VZCZCXRO2803
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0965/01 2310921
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180921Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8325
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH 5031
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 HANOI 000965 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR PM DAS GANYARD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PGOV OTRA VM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STEPHEN 
GANYARD 
 
HANOI 00000965  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU) Embassy Hanoi looks forward to welcoming you to Vietnam. 
Your visit will be an important contribution to the growing 
U.S.-Vietnam relationship and will highlight a broad area of 
bilateral defense and security cooperation that is gathering 
momentum in the wake of the Vietnamese Prime Minister's June visit 
to Washington. Your visit also will allow us to highlight how 
information provided by the Center for Bomb and Mine Disposal 
Technology has helped us approach mine action in a more systematic 
and transparent fashion.  We are on the verge of an important 
evolution in how humanitarian mine action is carried out in Vietnam. 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) The U.S.-Vietnam bilateral relationship continues to 
broaden and mature, in the process spurring economic, social and 
technological development that has eased the path for a limited 
expansion of personal freedom and expression for the people of 
Vietnam.  Vietnam's economic successes have translated into greater 
international clout.  Vietnam chaired the U.N. Security Council in 
July, a major diplomatic achievement for the GVN.  GVN leaders 
understand that the United States plays a direct role in creating 
the conditions for their nation's success and are committed to 
advancing the bilateral relationship. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Our strengthening relations are also due to Vietnam's 
realization that the United States is an important force in 
maintaining a stable geopolitical environment in which even "small" 
countries like Vietnam are assured their independence and freedom of 
action.  As such, Vietnam's leaders speak positively and 
optimistically about the future of U.S.-Vietnam ties.  Differences 
over human rights remain, however, and lingering fears that the 
United States supports the overthrow of the current regime continue 
to complicate the relationship.  China also looms as a factor 
coloring Hanoi's reactions to our proposals in the security realm, 
as discussed further below. 
 
Gradual Progress in Defense Cooperation 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Defense relations have advanced at a measured pace, but 
reflect the overall positive shift in the relationship.  We conduct 
professional military exchanges with the People's Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN) in a limited but growing range of areas including military 
law, military nursing, public affairs, search and rescue, 
meteorological/ oceanographic (METOC) prediction, and disaster 
preparedness.  PAVN officers have been invited as observers to Cobra 
Gold for the past four years and routinely attend U.S. Pacific 
Command-sponsored multilateral conferences.  Since 1997, over sixty 
GVN officials, including more than thirty PAVN officers, have 
attended courses and seminars at the Asia Pacific Center for 
Security Studies (APCSS).  PAVN also now sends observers to the 
annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises. 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Since 2003, U.S. Navy ships have made five port visits to 
Vietnam, including most recently a November 14-18, 2007 visit by two 
mine countermeasures ships, the USS Guardian and the USS Patriot, at 
Haiphong port.  In June, Vietnam participated in the Pacific 
Partnership mission of the USNS Mercy.  In 2005, Vietnam agreed to 
participate in the International Military Education and Training 
Program (IMET).  In 2007, we accelerated the pace of IMET and 
provided a language laboratory in Hanoi using IMET funds.  In FY08, 
IMET expanded mil-mil contacts through a U.S. mobile training team 
visit for military medical techniques training.  The GVN also 
continues to send well-qualified candidates to English language 
training and English language instructor training at the Defense 
Language Institute (DLI).  Reaching our full potential for closer 
cooperation in defense activities, including multilateral 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance efforts and attendance at U.S. 
military schools will require time, persistence and patience. 
 
Upcoming Defense Talks 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Planning continues for the first U.S.-VN Defense and 
Security Talks to be held in Hanoi in October of this year.  The GVN 
knows that PM A/S Kimmitt will lead the U.S. side, but has yet to 
designate the MFA official who will lead their team.  The GVN is 
currently reviewing our proposed agenda and your visit will be an 
opportunity to follow up on any outstanding agenda items.  The GVN 
has asked that we not call attention to the talks in public fora, 
citing regional political sensitivities, but has agreed to 
announcements about the talks after the fact.  We have agreed in 
principle to a low key approach, but also noted that the talks were 
highlighted publicly during PM Dung's visit. 
 
