Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1184, BASHIR OFFERS FEW DETAILS ON DARFUR INITIATIVE TO JEM AND

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KHARTOUM1184.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1184 2008-08-05 14:36 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3858
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1184/01 2181436
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051436Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1520
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001184 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: BASHIR OFFERS FEW DETAILS ON DARFUR INITIATIVE TO JEM AND 
SLM/MM AS THEIR FRUSTRATION INCREASES 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1130 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Despite showing a renewed interest in Darfur, 
Sudanese President Bashir has so far offered few concrete or 
specific ideas for solving the region's problems, say contacts from 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation 
Movement of Minni Minnawi (SLM/MM).  Members of  both organizations 
criticized Bashir's current lack of outreach to JEM and SLM/MM 
leaders.  One senior member of the SLM/MM stated that Bashir is 
motivated by the threat of an ICC indictment, not by a genuine 
desire to bring stability and peace to Darfur, while JEM contacts 
publicly stated that the NCP wants to keep Darfur unstable until 
2011.  END SUMMARY 
 
"NO SUBSTANCE TO BASHIR'S DARFUR INITIATIVE" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2.  (U)  On August 5, the pro-government Arabic daily "Akbar 
Al-Youm" published a lengthy interview with the Justice and Equality 
Movement's Deputy Chairman, Abu Bakr Hamid, focusing on President 
Bashir's widely announced Darfur initiative.  Like other JEM 
representatives (as reported in reftel) Hamid said that statements 
from JEM's Legislative Council President Dr. Tahir Adam Al-Faki 
should not be interpreted as an acceptance of Bashir's initiative. 
Hamid stated that JEM welcomes any peace initiative, but "regarding 
the Bashir initiative we do not know the details of this so it is 
impossible to have an opinion about it." 
 
3.  (U)  Responding to this comment, the interviewer and 
editor-in-chief of the pro-regime "Akbar Al-Youm," said that Bashir 
clearly invited all rebel movements to participate in this 
initiative, to which Hamid countered: "Bashir did not invite us by 
name, and we consider ourselves to be the strongest movement with 
the most influence in the region."  JEM's Hamid also stated that the 
GoS could have easily solved Darfur's problems in 2003 or 2004 if it 
wanted, but that it has never sought a conclusive solution to the 
chaos of Darfur.  "It will come as no secret if I say that most of 
the Darfurians are convinced that the government does not want to 
solve the problem of Darfur before 2011, the end of the interim 
period," stated Darfur. 
 
4.  (SBU)  JEM Spokesman Ahmed Hussein told poloff on August 5 
despite  giving Darfur more attention in the press, the GoS has not 
increased its contact with JEM.  Hussein stated that the GoS has not 
contacted JEM in the last week, and that "there are no new 
developments despite all of the talk about Darfur."  Hussein said 
that Hamid's interview in Akbar Al-Youm, along with his own efforts, 
have helped clear up previous misstatements by Al-Faki. 
 
SLM/MM FRUSTRATION AFTER BASHIR MTG. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  Also on August 5, Minnawi confidant and senior leader of 
SLM/MM, Muhammad Tijani, told poloffs that he was "very frustrated" 
with his personal meeting with President Bashir the week of August 
27.  Tijani delivered a personal letter from Minnawi ("which made 
all of Minnawi's usual statements about his commitment to the DPA 
and its lack of implementation by the GoS") to President Bashir. 
Tijani said that he expected that President Bashir would have 
"brought something to the table during our meeting, and not just 
listened to our concerns."  Tijani said that Bashir accused SLM/MM 
of causing most of the insecurity in Darfur, and that he appeared 
uninformed on many important issues.  According to Tijani, there are 
five to six people around Bashir, who "focus only on security 
issues, and censor what Bashir actually hears about the region -- it 
really showed in that meeting."  Tijani said that he also discussed 
the GoS's failure to provide funds to the Darfur Reconstruction and 
Development Fund, to which Bashir responded that a source of funding 
from the Chinese government may soon boost the DRDF.   Tijani stated 
that the meeting ended in an unproductive digression into the state 
of ethnic relations in Darfur.  "I was very disappointed with the 
meeting," noted d Tijani, "At this moment, after all that has 
happened [with the ICC] I still believe that the GoS is not ready to 
implement the DPA." 
 
 6.  (U)  Also on August 5, Minni Minnawi strongly criticized the 
NCP leadership in a lengthy interview in "Al-Sahafa."  Responding to 
a question about SLM/MM leaders such as Dr. Rayah Mahmoud 
"attempting to dethrone him," Minnawi stated that "We are closely 
following all these things, and they all are created by the NCP and 
GoS... The SLM Deputy Chairman [i.e. Dr. Rayah Mahmud] and the 
General Secretary [i.e. Mustafa Tirab] are the main reasons for the 
breakdown of the DPA and we consider that the NCP sneaked these 
individuals into the SLM."  Minnawi also said, "the Government 
depends on those who defect from the movement to weaken us... the 
Government has to respect itself and to follow up with the known 
mechanisms designed by Abuja."  Regarding Bashir's tour of the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001184  002 OF 002 
 
 
Darfur capitals, Minnawi stated that he did not receive an 
invitation for the rallies in El-Fasher saying, "I did not know 
about the event until I heard Bashir speaking in El-Fasher."  (Note: 
 Full translated text of this interview will be sent to AF/SPG and 
the office of the Special Envoy.  End Note.) 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
7.  (SBU) As of August 5, Bashir's much-announced Darfur initiative 
so far appears to be more of a public relations campaign than a 
genuine attempt to solve the ongoing Darfur crisis.  Minnawi and JEM 
contacts are correct to assert that the initiative lacks detail, 
substance, and, as some claim, perhaps even a genuine desire to 
solve the Darfur crisis. JEM's analysis of the GOS's desire to 
create ongoing instability in Darfur until 2011, SLM/MM's 
interpretation of Bashir as an aloof leader, and Minnawi's belief in 
the NCP's attempt to undermine his movement from within, are all 
troubling.  Many observers have speculated that the NCP wants to 
keep Darfur marginalized until after the elections, since it will 
obviously not fare well with much of the population there.  Even if 
these rebel perceptions are somewhat distorted, these ideas will 
continue to hamper efforts at bringing these groups into direct 
dialogue with the GoS. Embassy has made clear to the senior NCP 
leadership that the miserable "business as usual" situation in 
Darfur will never lead to an improvement in relations with the West. 
 
 
FERNANDEZ