VZCZCXRO9267
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2129/01 2260738
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130738Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5089
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002129 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF 101 POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON AF
SUBJECT: SHARANA PRT SIX MONTH UPDATE 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Paktika experienced a difficult spring; 
violence was up and the government did not uniformly provide 
services.  The long term outlook, however, remains positive, 
led by economic expansion.  Anti-government activities, 
particularly indirect attacks and IED events increased. 
Several incidents strengthened residents, perceptions of 
deteriorating security.  Coalition efforts to counter 
security problems, including increased kinetic operations and 
the roll out of Focused District Development (FDD), remain 
too new to be judged.  Further, despite Governor Khpalwak's 
efforts, provision of government services was uneven and 
Paktika's tribes believe the provincial government is weak. 
In spite of these setbacks, advances in development and 
governance bode well for Paktika's future.  Notably two of 
Paktika's largest bazaars expanded significantly, new roads 
connected Paktika's commercial centers, and the PRT and 
taskforces began to focus their assistance through the 
Provincial Development Council (PDC), shoring up the 
institution's credibility. 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Several key issues compromised Afghan National 
Police (ANP) effectiveness in Paktika, including recruitment 
difficulties, fuel shortages and the lack of a coherent 
maintenance or replacement plan for police vehicles. 
Resulting ANP immobility, particularly in Paktika's western 
districts, allowed anti-government elements freedom of 
movement, which was connected to the increase in IED attacks 
and ambushes.  Significant acts of violence doubled compared 
to spring 2007.  Some of these attacks were more 
sophisticated, coordinated and complex than attacks last 
year.  Several high profile killings strengthened residents' 
perception of deteriorating provincial security, including 
the murders of a former tribal shura leader and a school 
principal. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Coalition efforts, including increased kinetic 
operations and the launch of Focused District Development 
(FDD) in Mata Khan and Sar Hawza districts, will take time to 
evaluate.  Initially, district leaders were cautious about 
FDD, especially in Sar Hawza where the District Administrator 
complained the relief force of ANCOP officers was reluctant 
to patrol more than five kilometers from the district center. 
 Police Mentor Teams continue to work with the ANP to promote 
recruiting efforts and enhance police capabilities.  Small 
groups protested military operations in Mata Khan and Sharana 
districts, meeting with Governor Khpulwak and Provincial 
Chief of Police MG Mullah Khel to discuss claims that 
innocent people had been arrested or killed.  To date, 
Paktika provincial leaders continue to mollify these 
complainants. 
 
Governance 
---------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Paktika Governor Khpalwak returned from his April 
International Visitors' program to the U.S. enamored of 
localized planning and ready to push Karzai for additional 
support.  Despite Khpalwak's efforts, the provincial 
government failed to deliver some key services.  Khpalwak 
remarked on the degree to which planning in the U.S. occurs 
locally and sought ways to press Kabul for greater 
administrative decentralization.  Following his trip, he met 
with President Karzai and seven key Ministers, insisting that 
Paktika become a staffing and budgeting priority.  The 
majority of the Ministers rebuffed the request, arguing 
provinces such as Paktika with US-led PRTs are not a budget 
priority.  Meanwhile, the provincial education director did 
not pay most teachers for the first few months of the year 
and as a result, over a third of the schools in the province 
closed. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Paktika residents' perceptions of government 
ineffectiveness have empowered tribal leaders who remain the 
most powerful group in the province.  Tribal leaders continue 
to call for a more active and muscular response to 
anti-government infiltrators, but will not motivate popular 
opposition, saying they are not confident Kabul will support 
 
KABUL 00002129  002 OF 002 
 
 
their efforts.  Tribes point to the lack of ANP or ANA 
patrols and checkpoints as well as the government's inability 
to hold arrested insurgents as evidence of government 
ineffectiveness.  The Paktika Provincial Council is neither 
well known nor active in the Province.  Further, not all 
residents consider it representative as it does not have a 
member from the Kharoti tribe, the second largest provincial 
sub-tribe. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The PRT and task forces working in Paktika shifted 
to using the PDC to define new projects.  Development project 
proposals must now pass through district leaders to line 
directors and then the PDC for approval; without PDC 
approval, the task force and PRT will not begin project 
execution.  Within the PDC, line directors are required to 
secure Kabul approval for all projects requiring additional 
staffing or increased operational budgets prior to submission 
to the PRT for execution.  PDC members were satisfied with 
the new procedure as it gives them visibility on and 
authority over provincial development activities.  It also 
forces tribal and district leaders to work through the 
council.  Even security related projects will be reported to 
the PDC, though these will not require PDC approval prior to 
their execution. 
 
 
Development 
----------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Commerce in Paktika continued to expand at a 
vigorous pace.  Some merchants recently complained to 
National Assembly members that the Sharana bazaar lacks 
sufficient shops, even though it more than doubled in size 
over the previous two years.  Two factors fed growth of the 
Sharana and Orgun bazaars: the proximity of Coalition forces 
and the development of paved roads linking these cities to 
larger commercial centers.  Two cell phone providers, Roshan 
and AWCC, and at least two satellite TV installers, both of 
whom report business is brisk, have set up shop in the 
Sharana bazaar. 
 
WOOD