VZCZCXRO9495
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #0687/01 2400918
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270918Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9472
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0064
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 000687 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/FPP 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC DJ ET ER SO XA
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DJIBOUTI 
 
REF: STATE 74840 
 
¶1. Country Conditions: The Republic of Djibouti is a developing 
and stable African country in the Horn of Africa.  Although 
exact statistics are unavailable, unemployment is estimated in 
excess of 50 percent of the working-age population.  Over two- 
thirds of the country's estimated 650,000 residents live in the 
capital, also called Djibouti.  Djibouti attracts numerous 
economic migrants and refugees from neighboring Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, and Somalia. 
 
¶2. Since the suspension of all visa operations in Eritrea in 
December 2006, and of non-immigrant visa processing in Yemen in 
April 2008, Post has been processing an increased number of visa 
requests from both countries. 
 
¶3. The level of consular fraud in Djibouti is low but believed 
to be increasing. 
 
--------- 
NIV FRAUD 
--------- 
 
¶4. NIV fraud has become increasingly sophisticated.  Lying 
continues to be a method; document fraud has evolved as the 
interest to travel to the U.S. has become ever more popular with 
the increasing American presence in Djibouti. 
 
¶5. Tourism: Young applicants age 22-35--including couples going 
on their 'honeymoon', wanting to visit family, or planning to 
visit the U.S. for tourism--produce fraudulent documents to 
prove ties to Djibouti.  False documents are computer-generated 
to show stable employment and sufficient finances to support 
self and family.  Fraudulent bank statements are also included 
in the package with an official stamp and signature.  Spot 
checks by Post's consular fraud prevention unit (FPU) have 
helped identify such fraud; recurring transaction numbers and 
incorrect balances can be fraud indicators.  Applicants also 
commonly obtain a new passport as an attempt to conceal prior 
travel to what are considered as possibly 'undesirable' 
locations (i.e., to other predominantly Muslim countries). 
 
¶6. Students: The few Djiboutian student visa applicants received 
are typically children of government ministers or of other 
government officials.  These applicants are legitimate. 
 
¶7. The suspension of all visa operations at Embassy Asmara has 
shifted the bulk of Eritrean student visa applicants seeking to 
enroll in associate, bachelor's, master's or doctoral degree 
programs to Djibouti.  While some Eritrean students qualify for 
a student visa, it is evident that many--especially students 
seeking an associate or bachelor's degree--seek student visas as 
a means to easily immigrate to the U.S.  Post noticed that most 
Eritrean students only apply to one school, and have not 
searched for or applied to other schools.  Also, they apply to 
schools with relatively easy enrollment, most notably Maharishi 
University, in Fairfield, IA, which has a unique work-study 
program that offsets the cost of tuition.  Maharishi students 
usually spend a short time in the classroom at the beginning of 
the program, work at internships at high-paying firms to offset 
the cost of school, and then return for additional classroom 
work before receiving their degrees.  As students pay only 
$4,200 up front, the program attracts overseas students with 
limited funds. 
 
¶8. Post conducts text searchs in CCD for sponsors' names, to 
determine whether there are recurring sponsors in the student 
visa applicant pool. 
 
¶9. Post conducted a validation study in early 2008 on 2006 and 
2007 Djiboutian NIV applicants, which confirmed the return of 
approximately 75% of applicants.  However, post believes that 
future validation studies may show a lower return rate.  The 
Ministry of Finance's Director of Economics concurred with 
Post's observation that an increasing number of lower middle 
class B1/B2 applicants do not find the job market attractive, 
and therefore tend to falsify supporting documents (i.e., 
employment letters or bank statements) in hopes of appearing 
stable to qualify for a U.S. non-immigrant visa. 
 
¶10. Djibouti possesses porous borders, and Post continues to be 
concerned about possible terrorists entering the country seeking 
to travel to the U.S.  Post continues to be diligent in 
processing SAOs to curb the possibility of issuing a visa to a 
wanted terrorist.  In addition, we work with the regional LEGATT 
team for additional spot checks. 
 
¶11. Post has been informed by Djibouti-American contacts and 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000687  002 OF 004 
 
 
French authorities that Djiboutian passports can be purchased by 
Somalis.  In addition, French authorities have reportedly seized 
Djiboutian passports from Somali immigrants in France. 
Djiboutian authorities neither denied nor confirmed this claim. 
 
-------- 
IV FRAUD 
-------- 
 
¶12. Most Djiboutian IV applicants are bona fide.  However, the 
majority of immigrant petitions received in Djibouti are family 
reunification petitions for Somali citizens.  Post has a high 
rate of fraud in this area since there is no competent civil 
authority in Somalia.  All civil documents from Somalia can be 
easily purchased and falsified. 
 