 
HANOI 00000965  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
Global Peace Operations Initiative 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Over past years, the GVN has expressed increasing interest 
in the potential for involvement in peacekeeping missions, 
especially those organized under UN auspices.  Vietnam's recent UN 
Security Council membership has given significant impetus to such 
thinking.  Nonetheless, the GVN will have to do much more to meet 
the remaining challenges of the lack of interoperability, the 
paucity of English language speakers in the military and 
complications due to funding issues in order to fully engage in 
future peacekeeping operations.  Their participation in Global Peace 
Operations Initiative (GPOI) is an important step in this direction. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Joint Statement from PM Dung's June visit to Washington 
highlights Vietnam's agreement to participate in the GPOI through 
participation in training courses and other peacekeeping operations 
activities.  The next step is crafting a "country plan" for Vietnam. 
 This will involve a "Program Design & Development Visit" to Hanoi 
by a team from PACOM and the Center on Civil-Military Relations 
(CCMR) at the Naval Post-Graduate School.  In discussion with MOD 
and MFA officials and the Embassy, the team will craft a GPOI 
training plan tailored to Vietnam's current capabilities and 
priorities.  PACOM will elaborate at the mil-mil Bilateral Defense 
Dialogue (BDD), planned for mid-September in Hawaii, with further 
follow-up during the October Defense and Security Talks, as needed. 
Post has previewed these steps with both MFA and MOD, but expects 
that the GVN will not provide an official response until further 
details are forthcoming at the September BDD. 
 
Impacts of Remaining UXO 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) In your meetings, you are likely to hear references to 
"consequences of war" or "legacies of war" issues.  This is the 
catch-all term that the GVN applies to a myriad of problems, 
including Agent Orange(AO)/Dioxin contamination, unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) and land mines from the war era, and the incomplete recovery 
of missing Vietnamese military personnel. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Since 1989, USAID, with support from the Patrick J. 
Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF) and other sources, has provided over 
USD 43 million to support NGOs and private voluntary organizations 
to develop comprehensive programs for people with disabilities.  In 
addition, since 1993 the USG has actively assisted the people of 
Vietnam in overcoming the social and economic impacts of remaining 
UXO from the war.  Vietnam was formally accepted as the 37th 
participant in the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program in June 2000, 
and the USG is now the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for 
mine action programs in Vietnam.  The USG has invested over USD 37 
million in a broad spectrum of programs not only to locate, remove 
and destroy unexploded ordnance and landmines, but also to address 
the UXO effects on health and livelihood of Vietnamese living in 
affected areas. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Today, various NGOs conduct UXO and land mine clearance, 
risk education and victim rehabilitation. The USG has also donated a 
significant quantity of equipment to the PAVN to assist efforts in 
UXO and landmine clearance and return land to productive use.  In 
2006, the State Department provided USD 3.5 million to support UXO 
action and demining activities in Vietnam, almost a third of which 
went directly to PAVN in the form of donated demining equipment. 
FY08, an additional USD 2.5 million will be provided to underwrite 
mine action related activities in Vietnam.  For FY08, Congress 
directed that approximately $2.5 million be spent on demining 
programs, a substantial increase from the $800,000 requested by the 
Administration. 
 
¶12. Internally, we look forward to continuing our discussions on the 
FY09 Humanitarian Mine Action Country Plan for Vietnam.  We are 
working as a team in approaching the complex and challenging problem 
of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and their impact in Vietnam.  The 
development of a strategic framework that both maximizes the 
immediate effective impact of limited resources on the ground, while 
facilitating the growth of organic planning and management capacity 
is a difficult balance to strike, but one which is critical to 
Vietnam's ability to address the problem of ERW in the years to 
come.  Tackling these issues will require implementing mechanisms to 
effect mine action in some of Vietnam's most densely contaminated 
provinces (Quang Tri and Quang Binh) in accordance with a strategic 
vision that prioritizes actual clearance activity over other related 
mine action activities.  However, support for training and 
consultation activiQs to advance the development of management 
capacity at the provincial and national level will also be crucial 
to achieving a lasting positive impact on Vietnam's own mine action 
capacity for many years to come. 
 
