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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1276, WHILE DARFUR PLANS ABOUND, FOCUS SHOULD BE HUMANITARIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1276 2008-08-21 07:56 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5420
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1276/01 2340756
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210756Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1687
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001276 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: WHILE DARFUR PLANS ABOUND, FOCUS SHOULD BE HUMANITARIAN 
ACCESS AND PROTECTION 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1067 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Within the last month, many politicians, 
opposition political parties, and civil society representatives have 
announced their proposals for ending the crisis in Darfur (see para 
10 for a list of many of these initiatives).  On August 19, three 
different groups and individuals (the Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue, a moderate NCP advisor, and the TDRA's Compensation 
Committee chairman) all pitched their own Darfur plans to polchief 
and poloff.  With many different competing and vague plans, CHD's 
initiative, a pragmatic approach focusing on humanitarian access and 
security, appears the most promising.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CHD: START WITH HUMANITARIAN ACCESS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2.  (SBU)  On August 19, Dennis McNamara and Theo Murphy of the 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue told polchief and poloff that 
focusing on humanitarian access and protection should serve as a 
foundational step leading to more comprehensive negotiations.  In 
their view, the peace process is fragmented, stalled, and 
leaderless, and the focus in the near term should be securing 
humanitarian protection and access in Darfur -  "the proven worst 
region in the world for banditry and hijacking."  McNamara and 
Murphy stated that it is in the interest of both the movements and 
the GoS to ensure humanitarian aid reaches the people of Darfur and 
that some rebel groups such as JEM and SLA/Unity have already agreed 
to "affirm their full support for the efforts of the humanitarian 
organizations to assist the people of Darfur."  Building on the June 
workshop in Geneva that resulted in a commitment from SLA/U and JEM 
to coordinate on a mechanism to ensure a reduction in highjackings 
in their respective areas of control, McNamara and Murphy stated 
that they are now planning a meeting for only GoS officials in 
Geneva to discuss humanitarian access and security.  The CHD 
representatives reported that they were supposed to present the idea 
to General Commissioner for the Humanitarian Affairs Commission, 
Hassabo Abdel Rahman on August 19, but that neither Hassabo nor 
leaders such as U/S Mutriff Sadiq were able to meet. 
 
3.  (SBU)  According to these CHD representatives, although some of 
the rebel movements are currently supporting themselves through 
robbery and banditry, they could be enticed to help secure their 
areas of control.  McNamara noted that "a deal could be worked out," 
where the movements are discretely and indirectly rewarded with 
increased food aid and non-military logistical support for reducing 
the number of incidents of high jacking and banditry in their areas 
of control.  Polchief explained that there are restrictions to 
providing assistance to armed combatant groups, to which McNamara 
responded, "these things can always be worked out when done in the 
right way." (Comment:  In addition to legal barriers, it should also 
be noted that the CHD approach assumes that:  the rebels are able to 
develop stronger command and control structures over all of their 
field commanders and affiliated groups; the rebels have clearly 
defined and static areas of control; the GoS is ready to recognize 
the existence of rebel controlled areas.  All of these issues must 
be addressed if CHD's approach is successful.  End Comment.) 
 
4.  (SBU)  McNamara and Murphy agreed that this approach has 
provided the foundation for substantive negotiations in areas such 
as Congo and Sierra Leone.  McNamara and Murphy added that such 
humanitarian access and security will encourage communication among 
the parties, as there is the constant need for information about the 
movement of convoys from region to region. Murphy also told poloff 
on August 20 that this approach can help build confidence among 
parties as monitoring the number of hijackings can provide 
quantitative feedback about the success of this approach.  McNamara 
noted that CHD has discussed this idea with UNAMID's Joint Special 
Representative Rodolphe Adada, and while Adada expressed interest in 
the idea, he may need further convincing particularly about the 
implementation mechanisms for such a program.  Although formally 
operating under the authority of the UN/AU's Joint Mediation Support 
Team, McNamara and Murphy stated that they have not directly 
discussed their plan with new chief mediator Djibril Bassole, as 
they want to allow him the time and space to formulate his own ideas 
"before we step in an unhelpful way." 
 
NCP LEADER ON GoS DECISION MAKING & NEED FOR U.S. PLAN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  Also on August 19, a senior advisor of the National 
Congress Party told polchief and poloff that President Bashir's 
Darfur People's Initiative and the party's whole strategy to Darfur 
is "a mess."  (Note: Contact's name and biography is available by 
siprnet communications.  End Note.)  The NCP official characterized 
the decision-making process in the NCP as "a big problem" and stated 
that "there have been a lot of missed opportunities in Darfur 
 
KHARTOUM 00001276  002 OF 003 
 
 
because of this flawed decision-making process."  The NCP official 
claimed that NCP leaders have tried to control Darfur through 
Arabization, militarization, and the exploitation of ethnic 
identities.  According to the NCP official, strategic decisions are 
not made at NCP headquarters or in government offices, but in select 
circles at people's homes.  The NCP official said that Presidential 
Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie is at the head of this broken mechanism. 
Focusing on Nafie, the NCP official said that he has become such an 
authority in the regime that "as soon as he says something, it 
suddenly becomes a policy." 
 