¶13. The applicants typically have little to no evidence of a 
relationship to the petitioner.  Photos are almost never 
produced.  When photos do exist, they are clearly staged. 
(Note: Staged does not necessarily mean fraud.  Staged can also 
mean photographs by a paid studio portrait with fake backdrop.) 
Additionally, the majority of applicants are illiterate, and so 
there are no letters exchanged between petitioner and applicant. 
Phone calls are expensive and usually are made through prepaid 
cards, which leave no usable record.  Money transfer receipts 
are often offered as proof of relationship.  However, they tend 
to be handwritten on scraps of torn notebook paper, and often do 
not indicate the name of either petitioner or applicant, but 
rather use the name of a neighbor, relative, etc., in a position 
to send or collect the money. 
 
¶14. With the establishment and the expansion of in Djibouti of 
Camp Lemonier-?-headquarters for approximately 2,200 U.S. 
military forces--Post has seen an increase in K1 visas.  Some 
beneficiaries are female prostitutes working in local bars. 
Rudimentary English skills make them unable to answer simple 
questions about their fiance. 
 
¶15. In addition to fraudulent marriages, an egregious number of 
unrelated and overage children are added to petitions.  Children 
are often stated to be significantly younger than they are.  To 
ensure that all the children in a family will be younger than 21 
at the time of petitioning, some or all of their ages may be 
significantly regressed.  On many occasions, the panel physician 
has informed the Consular Officer that children are either 
suspected to be over 21, or are unrelated applicants. 
 
-------- 
DV FRAUD 
-------- 
 
¶16. Post began processing Diversity Visas (DVs) in 2007.  Most 
of the winners are Somalis, who present the same documents and 
at times have the same sponsor.  This is a concern for Post, 
considering the lack of competent government authorities to 
issue police records, civil documents, school records, etc., in 
Somalia.  It is therefore very difficult for Post to verify 
Somali DV applicants. 
 
---------------------- 
ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD 
---------------------- 
 
¶17. The same factors that influence IV fraud also affect 
passport and citizenship fraud.  Post is sometimes forced to 
rely on voluntary DNA testing to adjudicate CRBA cases for 
children born in Somalia. 
 
¶18. Another problematic and questionable factor is parents' 
ability to transfer citizenship to their child.  Some parents 
have lived out of the United States for so long it is hard for 
them to prove at least 3 years physical presence in the United 
States. 
 
¶19. Due to the high number of U.S. military servicemen in 
Djibouti, Post has recognized an increase of CRBA cases from 
them and their Djiboutian or Ethiopian girlfriends.  To protect 
the servicemen from the ring of prostitutes that target them and 
to prevent fraud, Post suggests DNA exams from the serviceman 
and the child in question. 
 
¶20. Post has experienced an increasing number of cases where 
Somali-Americans have lost their passports during their visit to 
Somalia.  Post believes there is a possibility that Somali- 
Americans return to Somalia upon receiving nationality and give 
their passports to family members (such as their brother, sister 
or cousin) who have similar physical features to the AmCit.  The 
family member then travels to the U.S. with the passport.  Once 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000687  003 OF 004 
 
 
the family member arrives in the U.S., the AmCit reports his or 
her passport lost or stolen.  Since post now has access to the 
DSH, we use this tool to track the entry and exits of AmCits who 
report their passports lost or stolen. 
 
¶21. Many new Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) visiting their 
countries of origin for vacation also report their travel 
documents or green cards lost.  Post relies on the DHS Regional 
Office to provide a travel letter. 
 
-------------- 
ADOPTION FRAUD 
-------------- 
 
¶22. Foreign adoption is extremely difficult in Djibouti.  By 
law, only non-Djiboutian children (e.g., a baby born to an 
Ethiopian mother and unknown father) are eligible for foreign 
adoption.  The difficulty in completing an adoption here deters 
all but the most determined would-be parents.  It is not unusual 
for the process to take up to a year to complete.  We therefore 
believe adoption fraud is negligible. 
 
--- 
DNA 
--- 
 
¶23. Post has frequently found that the only usable evidence of 
relationship is DNA.  We have found a decreasing number of cases 
with negative DNA results.  However, approximately 40 per cent 
of cases where we suggest DNA testing never follow through with 
such testing.  We believe that word is spreading that DNA can 
not be 'fooled', and abandoned cases know that they will be 
caught if they attempt to do DNA testing.  Many of the negative 
DNA tests come back close, but do not meet the required 
threshold for proof.  We suspect identify fraud in these cases; 
for example, an aunt or a sister claiming to be the mother. 
 
