes over construction of PAE sites as 
it will be forced to use its existing troops for force protection. 
Day said that they have received three proposal for replacement 
contracts for PAE, but "the only one that is not American is a lot 
more expensive." Medili stated that there are a few outstanding 
issues with PAE, including a poorly constructed transit camp  in 
Nyala.  Medili emphasized that he was reluctant to discuss this 
issue in depth as the camp is entirely flooded and "this is one 
issue with PAE that may very well have to be resolved with 
litigation," although he also said that there appears to be an 
agreement with DPKO to avoid any litigation and simply move on. 
Overall, these UNAMID interlocutors were very positive about the 
work that PAE has been able to accomplish. 
 
PIPELINE 
- - - - - 
¶13.  (SBU) DJSR Medili emphasized that there has been a noticeable 
improvement in the transportation pipeline from Port Sudan, 
specifically noting improved movement through customs, increased 
usage of railways and roads, and the use of more transportation 
contractors.  Medili stated that the backlog of containers "will 
soon be resolved," and said that UNAMID is looking at some 
innovative ways to transport COE, including driving, rather than 
shipping, UNAMID vehicles coming from Port Sudan. Weiszegger stated 
that UNAMID just closed a competitive bidding on freight providers, 
receiving 18 bids, many of which he is confident will be able to 
provide service to UNAMID. Weiszegger also stated that UNAMID is 
considering hiring third-party full- service transportation 
logistics providers (offering customs clearance, storage and 
warehousing, and shipment to Darfur.)  "There is capacity in the 
transportation market in Sudan that we need to tap into," stated 
Weiszegger. Weiszegger added that UNAMID will soon conduct a vender 
market seminar to potential contractors in Nyala this week, and more 
in Khartoum and El-Fasher in the future. 
 
HELICOPTERS 
- - - - - - - 
¶14.  (SBU) Chief of Staff Almstrom emphasized that UNAMID 
unofficially uses its current helicopters for occasional 
surveillance and reconnaissance missions.  He said that these 
transport helicopters are not designed for this, and that he 
questions this practice.  Almstrom said that if UNAMID had attack 
helicopters, the July 8 attack UNAMID forces resulting in 8 deaths 
might not have happened.  The attack lasted over two hours, noted 
Almstrom, and the attack helicopters could have made "quick work" of 
the force opposing UNAMID.  With respect to UNAMID's need for attack 
helicopters, Saiki stated that UN standards require not only night 
flight capabilities but also the ability to operate in a hot, dusty, 
and harsh environment.  (Note: His rationale for this is that since 
the attackers know that UNAMID has no helicopters, they can attack 
at any time.  If UNAMID receives helicopters that do not have night 
flight capability, the attackers will know to attack only at night. 
End note.)  This, in addition to the need for a competent crew and 
maintenance team, make the helicopter issue more complicated than 
just night capability, noted Saiki.  Alstrom and Stafford noted that 
the patrol that was attacked July 8 was 100 kilometers from its base 
with only one radio and little support, which Stafford termed 
"insane" from an operational point of view, given the lack of air 
support.  Chief of Planning Stafford noted that for deployment 
purposes, there is a need for three Illyushin-76 airplanes more than 
helicopters.  Stafford has already requested these air assets from 
New York and is awaiting a response. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001312  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
APCs 
- - - 
¶15.  (SBU) Weiszegger said  many of the Canadian armored  personnel 
carriers (APCs) are approximately thirty years old and require 
constant maintenance by PAE and rare spare parts.  He said that when 
PAE's service contract expires, UNAMID will attempt to hire PAE's 
local 500 local staff, something that PAE may consider despite a no- 
poaching clause in their contract.  Hiring PAE's international staff 
is more complicated for UNAMID (due to non-poaching clauses in the 
contract with PAE,) but UNAMID is still attempting to hire some of 
the international staff on an individual basis.  In the August 27 
morning operations brief for General Agwai, J4 reported that 
although 77% of all APCs are serviceable, contingent- owned APCs 
have much lower serviceable rates.  (Note:  For example, the COE APC 
rate for South Darfur is at 43%. End Note.) 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
¶16.  (SBU) Most UNAMID officials (with the exception of the outgoing 
Day,) appeared more optimistic than several months ago with respect 
to deployment issues.  The improved pipeline for shipments based on 
new contracts was especially positive, as previously UNAMID seemed 
to be in paralysis as to how to solve the problem of the 3000 
containers (and 5000 shipments overall).  Although very few of these 
senior UANMID officials are confident that they will reach a 
December 31st deployment goal of 80%, most appeared optimistic t 
that this goal could be reached by March 2009.  The "light 
deployment" or "rapid deployment plan" appears to serve little 
purpose, if only to bring more troops in to sit in large camps in 
major cities in Darfur.  Despite their newfound optimism, UNAMID has 
great challenges that will require new energy, flexibility, and 
coordination with the GoS and member states.  The lack of 
helicopters (both transport and attack) as well as the lack of 
formed police units (FPUs) and force protection to support them 
(septel) currently are the main obstacles to UNAMID achieving its 
core mission objectives. 
 
ASQUINO