 
HANOI 00000965  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
¶13. The Mission Input to the FY09 Humanitarian Mine Action Country 
Plan identified several key developments that suggest that the 
Government of Vietnam is beginning to take a very hard look at 
developing a national mine action center with defined management 
responsibilities and authority for mine action throughout the 
country.  Moreover, recent information provided by the Center for 
Bomb and Mine Disposal Technology (BOMICEN) suggest that the advice 
we have been providing them over the last several years has finally 
made an impression and that they now share our determination to 
approach mine action in a more systematic and transparent fashion. 
We are at the cusp of a significant evolution in the way that 
humanitarian mine action is carried out in Vietnam, perhaps the most 
significant development in a decade. 
 
¶14. As such, we see significant value in funding a seminar/workshop 
that brings consultative experts in the field of mine action 
management from Cranfield University or James Madison University to 
work with national and provincial stakeholders to identify 
infrastructure, technology and TTPs required for the establishment 
and operation of a true Vietnam Mine Action Center (VMAC) with real 
management authority.  Vietnam would also benefit from a guided 
stakeholder case analysis of existing Land Impact Survey data for 
the development of a regional mine action strategy to serve as a 
road map for this nascent VMAC. 
 
¶15. We have a key opportunity to taking our assistance to the next 
level by providing the management expertise that can serve 
ultimately to make Vietnam's own mine action efforts more efficient 
and effective, while making Vietnam more competitive in the 
competition of increasingly scarce humanitarian assistance from 
global donors. 
 
Agent Orange/Dioxin 
------------------- 
 
¶16. While debate continues over the human impact of AO, recent 
studies reveal that dioxin contamination is concentrated in 
approximately 20 "hotspots," mostly former U.S. bases where AO was 
stored.  Areas subjected to heavy aerial spraying do not currently 
have soil concentrations considered hazardous.  Our engagement on 
this issue has accomplished much, in both transforming the tone of 
the dialogue and capacity building.  Projects have included work at 
the Danang airport as well as a USD 3 million Congressional 
appropriation for "dioxin mitigation and health activities," which 
USAID has begun to implement.  The USG is continuing to work with 
the GVN, UNDP, Ford Foundation and other NGOs to discuss the next 
steps in the environmental remediation of three priority hotspots in 
Danang, Hoa Binh and Phu Cat airfields. 
 
Fullest Possible Accounting 
--------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The re-establishment of diplomatic relations and normal 
defense contacts continue today.  U.S. military and DoD elements 
efforts achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing 
from the Vietnam Conflict predate.  Since 1988, the Joint POW/MIA 
Accounting Command (JPAC), a USPACOM subordinate element, has 
evolved to include forward Detachments in Vietnam, Laos, and 
Thailand/Cambodia.  With its Vietnam Detachment (Det 2), it has 
completed 90 Joint Field Activities (JFA), which incorporated 
extensive research, interviews, analysis, and excavations in order 
to accomplish its mission.  From its inception, Det 2 has forged 
good relations with its GVN counterparts.  In December, 2006 the GVN 
approved the use of U.S. naval vessels to operate within their 
territorial waters in order to enhance JPAC's underwater 
investigations towards the identification of potential recovery 
sites.  Ultimately, JPAC's efforts in Southeast Asia have resulted 
in accounting for 880 Americans previously listed as MIA; 1766 
remain missing throughout Southeast Asia.  Internal political 
considerations compel senior Vietnamese leaders to ask us to pay as 
much attention to their MIA as we do to ours. 
 
Counterterrorism 
---------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) Vietnam says the right things about the threat of global 
terrorism and has participated with us in modest cooperative 
activities.  During President Bush's visit in 2006, the President 
and his Vietnamese counterpart pledged to increase cooperation to 
halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related 
technology and materials in accordance with international and 
national laws and each country's capacities.  The United States 
provides counterterrorism assistance to Vietnam by funding 
Vietnamese participation in counterterrorism-related training at the 
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, and through 
military-to-military exchanges with an emphasis on counterterrorism 
themes.  Vietnam has signed eight out of thirteen UN terrorism 
conventions.  Approval of the remaining five is winding its way 
 
HANOI 00000965  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
through the cumbersome GVN bureaucracy, the delay explained in part 
by GVN concern with its capacity to carry out obligations under the 
conventions. 
 
