VZCZCXRO4309
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0663/01 2190449
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060449Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3260
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1466

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000663 
 
AIDAC 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DCHA/AA FOR MIKE HESS 
AFR/AA FOR KATE ALMQUIST AND FRANKLIN MOORE 
AFR/SA FOR ELOKEN, LDOBBINS, JKOLE 
DCHA/OFDA FOR KLUU, ACONVERY, TDENYSENKO, LTHOMAS 
DCHA/FFP FOR JBORNS, JDWORKEN, LPETERSON, ASINK 
PRETORIA FOR HHALE, JWESSEL, GJUSTE 
STATE/PRM FOR MMCKELVEY, MLANGE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM PGOV KHIV PGOV PREL ZI
SUBJECT:  USAID/OFDA DIRECTOR VISITS ZIMBABWE TO ASSESS HUMANITARIAN 
SITUATION 
 
REF: A) STATE 77761 
B) Harare 593 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY:  USAID's Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Ky Luu, visited Harare, Zimbabwe July 
29-31, to consult with humanitarian organizations, United Nations 
(UN) agencies, donor representatives, and Zimbabwean citizens 
regarding the crisis in the country.  The timing of his trip was 
particularly opportune, as Zimbabwe's humanitarian community has 
been operating under a restrictive and threatening environment in 
the post-March 29 election period.  Luu's interactions and analysis 
led to a statement (see para 10 for complete text) released by USAID 
Administrator Fore calling on the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) to 
rescind its ban on NGO field activities and create conditions 
suitable for humanitarian organizations to resume work safely and 
constructively. Post is discussing a series of moves toward a 
strategic plan of action on the humanitarian situation. 
Complementary action by Washington is suggested in para 8.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) To inform his analysis of the humanitarian challenges with 
the context of the political situation, Luu first met with 
representatives from civil society and human rights organizations. 
These partners within USAID/Zimbabwe's Democracy and Governance (DG) 
portfolio provided Luu with evidence of intimidation, harassment, 
and threats to their personal and operational security during the 
post-election period.  Particularly notable was the fearful 
environment and lack of engagement between humanitarian actors and 
those promoting human rights, as evidenced by the fact that no NGO 
was willing to be a signatory to a document produced by Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) that called the GOZ's June 4 
suspension of NGOs a legal nullity. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Luu met with USAID's Food for Peace (FFP) NGO partners, 
the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the UN World 
Food Program (WFP), to discuss their operational environment and the 
country's food security situation, which were viewed to be both 
interrelated and distressing.  The GOZ's sustained restriction of 
humanitarian access was highlighted as a dire concern, particularly 
with regard to this season's extremely poor agricultural yield and 
these agencies' inadequate access to beneficiaries as the "hungry 
season" approaches in October.  The roundtable participants 
discussed approximate timeframes and deadlines by which beneficiary 
registration and distribution of agricultural inputs - both of which 
are currently prohibited - begin to lose their impact, also noting 
diminishing yield as crops are planted late in the season.  Luu 
elicited participants' opinions of the UN's efficacy in-country, and 
received frank comments that expressed critical concerns regarding 
the effectiveness of the Humanitarian Coordinator as well as the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 
coordinating a response to the post-election crisis and advocating 
for humanitarian space. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Post has articulated comparable concerns (REF B), issues 
which were also taken forward during Luu's July 14 meeting with John 
Holmes, the UN's Emergency Relief Coordinator (REF A).  In Harare, 
Luu met with Georges Tadonki, the head of the OCHA office in 
country.  Though Tadonki was defensive and often blamed the 
inefficacy of his office on the Humanitarian Coordinator (who was 
out of country for the week), the prolonged postponement of 
protection standby capacity (ProCap) serves as an apt metaphor for 
his office's passive role in the coordination of humanitarian 
activities and continued engagement with the GOZ in a submissive 
manner.  Scheduled to arrive the week of June 16, OCHA did not want 
to "provoke an incident" with the GOZ by deploying the officer. 
Particularly in light of the high number of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs, estimated at 30,000), the lack of monitoring presence 
in the rural areas where the security situation is largely unknown, 
and the absence of humanitarian space, USAID officers and Luu were 
extremely perplexed with this decision.  Tadonki was not able to 
clearly articulate why the ProCap officer remained in Johannesburg 
when the UN Country Team (UNCT) had already approved his presence, 
nor was he able to describe his office's measurable strategies and 
progress towards humanitarian coordination and recommencement of 
access.  Finally, Tadonki revealed that Holmes had recently offered 
to make another statement regarding humanitarian access, but that 
the OCHA/Zimbabwe office believed it would compromise negotiations 
with the GOZ. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Luu's meetings with UNHCR, UNICEF, and the heads of NGO 
partners exposed a recurrent lack of confidence in OCHA, and a 
 
