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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1219, ICC INDICTMENTS: THE TIMING IS ALL WRONG SAY SUDANESE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1219 2008-08-12 14:12 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8728
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1219/01 2251412
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121412Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1583
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001219 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ICC INDICTMENTS: THE TIMING IS ALL WRONG SAY SUDANESE 
SCHOLARS AND AFRICAN DIPLOMATS 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  As Sudan awaits a decision by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) on whether to issue an arrest warrant for 
Sudan's President Bashir, Sudanese scholars and African diplomats in 
Khartoum we have spoken with predictably believe that while 
atrocities have been committed in Darfur, the present time is too 
sensitive to pursue such a high profile and dramatic action against 
Sudan's President.  They believe the indictments may have pushed the 
regime to try and forestall ICC action by seeking a solution on 
Darfur - or at least, to make the appearance of doing so.  However, 
our interlocutors agree that an ICC decision to issue an arrest 
warrant for President Bashir risks throwing Sudan into turmoil and 
renewed violence, with dire implications for the North-South 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as well.  END SUMMARY. 
 
INDICTMENTS WARRANTED - BUT NOW IS NOT A GOOD TIME 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
2. (SBU) Poloff spoke in recent days to two Sudanese political 
science professors and to two African diplomats from bordering 
states.  All agree that President Bashir probably deserves to be 
brought to justice for his role in Darfur.  However, they also argue 
- unanimously and predictably - that the ICC action comes at a very 
inopportune time, and an arrest warrant should not be issued while 
Bashir serves as president.  They say the ICC indictments have 
painted Bashir into a corner - along with everyone else working for 
peace in Sudan. 
 
3. (SBU) In a conversation with the CDA, Ethiopian Ambassador Ali 
Abdo Sulieman said his country, as part of the AU, had spoken out 
against the ICC indictment, because it unnecessarily complicates the 
delicate political situation inside Sudan.  The Kenyan DCM, Lindsay 
Kiptiness agreed, calling the indictments "ill timed;" the ICC 
prosecutor obviously did not take into account the consequences on 
the ground in Sudan, he said.  In fact, the Kenyan Government issued 
a statement against the indictments.  Kiptiness cited a Kenyan 
proverb that it is better to sacrifice one sheep than risk losing 
the whole flock - in other words, it is preferable to allow Bashir 
to get away with his crimes than risk provoking a flare-up of 
violence.  The Kenyan government believes atrocities have been 
committed in Darfur, but justice must be pursued peacefully - even 
it takes another 15 years, and not by taking the rash step of arrest 
warrants.  Kiptiness said Bashir could be brought to trial after he 
leaves office. 
 
4. (SBU) Dr. Mukhtar al Assam, a political science professor at the 
University of Khartoum (and regular contributor of commentary to 
Khartoum newspapers) told poloff that the situation now is "very 
serious for Sudan" as it awaits an ICC decision.  The ruling NCP 
knows that other African countries are helpless to get them out of 
this predicament.  (Note: in this regard, the Kenyan DCM told us 
that even though the AU and IGAD countries are giving Bashir vocal 
support, the member governments have to deal with the fait accompli 
of the indictment, and can't ignore it in their dealings with Sudan. 
 End Note.)  The NCP is hoping that the Security Council will vote 
to postpone the decision; "that's the best they can hope for," al 
Assam said.  Otherwise, "our only hope is that the three judges do 
not uphold the indictment." 
 
5. (SBU) Dr. Adlan al-Hardeloo, another Khartoum University 
political science professor, largely agreed with his colleague's 
assessment.  He characterized the ICC indictment as "morally 
correct" in that "it seeks justice for those involved in the 
atrocities" in Darfur.  However, "politically, it is wrong - the 
timing is wrong.  It will just lead to further complications for the 
peace process," which is bogged down on a number of very sensitive 
issues right now, including Abyei, UNAMID deployment, and formation 
of the National Electoral Commission and subsequent planning for 
elections. 
 
ICC ACTION PUSHES REGIME TO SEEK DARFUR SOLUTION 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
6. (SBU) Our interlocutors agree that the ICC crisis at least seems 
to have had the positive effect of pushing Bashir and the NCP to 
pull out all the stops in looking for a solution to Darfur. 
Professor Al Assam said the ICC action has left the NCP anxiously 
casting about for a fix.  The party "wants to send a message to the 
whole world" by finally showing good faith in the search for peace, 
he explained.  However, he cautioned, the situation is not now 
amenable to a solution.  Many of Darfur's armed groups see that the 
ICC indictment has left Bashir vulnerable, and consequently are now 
even less interested in making the necessary concessions for a peace 
agreement.  Even if the GNU were to want to accede to what the 
rebels want, the rebels themselves are unable to agree on demands. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001219  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
 
7.  (SBU) Hardeloo is somewhat more optimistic about the 
indictment's prospects for Darfur.  The fact of the indictments is 
causing Sudan's leadership to deal with Darfur more constructively. 
Bashir has already shown more flexibility on Darfur.  However, 
Hardeloo said, it is unclear whether Bashir's stance is simply a 
tactic, or whether it represents a genuine change of policy.  If the 
international community is able to delay ICC action, the resulting 
situation could be very conducive to a solution on Darfur.  The 
country's only option is to press for a delay of the arrest 
warrants, to work for a quick solution to the Darfur problem, to 
address the demands of Darfuris, and to implement the letter and 
spirit of the CPA, particularly the reform of the media and security 
laws in a push for a real transition to democracy.  The political 
jockeying that will take place in pursuing a Darfur settlement 
"could even lead to a genuine, inclusive national unity government," 
he said. 
 