Expanding U.S. Naval Ship Visits 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) While we have regularized our SOP for regular ship visits 
over recent years, the GVN has remained firm in limiting the 
frequency of port visits by U.S. Navy vessels to one a year.  This 
restriction is frequently cited as being consistent with GVN laws 
that regulate visits by foreign warships; however, some other 
nations conduct more frequent port visits.  While it may be 
unproductive to demand more frequent port calls, we still seek to 
persuade the GVN to permit more frequent access for limited, 
technical calls (i.e., for refueling and replenishment).  This would 
support our overall goal of increasing routine access for U.S. Naval 
vessels at Vietnam's ports, while not escalating the pace of 
military contacts beyond a level that is comfortable for the GVN. 
We also hope to continue asking the GVN to participate in fly-outs 
and believe that the general positive trend in the relationship will 
result in an acceptance at some point soon. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Similarly, we hope to reverse the PAVN leadership's 
reluctance to participate in distinguished visitor fly-outs to U.S. 
Navy vessels transiting the South China Sea.  To date, these have 
been rebuffed due to concerns over the "appearance of Vietnam's 
participation in joint exercises with the United States."  This, 
clearly, is code for limiting advances in the relationship to a pace 
that does not discomfort the Chinese. 
 
Humanitarian Assistance 
----------------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) Since 1995, U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) programs have provided aid in legal reform, governance, 
economic growth, HIV/AIDS, environmental protection and disaster 
prevention.  For FY 2007, total U.S. assistance from all agencies 
was about USD 86.6 million, most of which has gone towards providing 
health-related assistance, notably in the area of HIV/AIDS treatment 
and prevention.  Vietnam is one of fifteen countries in the 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), with USD 65 
million provided in 2007 to expand integrated HIV/AIDS prevention, 
care and treatment programs.  This figure includes approximately USD 
3.1 million dollars for the Department of Defense (DOD)-managed 
portion of PEPFAR HIV/AIDS programs with Vietnam's Ministry of 
Defense. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Since 2000, DOD has supported a wide variety of Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDCA) projects in Vietnam. 
Through USPACOM, the U.S. Government has sponsored the construction 
of eight medical clinics in Thua Thien-Hue Province, a primary 
school in Quang Binh Province, and two centers for disabled children 
in Quang Binh Province.  Two additional humanitarian assistance 
construction projects were completed in the summer of 2007 and 
turned over to local authorities in Central Vietnam: a medical 
clinic in Quang Binh Province, and a 10-room primary school in Quang 
Tri Province.  Additionally, USPACOM has facilitated multiple 
donations of excess medical property to various medical facilities 
throughout Vietnam.  Five senior representatives of the Vietnam 
People's Navy Medical Branch and Military Medical Department are in 
the middle of a visit to the United States.  These representatives 
will take in U.S. Navy medical facilities in Southern California 
such as the U.S. Navy Hospital Balboa, the Field Medical Training 
Battalion, and U.S. Navy Hospital Camp Pendleton and will tour a 
typical battalion aid station and medical facilities aboard U.S. 
Navy ships. 
 
A Word on the Economy 
--------------------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) After a decade of isolation and failed economic policies, 
Vietnam is determined to catch up with the Asian tigers.  Vietnam's 
"doi moi" (renovation) program of economic reform, begun in 1986, 
has set the country on a successful market economy path, with an 
average growth rate of 7.5 percent over the past decade.  The GVN 
focuses on exports and foreign direct investment in its drive to 
achieve middle-income status by 2010.  The United States is 
currently Vietnam's largest export market and third largest overall 
trade partner.  U.S. investors tell us the key challenges they face 
in Vietnam are underdeveloped infrastructure, a shortage of skilled 
workers and managers, and the considerable level of state 
participation in the economy.  For its part, the GVN is grappling 
with issues of corruption, improving the legal environment, and 
implementing its WTO commitments.  Vietnam's current turmoil is 
rooted in high inflation (27 percent year-on-year July), the large 
current account deficit, and inefficient allocation of resources, 
which is particularly obvious in the disproportionate amount of 
 
HANOI 00000965  005.4 OF 006 
 
 
state resources devoted to powerful State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). 
 
