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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1249, US SPECIAL ENVOY MEETING WITH THE NGO STEERING COMMITTEE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1249 2008-08-17 15:06 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2467
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1249/01 2301506
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171506Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1643
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0099
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0285
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0105
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0268
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001249 
 
AIDAC 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, PRM, AF SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SP, USAID/W DCHA SUDAN 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NEW YORK FOR FSHANKS 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU
SUBJECT: US SPECIAL ENVOY MEETING WITH THE NGO STEERING COMMITTEE 
 
KHARTOUM 00001249  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1. (SBU) On August 13, SE Williamson met with the NGO Steering 
Committee to discuss the Committee's concerns regarding humanitarian 
aid programs throughout Sudan, particularly in Abyei and Darfur, as 
well as recent issues including the referral to the ICC for an 
arrest warrant against President Bashir, GOS bureaucratic 
impediments, the upswing in attacks on humanitarian workers, and the 
UN's recently-increased security phases.  During the hour-long 
session, representatives from MedAir, World Vision, CARE, IRC, 
Concern, Tearfund, and Mercy Corps offered the SE their observations 
on operational difficulties, security incidents, and their overall 
experiences.  He also solicited their thoughts on future contingency 
plans and maintenance of life-saving programs. 
 
--------------------------------- 
HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AND CAVEATS 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Members of the NGO Steering Committee covered specific 
concerns and issues impacting humanitarian partners operating in 
Sudan, including humanitarian access and space, bureaucratic 
impediments and government harassment, increased pressure fueled by 
the ICC announcement, and NGOs' preference to "de-link" humanitarian 
assistance from all political negotiations with government actors. 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
ABYEI:  MODEST PROGRESS AND MUCH WORK AHEAD 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) The SE recapped his trip to Abyei noting some optimism over 
progress made thus far, but also highlighting  the limited progress 
made with cleaning up the town, appointing a new Administration, 
deploying the JIUs, and witnessing some returnees to Abyei.  The SE 
expressed his disappointment with incomplete training of the JIU and 
noted that moving to the integrated unit will be a test of success. 
Overall, the SE suggested that recovery would be a long process, and 
that great strides must be taken to repair the roads and structures 
destroyed by the May violence and looting. 
 
4. (SBU) The Steering Committee was encouraged by the appointment of 
the Abyei Administration, however, they indicated a concern 
regarding the capacity of the appointed individuals, as well as the 
role that Edward Lino may play.  According to the NGOs, Abyei needs 
a strong and committed administration in order to achieve real peace 
and security. In addition, NGO representatives stated that they are 
concerned about creating a "pull factor" by providing assistance in 
Abyei for returnees.  Rather than responding to political pressure, 
the Committee confirmed that aQeople start to move back, 
assistance will follow, as long as the potential for violence is 
diminished. 
 
5. (SBU) The Steering Committee also stated concern regarding the 
role of UNMIS during the May violence. Although UNMIS conducted a 
successful evacuation of humanitarian staff, communications broke 
down, and UNMIS forces neglected to stop or document the subsequent 
looting throughout Abyei.  The SE also indicated his displeasure 
over reports that UNMIS only had between 70 and 90 armed soldiers in 
Abyei, rather than the 300 troops originally reported.  According to 
one person on the ground, the UNMIS issue "isn't a question of 
bravery, but rather one of preparedness," and the SE has pushed the 
issue of greater preparedness and force numbers for UNMIS with the 
UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).  Participants 
agreed that UNMIS would not have had to demonstrate a huge show of 
force in order to deter looting and such actions should be covered 
under UNMIS' Chapter 7 mandate that  includes a responsibility to 
protect civilians. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001249  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
DARFUR: A CHANGING SITUATION WITH CHRONIC PROBLEMS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
6. (SBU) NGOs reported that humanitarian access and space in Darfur 
are shrinking, bureaucratic impediments are increasing, NGO staff 
feel increased pressure related to the ICC decision, and programs 
are frequently impacted by changes in the political situation, 
whether at national or international levels.  NGOs described feeling 
like "political volleyballs" used by the GoS as a bargaining tool. 
NGO staff cited concerns about WFP ration cuts that foster increased 
protection problems for women who would usually sell part of a food 
ration for cash, but now must travel outside the camps to collect 
firewood or find work. (NOTE: Beginning in August, the UN World Food 
Program has restored the ration size to 75 percent of a full ration. 
END NOTE.) In addition, steering committee members highlighted how 
bureaucratic impediments limit the fuel and supplies that NGOs can 
transport to camps, leaving beneficiaries without clean water and 
other essential services, and thereby increasing the chance for 
disease outbreaks in the overcrowded camps as IDPs resort to 
drinking water from non-functioning water pumps or the wadis 
(seasonal riverbeds). Steering committee members also recalled 
incidents of the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) threatening 
relief agency staff and accusing humanitarian workers of providing 
information to the ICC for the ICC's Darfur investigation. According 
to the NGOs, the accusations were accompanied by threats of future 
restrictions on access for humanitarian workers and essential relief 
programs. 
 
7. (SBU) NGOs catalogued current threats of insecurity and the 
impact that frequent attacks continue to have on implementing 
partners and beneficiaries.  Throughout Darfur, displacement and 
de-facto camp expansion continue, pockets of increased malnutrition 
appear, and insecurity and bureaucratic impediments cause a 
breakdown in supply lines of essential, life-saving supplies.  In 
addition, increased attacks by bandits against humanitarian workers 
have forced several partners to remove staff and suspend essential 
programs.  According to one NGO partner, "we are forced to choose 
between putting our staff at risk, and letting children die." 
 
8. (SBU) The SE delegation asked the NGOs about the impact of the 
recent UN shift to Phase IV throughout Darfur.  According to the 
Steering Committee, relief agencies saw the shift as being 
arbitrarily imposed by the UN rather than stemming from an actual 
increase in area insecurity.  The shift to Phase IV forced 
humanitarian agencies to reduce staff.  This reduction in staff, 
according to NGOs, is due to air assets for evacuations rather than 
to security threats. One NGO described the UN-led process of 
determining essential staffing levels as chaotic and confused 
especially in determining air assets (particularly UN assets) to 
transport staff, in both day-to-day and emergency cases. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
9. (U) Throughout the conversation, NGO participants expressed 
concern about the future.  The SE observed that unfortunately 
sometimes it seems that "everything in Sudan is a no-win game."  The 
NGOs also expressed anxiety over the ramifications of an ICC 
indictment to their operations. The SE thanked the Steering 
Committee for their dedication to Sudan and their difficult work. 
He underscored the USG's commitment to Sudan and in providing 
humanitarian relief for those in need. Speaking of the latter, the 
SE concluded:  "It is important to feed them, but it is also 
important to give them a future for tomorrow--to give them their 
lives back". 
 
10. (U) SE Williamson did not clear this cable prior to his 
departure. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001249  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
ASQUINO