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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1311, KALMA CAMP UPDATE, AUGUST 28

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1311 2008-08-28 16:11 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0906
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1311 2411611
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 281611Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1746
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001311 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: KALMA CAMP UPDATE, AUGUST 28 
 
1. (SBU) As photos circulated on the internet of Kalma IDPs burying 
their dead from the August 25 violence, political actors in Darfur 
remain uncertain on how to deal with the events that left 32 IDPs 
dead, and up to 17 police officers injured. Ali Mahmoud, Wali of 
South Darfur, was vocal in his defense of the actions by GOS police 
forces, while the Wali of West Darfur issued a statement condemning 
the violence. Foreign Minister Deng Alor criticized the Government 
of Sudan (GOS) for its actions at Kalma camp, but no member of the 
National Congress Party (NCP) chose to comment. President Omar 
al-Bashir, visiting Juba to commemorate the signing of a 
dams-building protocol, did not address the violence. 
 
2. (SBU) Poloff met with UNAMID Deputy Joint Special Representative 
(DJSR) Henry Anyidoho at UNAMID headquarters in El Fasher, Darfur on 
August 28. Visibly ill-at-ease, Anyidoho detailed the numerous 
crises that have arisen at Kalma camp in the wake of the shootings. 
UNAMID's formal investigation is still continuing, as it is not yet 
fully clear who fired the first shot, even as the GOS continues to 
insist that armed IDPs fired first from inside the camp.  GOS 
authorities claim between seven and 17 police officers were injured 
in the armed engagement, but when the DJSR requested to see the 
wounded, GOS authorities denied access to the officers, which leads 
him to doubt whether they are truly injured. Anyidoho said he 
remains concerned that this week's significant rains will flood the 
camp, an event that  GOS authorities in South Darfur may use as an 
opportunity to dismantle the camp.  Two weeks previous, GOS 
officials told Anyidoho the camp needed to be searched for weapons 
to protect incoming flights, as the camp sits directly in line with 
the flight path of Nyala airport, but Aynidoho thought he had 
reached an agreement with the Wali not to conduct such a search. 
UNAMID's capacity to respond to such events is insufficient, as only 
one of out 19 UNAMID Formed Police Units (FPUs) is in place; this 
Bangladeshi unit is very conservative when it comes to performing 
patrols, said Anyidoho, and he added disappointedly, "It seems like 
we are moving forward at a crawling pace." 
 
3. (SBU) Poloff met Ali Hassan, the head of UNAMID civil affairs for 
South Darfur, in Nyala on August 28.  Hassan was blunt in his 
condemnation of the GOS role in the violence, saying, "This is by 
far the worst incident we've had in the camp since 2005." Hassan 
showed Poloff photos taken of the dead, photos he said would not be 
released publicly and would not be distributed internally. Poloff 
viewed six photos of three women, one child and two men, all of 
which revealed direct shots to the heads and faces of the victims. 
Hassan said that it appeared all were shot at close range.  Hassan 
was insistent that GOS officials do not currently understand the 
gravity of what had taken place. "They haven't seen graphic images 
such as these," he said. "They don't understand the repercussions 
this may have, or the magnitude of it."  Hassan said that in 
addition to the 32 known dead (one previously confirmed dead was 
determined not to be from Kalma camp), 51 were wounded and evacuated 
from the camp; the number of dead and wounded could be far higher, 
as many were unable to seek immediate medical attention.  Stories 
continue to differ on exactly what happened, but Hassan said the 
photos prove indiscriminate shooting on the part of GOS forces. 
"Whatever shooting came from the IDP side does not justify shooting 
someone in the head." 
 
4. (SBU) Hassan said that Kalma Camp remains a highly unstable 
"flashpoint."  Criminal gangs tied to rebel movements rule the camp, 
prostitution is common, and weapons are displayed in the open. 
Yesterday, IDPs gathered to dismantle a piece of the railway tracks 
leading to Nyala, and UNAMID arrived at the scene and urged 
restraint as GOS forces pulled back. However, Hassan was honest 
regarding UNAMID's limited capacity for reducing conflict.  Given 
current circumstances, he denied that UNAMID could have acted to 
prevent this violence without an FPU at Kalma camp full time. When 
asked how this event will change UNAMID, Hassan replied, "It will 
make us look at how we can use the resources we do have in a more 
effective manner." 
 
5. (SBU) Comment: There is a growing fear among IDPs that the 
government is trying to force them out of the camps, and the latest 
forcible disarmament attempt at Kalma camp only serves to reinforce 
those fears.  This is not particularly helpful at a time when the 
GOS is attempting to coordinate a new initiative on Darfur.  Despite 
its ongoing lack of capacity, UNAMID must find a way to engage on 
this issue - whether through training with local police or increased 
engagement with the police commanders, or both - in advance of the 
deployment of additional FPUs that should allow for 24-hour patrols. 
 
 
ASQUINO