Human Rights Challenges 
----------------------- 
 
¶24. (SBU) Serious human rights problems in Vietnam include lack of 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of the press. 
One of our key objectives is to end the use of catch-all "national 
security" provisions for the prosecution of peaceful dissent.  We 
continue to call for the release of all prisoners of conscience, but 
where we see individuals expressing their political opinions, many 
of our government interlocutors see "lawbreakers" trying to 
destabilize the regime.  The recent arrests and sackings of 
Vietnamese reporters and editors in the wake of a corruption scandal 
reveal the on-going battle within the GVN over the role of freedom 
of the press.  The continued existence of groups in the United 
States that advocate regime change complicates human rights 
engagement by providing ammunition to hard-liners who want to stoke 
the fading paranoia that we are indeed still "the enemy." 
Reassuring the GVN that the USG does not support separatist groups 
will help build a human rights dialogue based on mutual trust. 
 
The China Factor 
---------------- 
 
¶25. (SBU) While Vietnam's engagement with the United States will 
continue to broaden, China is necessarily Vietnam's most important 
strategic preoccupation.  This is not to say that Vietnam is 
"choosing" China over the United States; the situation is much more 
complex than that.  Vietnam's leadership is sophisticated enough to 
realize that relations with China and the United States do not 
represent a zero sum game; it is possible to have good relations 
with both.  Each relationship also creates challenges, however. 
While China constitutes a vital commercial partner and former ally, 
it is also perceived as a significant and frustrating constraint to 
Vietnam's freedom of action. 
 
¶26. (SBU)  Chinese bullying of foreign companies in an attempt to 
compel them to cease oil and gas exploration efforts in the South 
China Sea serves to remind Vietnamese officials that while the 
Vietnamese may not approve of all U.S. policies, the same is 
certainly true of Chinese actions.  While progress has been made in 
settling the land border, there is no commonality of views on 
sovereignty issues regarding the South China Sea, known as the "East 
Sea" to the Vietnamese.  Hanoi is also "riding the tiger" with 
regard to managing the deeply negative views toward China of many 
Vietnamese.  China is widely disliked and distrusted as a former 
colonial master, and Beijing's actions in the Spratlys and Paracels 
threaten to inflame those passions.  Should Hanoi allow 
unconstrained protests against the Chinese, however, it would appear 
weak in the face of calls to action that it could not satisfy, as 
well as risking Beijing's anger. 
 
¶27. (SBU) The GVN is understandably cautious with regard to China's 
potential reaction to enhancements in Vietnam's cooperation with the 
United States. U.S.-Vietnam cooperation in the security field is 
also constrained by an institutional conservatism born of concern 
over "peaceful evolution" as a real threat to the regime, as well as 
by an ingrained caution on the part of Vietnam's military in the 
face of relative power calculations vis-a-vis China. 
 
Future Prospects 
---------------- 
 
¶28. (SBU) The GVN recognizes the strategic importance of the United 
States in the region and the world, but is not shy about raising the 
specter of "peaceful evolution," or to criticize U.S. actions it 
perceives as outside the multilateral system.  They routinely chafe 
over U.S. criticism of Vietnam's human rights and religious freedom 
record.  Nonetheless, Vietnam's leaders are also pragmatic and 
recognize that Vietnam's own continued economic well-being, growth 
and security are, in large measure, inexorably tied to its 
relationship with the United States. 
 
¶29. (SBU) Vietnam has begun to explore opportunities within regional 
organizations to increase joint efforts against terrorism, 
narcotics, maritime piracy and other issues of shared concern. 
Vietnam recently began joint sea patrols with other neighbors in the 
Gulf of Thailand and has established hotlines to help facilitate 
coordination along sea boundaries.  Nevertheless, for historic and 
foreign policy reasons, the GVN is generally reluctant to speak out 
against its "traditional friends" such as North Korea and Iran when 
they engage in behavior that the rest of the international community 
condemns. 
 
What You Can Expect 
-------------------- 
 
 
HANOI 00000965  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
¶30. (SBU) You can expect your interlocutors not only to be 
articulate and well informed, but also to speak in terms generally 
supportive of growth in the bilateral relationship.  As noted above, 
lingering suspicions still exist among conservatives in leadership 
about the development of closer ties with the United States, but the 
overall tenor is one of support and interest at a measured pace that 
will not upset the GVN's calibrated attempts to maintain balance 
among its other regional partners.  Your trip to Hanoi will continue 
to help translate those good feelings into measurable 
accomplishments in the defense and security relationship.  We look 
forward to your visit and stand ready to do everything we can to 
make your time in Vietnam as productive as possible.