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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1270, UNAMID NIGHT FLIGHT CLARIFICATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1270 2008-08-20 05:00 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4411
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1270 2330500
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200500Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1677
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001270 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID NIGHT FLIGHT CLARIFICATION 
 
1. (U) On August 17, the Sudan Tribune online reported that the GoS 
has permitted UNAMID to conduct night flights in Darfur.  The 
article reports that "eight months after the start of the hybrid 
mission, the Sudanese government agreed to allow the AU-UN 
peacekeeping force to fly at night, the head of UNAMID said today." 
 
 
2.  (SBU)  On August 19, Adam Day, the assistant to Joint Special 
Representative Rodolphe Adada, told poloff that the Sudan Tribune 
report was exaggerated and "not true."  According to Day,  the GoS 
agreed "in principle" to UNAMID night flights, once UNAMID completes 
upgrades (i.e. extending the runway and adding lights) to the 
airports in Darfur.  Day said that UNAMID has the capability to land 
their planes even without these improvements, as demonstrated by one 
landing in an exceptional case.  However, he continued, the GoS will 
not allow night landings until the upgrades allow all planes to 
conduct such night landings on a routine basis. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Day said that both UNAMID and the GoS are responsible for 
this continued misunderstanding.  He said the GoS could improve the 
situation by allowing UNAMID to speed deployment by allowing UNAMID 
to land their planes at night while upgrades are ongoing.  For their 
part, UNAMID could improve the situation by delivering material 
needed for the upgrades to the airports as soon as possible.  Day 
said that UNAMID is expected to provide all material for the 
upgrades to the airports.  Day did not specify whether UNAMID would 
also be solely responsible for completing all of the work for the 
upgrades.  Day said there have been approximately one-half dozen 
meetings such as this, where "we have not gotten into these 
specifics, and we never quite nail down what is going to happen." 
 
 
4.  (SBU)  Day noted  this issue continues to be an important one 
for UNAMID, as an agreement on night landings would more than double 
the number of flights bringing contingent-owned equipment into 
Darfur.  Day said that the next 10-12 days before Ramadan will be 
crucial, as work will come to a standstill during the entire month. 
 Day added that UNAMID and the GoS were drafting an MOU on UNAMID 
presence in Sudanese airports that should be completed in the next 
two weeks. 
 
5.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  As is often the case with the AU/UN's efforts 
in Darfur, the blame for the ongoing difficulty with night flights 
seems to fall both on the GoS and UNAMID.  The GoS wants to benefit 
from UNAMID's work in Darfur and expand its transportation 
infrastructure, while UNAMID wants to move material into Darfur 
expending the least possible effort.  Both of these are reasonable 
expectations, but what is unreasonable, and should be pointed out to 
both parties, is that the people of Darfur continue to be plagued by 
insecurity while slow UNAMID deployment brings little relief.  If 
UNAMID is serious about engaging with the GOS on this issue and 
solving the problem of night flights, it needs to find out precisely 
what is required to upgrade the airports and then get the job done. 
Emboffs will discuss this with UNAMID during a field visit to El 
Fasher next week. 
 
ASQUINO