6.  (SBU)  The NCP official stated that because of this flawed 
system, it is difficult for senior NCP officials to listen to new 
ideas.  However, the NCP official noted that during this critical 
period the regime will listen to anything the U.S. proposes. Even if 
the NCP rejects a U.S. plan for Darfur, said the NCP official, a 
U.S. initiative could start a new dialogue about possible solutions 
for the troubled region.  "Some people in the NCP are very eager to 
hear from the U.S.  The U.S. has a responsibility to try to do 
something and this will put pressure on the hardliners," stated the 
NCP official.  However, on a much more pessimistic note, the NCP 
official said that he doubted the NCP will allow for progress in 
resolving the Darfur conflict "because they are afraid that Darfuris 
will unite against them."  Therefore the regime is unwilling - 
"paralyzed" according to the NCP official - to take any specific 
course of action other than continuing to play various groups off 
one another. 
 
DARFUR JUNCTURE FOR UNITY AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
7.  (SBU)  Also on August 19, Abulgasim Ahmed Abulgasim, the Head of 
the TDRA's Compensation Committee, and Abdulhamid Ahmed Amin, a 
Darfuri businessmen working in Saudi Arabia, presented their plan 
for Darfur to polchief and poloff.  According to Abulgasim, the plan 
entitled "The Darfur Juncture for Unity and Sustainable Peace," will 
focus first on "creating a conducive environment for uniting the 
people of Darfur..."  Abulgasim stated that the forty-page plan was 
drafted months ago, but not released until it was presented to 
government leaders such as Nafie Ali Nafie, Muhammad Mandour 
Al-Mahdi, and Ahmed Haroun. Abdulgasim said that it is necessary to 
convince VP Taha ("leading the political wing of the NCP,") and 
Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie ("leading the security wing of 
the NCP,") of the validity of this initiative.  Abulgasim said that 
the GoS as a whole has been very receptive to the plan. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Abulgasim added that this unaffiliated plan is 
particularly important, as Darfuris will reject proposals put forth 
only by political parties or by the government.    (Note:  On August 
20, Abulgasim delivered an English translation of the declaration, 
objective, and signatories of the initiative to poloff.  This 
document has been forwarded to AF/SPG and the office of the Special 
Envoy.  Abulgasim promised to forward a full translation of the full 
40 page Arabic document to poloff when completed. End Note.) 
Abulgasim stated that he has not had any contact with Chief Mediator 
Djibril Bassole. 
 
9.  (SBU)  Comment:  Although a comprehensive analysis of 
Abulgasim's plan will not be completed until a full translation of 
the document becomes available, locally engaged staff observed that 
the plan appears to treat the GoS with great sensitivity.  LES staff 
speculated that the document may have been written with the GoS in 
mind as a primary audience.  The plan also requests a budget of 25 
million euros for this initiative, a significant sum, especially 
when compared to the measly 13 million received by the TDRA in its 
two and half years in existence.  End Comment. 
 
KNOWN DARFUR INITIATIVES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
10.  As of August 20, the following Darfur initiatives have been 
announced: 
 
- National Umma Party Initiative 
- Democratic Unionist Party Initiative, Muhammad Othman Mirghani 
Initiative 
- Democratic Unionists Party Initiative, Ali Mahmoud Hassanein 
(Translated version sent to AF/SPG and Office of SE.) 
- SPLM Initiative 
- Darfur Forum Initiative 
- Darfur Civil Society Organization Initiatives (Heidelberg, 
Cambridge, DAJO, Dar Es Salaam) 
- Popular Congress Party Darfur Program, otherwise known as the 
Darfur People's Initiative 
- Umma Federal Party Darfur Initiative 
- Rashaida Free Lion Initiative (Translated version sent to AF/SPG 
 
KHARTOUM 00001276  003 OF 003 
 
 
and Office of SE.) 
- Darfur Civil Society Forum 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
11.  (SBU)  The plethora of Darfur plans has created a chaotic 
environment in which almost every political group claims to have the 
answer to the Darfur crisis.  While the potential ICC indictment 
against Bashir has brought a newfound energy to the peace process, 
it has not done so in a constructive, structured, and unified 
manner.  Until the GoS brings something concrete to its much-touted 
Darfur People's Initiative or Djibril Bassole outlines his own plan 
for Darfur, CHD's vision appears to be the most reasonable plan.  It 
starts with humanitarian access and security as a point of 
departure; with participation from UNAMID, this plan could be built 
into closer security coordination among UNAMID and rebel, militia, 
and SAF commanders in the field.  Although CHD leaders have 
presented this idea to senior GoS officials, Adada, and the 
international community, it is surprising that CHD has not pushed 
this idea with one of the single most important players - Djibril 
Bassole - who is now in the UK studying English.  During our August 
19 and 20 meetings with CHD representatives, we encouraged CHD to 
reach out to the Chief Mediator, as they have extensive experience 
on the ground in Darfur, and can help inform Bassole during this 
crucial transitional period. 
 
ASQUINO