VZCZCXRO8897
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1300/01 2391500
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261500Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1726
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0280
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001300 
 
AIDAC 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, PRM, AF SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, BPITTMAN, CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SP, USAID/W DCHA SUDAN 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NEW YORK FOR FSHANKS 
BRUSSELS FOR JADDLETON 
USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KPKO AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON FIGHTING IN KALMA CAMP, SOUTH DARFUR 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1289 
 
KHARTOUM 00001300  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) BEGIN SUMMARY: On August 25, USAID staff received reports 
of fighting and casualties in Kalma internally displaced person 
(IDP) camp, South Darfur (REFTEL).  UNAMID stated that armed IDPs 
had set up human shields and fired first on GOS forces assembled 
outside the camp, and UNAMID managed to respond with Armored 
Personnel Carriers (APCs) and police in the afternoon following the 
incident. On August 26, USAID received additional information 
regarding the casualties, residents fleeing the camp, and emergency 
needs within the camp's facilities. USAID will continue to monitor 
the situation, and will provide updates as additional information 
becomes available.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
THE SITUATION IN KALMA: WOUNDED, DEAD, AND SURROUNDED 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) All reports indicate that fighting in Kalma camp ceased 
around midday on August 25, although the government maintained and 
later reinforced a heavy military presence around the camp. 
According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), throughout the day on August 25, the Sudanese 
government forces, including police and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), 
refused entry to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
trying to access the camp in order to help injured residents. 
Additional reports indicate that government troops were 
simultaneously trying to remove dead bodies from the camp by force. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) By 1200 hours on August 25, USAID's implementing partner, 
the International Rescue Committee (IRC), reported that its clinic 
housed at least 64 injured camp residents and three dead.  At 1500 
hours, IRC clinic staff reported 39 seriously wounded patients with 
gunshot injuries and fractures.  In addition, the clinic was running 
out of IV fluids and antibiotics, and staff reported six patients in 
critical condition and in need of an emergency evacuation.  By 1700 
hours, the clinic had 5 dead civilians.  As of 1900 hours, IRC staff 
reported that UNAMID forces had accessed the clinic and transported 
the six critical patients out of Kalma. Throughout the day, 
additional IRC staff tried to gain access to assist their 
overwhelmed coworkers; however, Sudanese forces prevented any NGO 
access to the camp. 
 
¶4. (U) Exact numbers of deaths and injuries are conflicting and 
unverified; however, according to one UN source, the fighting killed 
32 people and injured 105 camp residents.  The same UN source 
identified the incident as a "full armed confrontation" between SAF 
and IDP residents of Kalma camp. In addition, international news 
agencies are reporting that thousands of Kalma's residents fled from 
the camp and into the desert in order to escape the shooting. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Medecins Sans Frontieres/Holland (MSF/H) reported that 
MSF/H staff treated more than 65 shooting victims, mainly women and 
children, in its medical clinic in the camp. MSF/H also reported 
that Government of Sudan (GoS) forces tried to prevent MSF/H staff 
from entering the camp, and as of 1700 hours on August 25, the GoS 
deployed additional army and police forces to Kalma. After gaining 
access to the camp at 1800 hours, UNAMID and MSF/H evacuated 45 of 
IRC and MSF\H's most critical patients to a hospital in nearby 
Nyala.  On August 26, MSF/H sent a team to Kalma to assist with 
burying the deceased. 
 
¶6. (U) As of 1200 hours on August 26, international new sources 
quoting camp residents indicated that government troops had 
reinforced positions around the camp overnight and may be preparing 
for a second attack. In addition, camp residents and armed 
opposition group members offered casualty numbers including 46 dead 
and 118 injured from the firefight. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
KHARTOUM 00001300  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
HUMAN SHIELDS SET UP BY ARMED IDPS: UNAMID 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7. (SBU) UNAMID Chief of Staff John Alstrom met with Poloffs at 
UNAMID headquarters in El Fasher on August 26 and offered a clearer 
explanation of events that led up to the outbreak of hostilities 
between IDPs and GOS forces on August 25.  According to Alstrom, GOS 
police had surrounded the camp the previous evening, with the intent 
to search it, but heavy rains forced them to retreat and return the 
next morning.  Tipped off that authorities intended to enter and 
search Kalma, agitators within the camp assembled a group of human 
shields, mostly women and children, in the early morning of August 
25, and fired first from inside the camp on GOS forces assembled 
outside.  .  As the fighting escalated, GOS forces did not enter the 
camp, but continued shooting from  outside.   UNAMID responded with 
a convoy of armored  personnel carriers, police and military staff 
from El Fasher that, after encountering  roadblocks, arrived at 
Kalma camp that afternoon to assess the events and estimate 
casualties. Although UNAMID is unable to confirm the varying reports 
of numbers of dead or wounded, Alstrom did say that some reports 
coming from inside the camp may be exaggerated. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Kamal Saiki, director of UNAMID Public Information, 
expressed concern in a meeting with Poloffs on the humanitarian 
principle that if IDPs are armed, they can no longer be classified 
as IDPS, but must be considered combatants. Saiki believes the event 
to have been orchestrated by the Wali of South Darfur and local 
police authorities, noting that Khartoum has been helpful in 
cooperating with UNAMID as of late. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
INTERNATIONALS CONDEMN, LOCAL AUTHORITIES DEFEND 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9. (U) On August 25, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator issued a press 
statement condemning the incident in Kalma camp.  In the UN 
statement, the Humanitarian Coordinator called for restraint and the 
immediate establishment of a humanitarian corridor to allow for the 
evacuation of the wounded.  On August 26, the UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator met with the South Darfur Wali and indicated that the UN 
and international community do not welcome the actions taken on the 
part of the GoS.  In addition, the Humanitarian Coordinator 
reiterated that a humanitarian corridor must be established in order 
to assist people and underscored that UNAMID should maintain the 
corridor.  On August 26, the UN sent UNAMID police and military 
forces to patrol Kalma camp to confirm details of the incident and 
to provide assistance. 
 