¶24. Post also finds a significant number of legitimate families 
will slip in additional children.  Where more than one child is 
DNA tested, one may come back legitimate while another returns 
as no relation. 
 
¶25. Marriages where no children are available to DNA test are 
particularly difficult to prove.  Often, there is no 
relationship between the two spouses, because the marriage was 
arranged and the spouses knew each other for only a matter of 
days.  While the vast majority of the marriage arrangements 
involved payment to the AmCit or LPR, the applicants still 
appear to take the arrangement seriously, and consider it to be 
a valid marriage. 
 
------------- 
V92s and V93s 
------------- 
 
¶26. All the issues detailed in IVs above apply to V92s and V93s. 
However, we find a significantly higher percentage of 
relationship fraud in 92s and 93s.  For Visas 93, in cases of 
spouses without children, the vast majority were married well 
after the I-590 was approved, usually only weeks or in some 
cases just hours prior to departure for the U.S.  During the 
interview, they frequently claim that they were living together 
as spouses for several months prior to the filing the I-590, but 
only decided to marry when departure was imminent.  Post 
believes that many unmarried refugees accept the highest 
financial bidder for a spouse after they receive their travel 
date. 
 
--------------- 
ALIEN SMUGGLING 
--------------- 
 
¶27. While Post has not identified any alien smuggling trends, it 
cannot discount the possibility of alien smuggling in IV cases, 
particularly when post must rely on DNA testing to determine 
relationship.  Djibouti is a major transit country for economic 
and political migrants from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia 
heading to the Middle East.  In a desperate attempt to reach 
their destination, the migrants become targets for traffickers 
and smugglers. 
 
------------------------------- 
DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶28. The RSO and ARSO support the Consular Section fraud 
investigations.  They also provide information regarding 
possible visa fraud we may encounter due to the evolving 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000687  004 OF 004 
 
 
dynamics of Djibouti?s economy.  One of the three FSNs in the 
Consular Section is dedicated to fraud investigation, but has 
not taken any formal fraud detection training.  The RSO FSN 
Investigator (FSNI), who assists the Consular Section with fraud 
investigations, is an experienced investigator who has received 
field investigation training.  This partnership between the RSO 
and Consular Section has strengthened Post's fraud prevention. 
All investigations results are reported in writing. 
 
---------------------------------- 
HOST CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶29. Citizenship is not conferred by birth in Djibouti; to 
inherit citizenship, at least one parent must be a documented 
Djiboutian.  The Government will not issue a birth certificate 
for a child deemed to be non-Djiboutian.  However, most 
Djiboutians are documented, and those documents are well 
organized and maintained by the government.  Upon gaining 
independence from France in 1977, Djibouti launched a campaign 
to document its citizens. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITES 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶30. The government cooperates with Post and is willing to assist 
us with combating visa fraud. 
 
--------------------------- 
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
--------------------------- 
 
¶31. As detailed above, a key concern is insufficient ability to 
authenticate documents presented by the many Somali applicants 
who appear at Embassy Djibouti.  As a result, it is difficult to 
establish with satisfaction the bona fides of Somali travelers, 
many of whose applications are thus denied, in the absence of 
guidance to the contrary from the Department. 
 
¶32. Long delays in responding to requests for Security Advisory 
Opinions (SAOs) is another concern.  Djibouti's predominantly 
Muslim and ethnic Somali society means a large number of 
applicants must await 'further administrative processing.'  Lack 
of specific date or place of birth information for many CLASS 
hits has required Post to submit numerous SAO requests--the vast 
majority of which are cleared, albeit weeks later (if not 
longer). 
 
¶34. ConOff works closely with the French and other Consulates to 
share and receive information on fraud trends in Djibouti.  In 
order to combat fraud from applicants from Eritrea, Yemen and 
Somalia, Post also works closely with regional posts to verify 
documents. 
 
---------------- 
PERSONNEL ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶35. Post has only one Consular Officer (Civil Service on 
excursion) and a back-up Consular Officer (untenured JO). 
ConOff has taken PC541 (Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers) 
at FSI and acts as the Fraud Prevention Manager.  The Senior FSN 
in Post?s Consular Section serves as the Fraud and ACS 
assistant.  No formal fraud detection training has been 
provided, but she has been nominated by Post for the upcoming 
LES Fraud Prevention Workshop.  Current ConOff will leave post 
in August 2009. 
 
WONG