HARARE 00000663  002 OF 003 
 
 
common recognition for the need of in-country protection expertise. 
Though UNHCR is the designated global cluster lead in protection for 
conflict-generated IDPs, the agency has avoided chairmanship of the 
Protection Working Group and has yet to meaningfully engage with 
either protection or IDP concerns in the present crisis.  However, 
UNHCR's new Resident Representative expressed willingness to more 
fully assume these roles.  UNICEF's Country Representative serves as 
Acting UN Resident Coordinator (standing in for UNDP Resident 
Representative) and, while meeting with his agency, he agreed with 
Luu's protection concerns and confirmed that he would push 
deployment of the ProCap.  Ultimately, without Luu's probing this 
issue with these UN agencies, the officer would have not been 
deployed.  Representatives from UN agencies commonly agreed that 
OCHA's consistently passive engagement with the GOZ "sent the wrong 
message" to the wider, very expectant, humanitarian community.  As a 
result of OCHA's weak performance in advocacy, Luu noted that other 
representative bodies - including Harare's Heads of Missions and 
Heads of Aid Agencies - were now focusing on alternative 
multilateral channels by which they might utilize their own 
collective advocacy, utilizing joint demarches and statements to the 
GOZ. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  During all discussions with UN agencies and NGO partners, 
Luu was inquisitive regarding their collective priorities and what 
was needed to create an enabling environment for the resumption of 
humanitarian assistance.  It was commonly recognized by agencies 
that, though it was rumored that the NGO suspension would soon be 
lifted, several conditions must accompany the lifting of the ban. 
The themes of these discussions culminated in a meeting with all 
USAID/Zimbabwe's program partners (OFDA, DG, and HIV/AIDS), in 
addition to the USAID Mission Director and U.S. Ambassador, on the 
morning of Luu's departure date.  This discussion ultimately formed 
the basis of the July 31 Press Statement by USAID Administrator Fore 
on Zimbabwe Humanitarian Access - the foundation of which is rooted 
in humanitarian principles, which have been routinely violated by 
the GOZ and agents of the state since the March 29 elections. 
Though NGO partners are hesitant to individually or collectively 
speak out, largely out of fear of repercussions to their operational 
status and beneficiaries, they very much appreciated the opportunity 
to have a strong statement emerge from USAID that was specifically 
crafted around their concerns. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The timing of Luu's trip was ideal, as his presence 
amplified awareness of the humanitarian access issue.  The momentum 
of these recent meetings and discussions prompted Post to create a 
strategic action plan to push the resumption of humanitarian 
assistance. Post is committed to undertaking the following tactical 
actions in support of positive movement on the humanitarian 
situation: 
 
--Make a joint donor demarche to the GOZ regarding humanitarian 
access, delivered by Danish Ambassador on July 28; 
 
--Release a demarche letter from Heads of Mission (HOMs) to the 
public to stimulate pressure from multiple channels (i.e. 
intra-party power brokers, civil society, and SADC countries). 
COMMENT: The Ambassador has noted that the HOMs are willing to go 
public with their concerns.  It remains to be determined in meetings 
this week how this will be done.  END COMMENT; 
 