¶10. (SBU) On August 26, U.S. Embassy in Khartoum released the 
Department of State's August 25  press statement  condemning the 
SAF's indiscriminate weapons fire and calling upon the GoS to 
investigate the incident and ensure that such actions are not 
repeated and delivered it to Ambassador Eltayeb, Director of the 
Peace Institute of the MFA.  Eltayeb expressed skepticism that GoS 
forces used indiscriminate force and said that judgments on the 
incident should await a full investigation. 
 
¶11. (U) On August 25, the SAF issued its own  statement on the Kalma 
incident, claiming that the GoS carried out the operation in order 
to seize weapons stored at the camp and that government forces were 
ambushed by camp residents and thus returned fire.  In addition, the 
statement contended that the Darfur IDPs planned to use such weapons 
to carryout sabotage operations and target government forces (Note: 
SAF Statement has been sent via email to SPG. End Note.)   In the 
past, the GoS has raided Kalma, claiming that IDP residents use the 
camp as a base for recruitment, opposition, and weapons storage. The 
SAF statement also confirms that forces will continue to "besiege" 
the camp in order to collect weapons, prevent armed opposition group 
access, and impose government sovereignty. 
 
¶12. (SBU) According to August 26 phone conversations between USAID 
staff and NGO representatives, NGOs are calling on the government 
and all armed actors to allow a humanitarian corridor that  would 
allow humanitarian agencies safe access to treat and/or evacuate 
those who need medical care.  Additionally NGOs are calling on 
 
KHARTOUM 00001300  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
UNAMID to deploy the formed police unit and civilian police to 
provide 24 hour presence within the camp.  They are also asking 
UNAMID for 24 hour military patrols along the perimeter  of the 
camp.  US Embassy staff currently in El Fasher will meet with UNAMID 
on August 27 and plan to discuss the issue further. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶13. (U) Kalma camp is home to between 90,000 and 100,000 IDPs from 
29 different ethnic groups.  In recent months, Kalma camp has been a 
flashpoint for nearly every chronic and reoccurring problem in 
Darfur.  Whether problems of bureaucratic impediments, fuel and 
water shortages, seasonal flooding, or government raids, the camp 
continues to make headlines on a weekly or daily basis. 
 
¶14. (SBU) On August 25, UNAMID received a letter in Arabic from the 
GoS Police stating that the GoS had a search warrant authorizing 
police to enter Kalma camp.  The warrant was effective as of August 
24 and authorized GoS forces to search the camp for weapons and 
wanted persons.  The letter served as UNAMID's notice that the GoS 
expected UNAMID assistance and accompaniment for this exercise. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Shortly after GoS delivered the letter, UNAMID received a 
call from the sheikhs (local leaders) of Kalma camp who reported 
that the GoS had positioned more than 30 vehicles of personnel at a 
checkpoint to the IDP camp.  By 0900 hours, the leaders reported 
that the vehicles had increased to more than 80 and camp residents 
reported that the GoS personnel were shooting randomly into the air. 
 
 
¶16. (SBU) According to USAID field staff, on August 21, GoS forces 
raided Kalma camp and removed weapons from two IDP houses.  This 
raid followed an incident during the week of August 18 when National 
Security (NISS) and SAF military intelligence forces at the Mojuck 
checkpoint 8 km from Nyala detained 11 IDPs en route to Kalma. 
Although the IDPs were later released, according to UNAMID, the 
detainment was arranged after the government forces alleged the 
discovery of arms in Kalma camp. 
 
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COMMENTS 
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¶17. (SBU) In the past year, the GOS has been quite public in its 
desire to close Kalma camp and disperse the camp's residents. 
Despite this, the question of who is guilty of provoking this 
particularly deadly encounter between the SAF and armed IDPs remains 
in dispute.  The issue of armed IDPs presents the international 
community with yet another source of instability in Darfur.  While 
UNAMID recognizes that it needs to do more to prevent such 
incidents, it continues to have  limited capacity to respond once 
these violent conflicts erupt. 
 
ASQUINO