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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1303, KALMA IDP CAMP UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1303 2008-08-27 14:33 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9753
OO RUEHRN
DE RUEHKH #1303/01 2401433
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271433Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1732
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0283
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001303 
 
DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, PRM, AND S/CRS 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
BRUSSELS FOR JADDLETON 
USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID KPKO AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT:  KALMA IDP CAMP UPDATE 
 
REF:  Khartoum 1300 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COUNTING THE COST IN KALMA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
1. (SBU) UNAMID sources confirmed that 33 IDPs were killed on August 
25, with 31 buried inside the camp following the fighting, and two 
dying at the hospital in Nyala.  The embassy received an unconfirmed 
report from Fur tribal leaders that of the 33 dead, 11 women were 
killed, two of whom were pregnant; and seven children were killed, 
two of whom were infants.  Witnesses report that army forces have 
withdrawn, and UNAMID has taken up posts surrounding the camp. 
 
2. (SBU) On August 27, Deputy UNSRSG Amina Haq briefed the monthly 
UN-Donors Principals meeting on her visit to Nyala the previous day. 
 UNICEF had been allowed access to the camp and had evacuated 51 
wounded to Nyala General Hospital, of whom two later died.  14 of 
the surviving injured are children, she said, and 19 female.  Haq 
reported that DPKO had briefed the UNSC on the Kalma situation the 
previous day. 
 
3. (SBU) Haq was unable to enter the camp itself, but did meet with 
South Darfur-state authorities, including the Deputy Wali. 
According to Haq, the Deputy Wali defended the GoS actions, saying 
that "Kalma is out of control" and posed a credible threat to 
security, but added that he regretted the loss of civilian life. 
The UN delegation had responded that the civilian deaths were 
"unacceptable," and that there are better ways to establish security 
in the IDP camps than periodic incursions, such as a permanent 
police presence or joint patrols with UNAMID.  The Deputy Wali 
agreed that in the short-run the government must work with 
humanitarian agencies to protect civilians and in the longer-term 
must establish a mechanism for working with the UN and humanitarian 
NGOs. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
POLITICAL FALLOUT 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
4. (SBU) Political repercussions from the events in Kalma camp 
spread across Darfur, as seven Fur leaders who held posts within the 
government of South Darfur announced their resignations Wednesday, 
and authoritative sources conjectured that the governor of West 
Darfur would resign as well.  Salah Mohamed Fadil, Fur sultan and 
advisor to the Wali of South Darfur on IDP affairs, told Pol FSN he 
tendered his resignation because the GOS is directly responsible for 
the use of excessive force. 
 
5. (SBU) Denying that it was a local decision on which he was 
consulted, Fadil said it was most likely an order handed down from 
Khartoum, as he had received word that the Wali of West Darfur was 
similarly advised to depopulate the camps, but had refused the 
order. Maqdoom Ahmed Adam Rijal confirmed that the Wali of West 
Darfur had refused a similar order, and suggested that the assault 
on Kalma camp was "part of a larger plan" delivered to Darfur when 
Ali Osman Taha, an NCP insider and Vice President of Sudan, visited 
Nyala secretly several days before. Al-Fadil Kaya, force commander 
of SLM/Free Will, expressed his anger by withdrawing Free Will 
integrated forces from GOS police and military units, and reiterated 
that the GOS is not seriously interested in peace.  A signatory to 
the post-DPA Declaration of Commitment (DOC), Kaya announced that 
Free Will intends to pull out of the DOC. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
POLICE DEFICIENCIES EXPOSED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6. (SBU) During a meeting attended by Poloffs at UNAMID headquarters 
in El Fasher, UNAMID's civilian police unit emphasized that the 
GOS's handling of the events at Kalma camp this week had exposed 
deficiencies in the capabilities of Sudanese police in dealing with 
angry mobs.  Sudanese police officers, including those sent in to 
deal with riots, are armed only with AK-47s; they generally respond 
to angry demonstrators by shooting into crowds. Should donors 
prioritize improving Sudanese riot-control capabilities, UNAMID is 
prepared to reformulate what kind of training and commitments are 
needed to equip Sudanese police to avoid such violent resolutions in 
the future. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001303  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
SLM/MM ADVISER: "EXCESSIVE FORCE" USED BY GOS AT KALMA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7. (SBU) Poloffs met with Mohammed Basheer Abdalla, chief of staff 
to Senior Presidential Assistant Minni Minnawi, on August 27 at his 
office on the grounds of the Republican Palace to discuss his 
insider's perspective on the August 25 fighting at Kalma camp. 
Blaming the GOS for using what he called "excessive force," Basheer 
was quick to dismiss the official GOS line that Kalma camp was a 
militarized haven for rebel agitators intent on fomenting rebellion. 
 "It is not true to say that Kalma camp is armed. It is normal to 
have arms and drugs inside an IDP camp, but the GOS has always been 
concerned that they know too little about what is going on inside 
the camp."  A university classmate of the Wali of South Darfur, 
Basheer was skeptical that the Wali himself commanded the forces 
that surrounded, then fired on human shields and shooters inside the 
camp. "Anything he does is ordered by my neighbors here," he said, 
tilting his head in the direction of the Republic Palace, across the 
palace grounds from his office. 
 
ASQUINO