8.  (SBU) In particular, Hardeloo said the government must come up 
with a concrete plan for Darfur - but he agreed with al Assam that 
the ICC decision has just stiffened the inflexibility of the Darfur 
rebels.  Also, the rebels are too divided among themselves to agree 
on a settlement.  One solution the GNU may try would be to grant 
Darfuris their own region, and then create another vice presidency 
for Darfur - but Darfuri leaders would never agree on who gets to 
fill that position, the professor said. 
 
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP 
------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) The two political science professors disagree to some 
extent on the implications for Sudan's president of an ICC arrest 
order.  Al Assam believes that the NCP is too frightened to consider 
replacing Bashir - even though the present situation would seem to 
provide an excellent opportunity to show Bashir the door.  There is 
no one   available on whom the NCP could agree  to take his place. 
If an arrest warrant is issued, al Assam speculated that the NCP 
could ask Bashir to step down, but, he added, "Bashir is not without 
friends."  Asked what the alternatives to Bashir are, the professor 
shook his head and said "the only alternatives to Bashir are the 
ethnic rebels of Darfur - and they're even worse!" 
 
10.  (SBU) By contrast, Professor Hardeloo argues that the ICC 
actions have ended up strengthening the regime.  Moreno-Ocampo's 
charges and request for an arrest warrant have united Sudanese 
behind Bashir, despite the fact that "a majority of people in Sudan 
hate this regime - it has done many bad things; they have no 
legitimacy," he said.  Many of Sudan's political forces have 
rejected the referral to the ICC, not because they like Bashir, "but 
because the Sudanese people are very sensitive to foreign 
interference," Hardeloo said.  The Government has been successful at 
encouraging the public to view the threat to the President from the 
ICC as "an attempt at foreign conquest" - especially on the part of 
the U.S.  Arguments that the U.S. is not involved with the ICC are 
not convincing to Sudanese, he said. 
 
11.  (SBU) Kenyan DCM Kiptiness disagreed with Hardeloo's 
assessment.  He said his impression, from talking with Sudanese, is 
that a majority of Sudanese actually support a possible ICC arrest 
warrant against Bashir, and feel that "it is a good thing," he 
said. 
 
DIRE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ICC ARREST ORDER 
---------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Our academic and diplomatic contacts suspect probable 
dire consequences of an ICC decision to issue an arrest warrant for 
Bashir.  Al Assam fears such a decision will send the country 
spiraling into instability and renewed violence.  "The threat is 
very imminent," he said.  Hardeloo agrees with his colleague's 
gloomy assessment.  An ICC decision to issue such a t warrant could 
lead to the destruction of the entire political system in Darfur, 
including a collapse of the government, he said.  In the ensuing 
chaos, he predicted, Darfur could come under the control of 
religious extremists.  Another casualty would be the "destruction of 
the whole peace apparatus," including the CPA process. The NCP has 
promoted this "nightmare scenario" of bad behavior by hosting visits 
by the terrorist groups Hamas and Hizballah offering Sudan political 
support in its struggle with the ICC. 
 
13.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Our panel of professors and African diplomats 
expressed unanimity: while President Bashir deserves to stand trial 
for crimes against humanity in Darfur, an ICC decision to issue an 
arrest warrant would upset the various chess boards at play in the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001219  003 OF 003 
 
 
country.  Others disagree - Ugandan President Museveni expressed 
support for the ICC and Darfuri IDP leaders told CDA Fernandez on 
August 11 that they believe the indictment was long overdue. No one 
is sure of what the exact chain of events would be, but many agree 
the likely consequences are instability, potential chaos, and an 
upsurge of violence. Behind these predictions is an uncertainty 
about just what Bashir might do and how far he might go to save his 
own skin, but no one believes he would behave like a statesman and 
step aside for the good of the country.  Of course, it is to 
Bashir's advantage to encourage those uncertainties, among both 
Sudanese as well as the international community.  The ICC 
predicament, or "crisis" as it is often called here, has left the 
Sudanese feeling rather powerless:  the most the regime can do is 
make nice on Darfur, and hope the international community notices. 
The regime has done precious little thus far, apart from President 
Bashir's empty promises in Darfur and numerous diplomatic 
initiatives.  This won't be enough, and time is running out. 
 
FERNANDEZ