--Deliver a second HOMs demarche; 
 
--Urge humanitarian partner organizations to get into the field, 
attempt program implementation, and push the access issue.  They 
should test the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) commitments to 
openness, document the reactions, and report their findings (to 
donors, UN, SADC/AU, and participants/mediators of talks); 
 
--Send a letter from Ambassador McGee to Minister of Social Welfare 
Nicolas Goche outlining the impact of NGO restriction and holding 
him personally accountable for denying humanitarian assistance to 
suffering citizens.  Publicize this letter or have the State Press 
Spokesperson release key points about the letter; 
 
--Urge the ZLHR to submit a class action lawsuit against Minister 
Goche ("people v. Goche") holding him criminally liable for denying 
humanitarian access; 
 
--Follow up on the diplomatic note protesting the GOZ theft of 20 MT 
of USAID food in Manicaland by writing a letter to Minister Goche 
and including an invoice for the full amount of nearly US$20,000. 
 
HARARE 00000663  003 OF 003 
 
 
Deliver invoice and initiate legal action against the Manicaland 
Governor who personally ordered the theft.  COMMENT:  Mission 
requests FFP guidance on how to approach the legalities of recovery. 
 It is our opinion that addressing the central government would be 
most effective but Post needs information on how this has been 
accomplished elsewhere.  END COMMENT; 
 
--Have Ambassador McGee host a prayer breakfast in Harare and in 
Bulawayo with leaders of the interdenominational faith community to 
encourage humanitarian action by faith-based organizations and 
churches; and 
 
--Work with civil society and advocacy groups to mobilize the 
Zimbabwean diaspora to take a more vocal stance on humanitarian 
access. 
 
¶8. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: To support these field-based tactics, Post 
requests that Washington consider taking the following actions: 
 
--Negotiate and release a joint statement by like-minded governments 
calling on the GOZ to close militia camps, respect humanitarian 
principles, restore access, protect humanitarian workers, and end 
harassment of humanitarian organizations.  If the GOZ does not 
respond, we will face an imminent humanitarian emergency, and we 
hold the ministers and government officials personally liable for 
criminal acts; 
 
--Call in the Zimbabwean Ambassador to the U.S. to inform him of the 
call for humanitarian access to be restored and to deliver the 
invoice for the stolen USG food.  Continue pressure on this front if 
action is not taken to lift the suspension; 
 
--Work with civil society and advocacy groups to mobilize the 
Zimbabwean diaspora in the region and in the U.S. to take a more 
vocal stance on humanitarian access; 
 
--Request that InterAction host a half-day conference on the 
humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe to boost interest, action, and 
advocacy on Zimbabwe by U.S. NGOs.  Mission Zimbabwe will similarly 
advocate with their partners to raise the profile of the situation 
in Zimbabwe; 
 
--Send an open letter from USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore to 
heads of humanitarian and development organizations working in 
Zimbabwe, urging them to do more advocacy and raise public awareness 
of the GOZ restrictions and policies; and 
 
--Call on UN agencies - and the UN Secretary General - to release 
statements condemning the GOZ for its restrictions on humanitarian 
organizations and warning of potential consequences. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The objective of these actions is to create conditions 
conducive for humanitarian response in Zimbabwe, most notably 1) 
free access to vulnerable populations for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance and protection in accordance with 
internationally accepted standards, and 2) a strengthened and 
capable network of humanitarian actors that actively engage in 
coordinated program activities. 
 
¶10.  (U) Text of July 31, 2008 Press Statement by USAID 
Administrator Henrietta Fore is available at: 
http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2008/ps08 0731.html 
 
¶11.  (U) Post will continue providing updates on the implementation 
and impact of this strategy. 
 
¶12.  (U) This cable was cleared by USAID's Director of the Office of 
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Ky Luu and OFDA/Pretoria. 
 
MCGEE