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Viewing cable 08KABUL2229, FARAH: SECURITY WORSENS, GOVERNANCE IMPROVES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL2229 2008-08-21 02:46 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO5212
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2229/01 2340246
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210246Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5189
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002229 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON AF
SUBJECT: FARAH: SECURITY WORSENS, GOVERNANCE IMPROVES 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Roohul Amin became Farah's governor on May 4, and 
is working closely with provincial officials, elders and the 
international community, but is struggling with ongoing insecurity. 
Amin's efforts to tackle corruption have produced some positive 
results.  His efforts to secure Farah have not been as successful; 
security is worsening as insurgents turn to indirect attacks against 
security forces.  Despite this poor security environment, 
development projects in Farah have found new purchase.  Recognizing 
this trend, Governor Amin has successfully negotiated for additional 
projects and money.  Internationals and Afghans alike see Amin as a 
powerful force for good, but fear continued insecurity in Farah 
could jeopardize his efforts. 
 
New Governor is a Big Improvement 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Newly appointed Farah Governor Roohul Amin's extensive 
experience as Deputy Director of the Welfare Association for the 
Development of Afghanistan (WADAN), an Afghan NGO, has guided his 
approach to difficult issues facing Farah.  Farah residents have 
received his outreach to the general population and business 
community well.  Since his appointment, Amin has met with the 
Provincial Council (PC), ministry line directors, district 
administrators, elders and the Provincial Reconstruction Team, and 
has prioritized Farah's needs. 
 
3. (SBU) Amin has worked on tackling corruption in Farah. 
Originally from Kunduz, Amin touts his lack of ties in Farah, saying 
his origin shields him from local manipulation.  He hopes to prevent 
perceptions of bias from developing by continuing the previous 
governor's custom of not visiting businessmen or officials in their 
private homes.  Amin's efforts have begun to pay dividends; during 
his three months in office, Amin increased customs revenue deposits 
from 2 million Afghanis (USD 40,000) to 10 million Afghanis (USD 
200,000).  He remains cautious, however, about rooting out 
corruption and probing Iran's influence among his staff and 
influential figures in Farah.  For example, Amin has hinted to the 
PRT that Police Chief Colonel Khalil may be out of favor with the 
Ministry of Interior due to corruption, but has not taken direct 
action against Khalil. 
 
4. (SBU) Amin has sought to bolster security in Farah by reaching 
out to interlocutors throughout the province.  He has been willing 
to meet with anyone who visits his offices, including elders who may 
be aligned with insurgents and support poppy cultivation.  Amin's 
outreach has gained him allies, but controlling Farah's security 
remains beyond his reach.  Amin is still unable to travel outside of 
the capital due to ongoing threats and violence. 
 
Security: Increased Indirect Attacks 
------------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) Security in Farah is worsening, and there are some 
districts the PRT can no longer visit.  Insurgents reacted against 
the arrival of the 2/7 Marines, stepping up their attacks against 
Afghan and Coalition Forces.  The Marines and a more robust ANA and 
ANP have, in turn, inflicted some significant defeats on the 
insurgency.  During fighting between a combined ANA/ANP force and 
Taliban elements in Bala Baluk district of central Farah, Afghan 
forces killed several Taliban commanders.  Broadly, insurgents have 
refrained from direct engagement with Afghan forces supported by 
Marines in Delaram, Bakwa and Gulistan, but have sustained direct 
engagements with the ANA and ANP in the Khaki Safed, Pusht Rud and 
Farah districts. 
 
Development: New Projects Abound 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The arrival of USAID's implementing partner, ARD, has 
brought renewed emphasis on development.  ARD and USAID have begun 
an ambitious 100-day "cash for work" program coupled to long-term 
development projects.  The Ministry for Women's Affairs, Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Department of 
Agriculture, and NGOs are implementing projects in Farah, Pusht Rud, 
and Khaki Safed districts.  USAID is also implementing a Local 
Governance and Community Development (LGCD) program focused on Lash 
wa Juwayn, Dilaram, Bakwa, Bala Baluk, and Pur Chaman districts. 
Governor Amin enthusiastically supports these new initiatives and 
has been at the forefront of ensuring community and government 
 
KABUL 00002229  002 OF 002 
 
 
participation.  He has also traveled to Kabul to meet with 
ministries, NGOs and embassies to mobilize additional funds. 
 
Farah's Future 
-------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Amin has become an effective lobbyist for government and 
international assistance.  The Governor's recent trip to Kabul 
resulted in impressive line ministry pledges focused on improving 
power and water infrastructure in the city of Farah and then 
throughout the province.  He obtained a USD one million pledge from 
the Ministry of Power and Water for the construction and 
installation of sub-stations, transformers, electrical power lines 
and light poles.  Amin also secured a 500kva generator to back up 
the system and a pledge of USD 4.5 million to survey Farah city and 
improve its street network.  Finally, at a disaster preparedness 
conference in Herat, Amin negotiated for 4780 metric tons of World 
Food Program wheat, which is already in Farah city warehouses and 
set for distribution to locals should food become scarce. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment:  Despite Amin's short tenure and struggles with 
insecurity, international and Afghan officials believe him an 
influential and positive force worthy of additional support.  Amin's 
effort to root out corrupt and ineffective officials, albeit in a 
somewhat limited fashion, is a positive sign.  The worsening 
security situation, however, could threaten Amin's efforts to move 
the province towards social and economic normalization. 
 
WOOD