VZCZCXRO9393
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1223/01 2260943
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130943Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1591
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001223 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON MEETING WITH UNAMID 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On August 12, senior UNAMID officials briefed SE 
Williamson at UNAMID headquarters in El-Fasher.  Officials 
complained of growing insecurity, significant and ongoing delays in 
deployment, and an ambitious (and most likely unrealistic) plan to 
make up for lost time.  SE Williamson strongly expressed his 
continued frustration with UNAMID, and asked that the hybrid 
operation be more flexible and pro-active in the tough environment 
of Darfur.  He also requested that UNAMID inform the U.S. when 
encountering difficulties, "as we can't help you if we don't know 
what you need." SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  (NOTE:  UNAMID officials shared the meeting's PowerPoint 
slides with the visiting delegation.  These slides have been sent to 
AF/SPG, USUN, and the Office of the Special Envoy. END NOTE.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Deputy Joint Special Representative Henry Anyidoho opened 
the meeting highlighting the July 8 attack on UNAMID peacekeepers, 
and the growing insecurity in Darfur caused by banditry and 
carjackings.  He said that despite delays, "UNAMID is doing the best 
that we can."  He noted that UN Security Phase IV may further impede 
and slow its operations.  UNDSS Head of Security in El-Fasher, 
Francis Sikaonga, stated that he number of carjackings, deaths (for 
UNAMID personnel, contractors, and INGO workers) and other security 
incidents in 2008 (as of July 30) already exceeds the total number 
in 2007. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Deputy Force Commander Emmanuel Karake Karenzi 
highlighted attacks by unknown forces on UNAMID forces in Shangil 
Tobaya and Muhajaria.  He stated that JEM has tried to contact Minni 
Minnawi and other forces, and that it has approximately two to three 
thousand fighters along the Chad-Sudan border in North Darfur. A 
similar number of Khartoum-supported Chadian rebels are poised along 
the Chad-Sudan border in West Darfur.  According to Karenzi, the 
number of UNAMID patrols, convoy escorts, and support to NGOs have 
all increased in 2008.  Like previous speakers, Karenzi also noted 
that the Phase IV security will affect operations.  Karenzi ended 
his presentation saying that 90% of battalions already deployed do 
not meet UN standards, and that most battalions promised by troop 
contributing countries have not yet deployed. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  On these points, SE Williamson interjected and stated 
that Ethiopian officials recently expressed their dissatisfaction 
with UNAMID's inability to absorb their troops.  He noted that 
before last month, UNAMID had spent only 300 million of a 1.2 
billion dollar budget (though adding that in the past month over 900 
million dollars had been quickly committed.)  "I have never known a 
bureaucracy that is not able to spend money," stated Williamson. 
Williamson labeled UNAMID's slow progress as "frustrating and 
incomprehensible."  He noted that in over six months, UNAMID has 
added only two battalions, a source of deep disappointment for the 
U.S.  Williamson said that UNAMID needs to pass on requests for help 
to the U.S, as "as we can't help you if we don't know what you 
need."  He noted that in 2008, the U.S. has spent an amount of money 
training African troops that is greater than that spent building 
camps, asking, "How do you justify that?" 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  DJSR For Operations and Management, Hocine Medili lamely 
stated that "everyone in the room believes we should be further 
along than we are."  He noted that more troops and camps are "in the 
pipeline," to which Williamson responded, "How long did it take the 
US to build camps for AU peacekeepers compared to what you are 
doing?"  As an example, Williamson said that UNAMID should be 
flexible and accept needed equipment, even if it does not meet 
exactly the UN's high and rigid standards. Using helicopters as an 
example, he stated that the Ethiopians would like to bring their 
attack helicopters without night vision, but that UN standards 
prevent this. DFC Karenzi readily admitted that some attack 
helicopters, whatever their limitations, are better than none. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The remainder of the meeting focused on ongoing delays in 
deployment.  Karenzi noted that deployment stands at 42% (8077 of 
19,555,) but that 80% might be attained by the end of 2008.  SE 
Williamson stated that this number appears unrealistic and 
challenged UNAMID officials to bet on this. Logistics Chief Ian 
Divers jokingly stated that he would not accept Williamson's bet, 
but that UNAMID officials are doing their best under difficult 
circumstances.  He observed that UN headquarters in NY did not 
accept his earlier and lower forecasts for deployment by the end of 
2008 preferring a higher number to give a more optimistic (but 
unrealistic) number to fool the unwary.  He said UNAMID in El-Fasher 
then raised the goal to 80%, even though they will have to struggle 
to achieve this goal.  Divers acknowledged that this high goal 
depends on the completion of a number of "resource requirements" 
including a new airport in El-Geneina and air lift support directly 
to Darfur bypassing clogged Port Sudan.  (Note: Pushed on the 
feasibility of 80% deployment, UNAMID noted they came up with a 
 
KHARTOUM 00001223  002 OF 002 
 
 
realistic assessment of 65% deployment; however Jane Hol Lute stated 
that was not acceptable and made them revise their assessment.  The 
result was the current optimistic 80% deployment. End note.) 
 
¶8.  (SBU) COMMENT: Bureaucratic battles between New York and 
El-Fasher have resulted in goals that no one in El-Fasher believes 
are attainable.  In the coming months, we can expect that UNAMID 
officials will focus on Phase IV Security as a likely excuse for 
slow progress.  Although a source of continued frustration, the 
meeting did provide an opportunity to remind UNAMID of the need to 
be flexible, accountable, and accepting of outside help. UNAMID 
officials do feel that they are victims of former officials in DPKO 
playing a "double game," blaming a nasty regime in Khartoum and TCCs 
for their own internal shortcomings and reluctance for the mission. 
END COMMENT. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  SE Williamson cleared this cable prior to transmission. 
 
FERNANDEZ