VZCZCXRO7777
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2809/01 2381002
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251002Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8473
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0294
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9038
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8558
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3675
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0208
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5948
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 4749
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHIL/ODRP ISLAMABAD PK PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002809 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER ASEC AMGT OVIP PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: MANAGING VISITOR OVERLOAD 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary.  Mission Pakistan welcomes codels and 
distinguished USG visitors, but the increase in the number of 
visitors has dangerously increased our threat profile and 
overtaxed our limited support resources.  Effective 
immediately, the Mission advises Washington that we will deny 
country clearance for transit purposes and will limit the 
size and number of visiting delegations.  We simply do not 
have the security or transportation resources to support and 
protect a growing number of VIP visit requests.  Post 
recommends that the eCC process be amended to allow the 
bureaus/regional desks to resume their role of screening 
visitors.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  In August alone, Mission Pakistan received 
requests for over 25 high-level often overlapping visits 
involving over 100 travelers, some planning to come in groups 
of 15 or more.  The Embassy and its three consulates are all 
critical threat posts; the level of both anti-extremist 
military activity in the tribal areas and militant suicide 
bombings across the country is increasing.  Most visitors 
request meetings with the same GOP officials in the same 
venues via the same routes; this has escalated the 
threat/risk profile for both visitors and Mission personnel 
alike.  Four Mission personnel were injured and were lucky to 
survive a suicide attack in March.  Over 600 Pakistanis, 
mostly government and security personnel, have been killed by 
suicide bombings since July 2007.  The latest attacks in 
Lahore, Rawalpindi and Karachi highlight the growing risk. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Pakistan is not Iraq or Afghanistan.  We have less 
than 100 U.S. military representatives in country (none of 
whom are dedicated to VIP protection), a limited cadre of DS 
agents, no U.S. military bases, and very limited air support 
options.  These air assets (old, unarmored Huey IIs) are 
normally designated for use with the host government on 
specific anti-narcotics or counter-terrorism missions, not 
for VIP support.  Asking the GOP to divert their own limited 
number of fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters (which have low 
readiness rates and are often not fully mission capable) from 
fighting militants to support VIP travel undermines our 
policy goals.  Therefore, we cannot either support or protect 
large VIP contingents. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Based on an August 8 Emergency Action Committee 
meeting with the Embassy and Principal Officers from Karachi, 
Lahore and Peshawar, the Mission advises Washington that, 
effective immediately: 
 
--We will no longer grant country clearance for transit 
purposes only, or for overnight transit stays only.  We 
recognize this will affect codels traveling to and from 
Afghanistan and Iraq, but a critical threat post should not 
be used as a transit point.  There are ample numbers of safe, 
alternative destinations in the region. 
 
--We will restrict the size of delegations to reduce our 
security profile in hotels, motorcades and at GOP offices. 
We urge that all potential delegations limit the number of 
principals and staff traveling to those absolutely necessary 
to conduct legitimate business. 
 
--Mission Pakistan is unaccompanied for the Embassy and all 
constituent posts, and the environment is not safe for most 
potential tourism expeditions.  We strongly discourage travel 
by spouses of congressional members, U.S. military officers 
or USG civilian visitors. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  We are seeing an increase in the number of 
USG/congressional requests to visit the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).  Travel in the FATA is 
controlled by the host government and subject to the 
Mission's internal threat assessments.  Please be advised 
 
ISLAMABAD 00002809  002 OF 002 
 
 
that there are ongoing military operations in this area. 
Based on security considerations, we restrict Mission travel 
to FATA and may have to deny VIP requests to visit the area. 
We do not have the military/security personnel or 
transportation assets required to provide VIPs with adequate 
protection.  Mission is in the process of evaluating security 
requirements for Quetta in the face of rising numbers of 
requests for travel there.  We will advise Department on the 
results of that evaluation. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  In the Mission's opinion, the new eCC process 
provides inadequate vetting for visitors to critical threat 
posts.  The process should be amended to ensure the regional 
bureaus/desks can assist posts in screening visitors.  We 
recommend that the previous practice of having the NSC vet 
visits at the Assistant Secretary and above level be 
re-instituted to better coordinate both visitor levels and 
policy implementation. 
 
 
FEIERSTEIN