VZCZCXRO6535
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHDR #0536/01 2351214
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221214Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7798
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0980
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3174
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 1109
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 2678
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DAR ES SALAAM 000536 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT AF/E FOR JLIDDLE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID MARR TZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR TANZANIAN PRESIDENT KIKWETE'S OFFICIAL U.S. 
VISIT, AUGUST 26-30 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (SBU) Over the past three years, the U.S.-Tanzanian 
bilateral relationship has witnessed a sea change.  With the 
election of a charismatic, pro-Western President, and increasing 
levels of U.S. assistance, cooperation has expanded in areas ranging 
from health, education, and natural resource management to 
counterterrorism and military affairs.  As a nascent democracy with 
an impressive record of peaceful political transition, Tanzania is a 
stabilizing influence in a turbulent region.  Despite daunting 
challenges--HIV/AIDS, poor infrastructure, corruption, and political 
stalemate in Zanzibar--the Government of Tanzania (GOT) remains 
committed to furthering both economic development and democracy. 
Providing more than USD 400 million in direct bilateral assistance 
to the GOT in FY 2008, the USG aims to advance several strategic 
priorities such as enhancing Tanzania's counterterrorism capability 
and strengthening the checks and balances of Tanzania's democracy. 
A USD 698 million MCC Compact, the largest Compact to date, was 
signed during President Bush's February 2008 visit to Tanzania.  The 
level of cooperation between our military and the Tanzania People's 
Defence Forces is deeper than ever, with active USG peacekeeping 
training programs and USG assistance to support Tanzania's role in 
African Union operations. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On anti-corruption and transparency, President 
Kikwete, well aware of the importance of government accountability 
to the 82 percent of the electorate who voted him into office and to 
the donors, allowed press freedoms to strengthen, particularly 
investigative reporting.  During the second year of his 
administration, one corruption case after another was aired in the 
press.  Some major donors even threatened to reduce "medium term" 
assistance levels without greater transparency and accountability. 
Over the last year, with our assistance, the Tanzanian press was 
further energized, resulting in a huge increase in corruption 
reporting.  Partly as a result, in less than four months, President 
Kikwete fired the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania, the Prime 
Minister and four other key ministers resigned, and the entire 
cabinet was reshuffled.  However, subsequent GOT action on grand 
corruption cases has been incomplete. 
 
Political and Economic Background 
--------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) In 1992, Tanzania opened the door to multi-party 
democracy, transitioning from a single party, socialist 
state.  Under the stewardship of former President Mkapa, 
fundamental macro-reforms were introduced and Tanzania began its 
transition toward free-market capitalism.  With the landslide 
election of President Kikwete in 2005, Tanzania underwent its third 
peaceful transition to a new President.  Taken together, political 
and economic reforms introduced since 1992 have made Tanzania an 
example of peace and stability in the region. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Formidable challenges remain.  Located in a 
turbulent neighborhood, Tanzania is neighbor to eight countries, all 
with porous borders and a 1,500 kilometer coastline.  Tanzania is a 
member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), an 
association of its southern neighbors.  Tanzania is also a member of 
the East African Community (EAC), an association of its East African 
and Great Lakes neighbors.  Infrastructure remains rudimentary; red 
tape and corruption impede private sector 
development. There are positive signs that HIV/AIDS prevalence is 
not increasing and may be on a downward trend, as the HIV prevalence 
rate for 15-49 year-olds has decreased from seven percent (2003) to 
5.7 percent (2007).  While elections on the Mainland have been free 
and fair, Tanzania is still a state dominated by the executive 
branch and the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party.  In Zanzibar, 
serious irregularities and sporadic violence marred elections in 
1995, 2000, and 2005. 
 
¶5. (SBU) While Tanzania has achieved major macroeconomic 
reform over the past decade, macro-stability has yet to 
translate into significant gains at the micro level.  More 
than one third of Tanzanians live in abject poverty and per 
capita GDP is USD 340.  In a 2007-08 UN Development Program (UNDP) 
report, Tanzania ranked 159 out of 177 in the Human Development 
Index.  In 2006, the Tanzanian government had to revise its growth 
forecasts downward (from 7.2 to 5.8 
percent) due to a food shortage and an ongoing power crisis.  The 
lack of electricity, coupled with rising oil and food  prices, 
caused inflation to increase from approximately 4 to 7 percent. 
Tanzania's oil import bill quadrupled and its business climate 
suffered set backs.  While in 2007, the economic forecast rebounded 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000536  002 OF 005 
 
 
to a growth rate of nearly 7.2 percent, sharp increases in food 
prices during the first half of 2008 once again threatened growth. 
 
U.S.-Tanzanian Bilateral Relationship 
------------------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) Since the election of President Kikwete in December 2005, 
U.S.-Tanzanian bilateral relations have significantly deepened. 
President Kikwete's pro-Western stance, coupled with an increasing 
level of U.S. assistance, has been the catalyst for this change, 
enhancing cooperation in sectors from health and education, to 
counterterrorism and military affairs.  President Kikwete has 
visited the U.S. five times since taking office, including two 
meetings with President Bush in Washington D.C. (May 2006, September 
2006) and attending the UN Assembly in September 2007 at which time 
he met the Secretary of State in Washington.  During President 
Bush's historic trip to Tanzania in February 2008, the relationship 
was further cemented through the public signing of the MCC compact 
and, equally importantly, the favorable reaction of Tanzanian 
citizenry to President Bush's visit to hospitals, factories and 
schools in Dar es Salaam and Arusha.  A 2008 Pew Global Attitudes 
Poll showed a 19 percent increase, to 65 percent, of Tanzanians who 
have a favorable attitudes towards the U.S. 
 
¶7. (SBU) As a member of the UN Security Council (January 
2005-December 2006), Tanzania supported key resolutions 
sanctioning North Korea and Iran.  Tanzania did not fully 
support the USG's effort to address Burma's human rights 
situation in the Security Council, insisting the issue be 
dealt with in the Human Rights Council instead.  With respect to 
country specific human rights resolutions in the Third Committee, 
Tanzania was also not completely cooperative and abstained from 
votes or voted to close the discussion on some key human rights 
resolutions that the GOT believed should be handled by the Human 
Rights Council. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Tanzania has started to play an increasingly 
prominent role in the region on issues ranging from Sudan to 
Somalia.  Standing up to Sudan, the Kikwete administration was 
outspoken in its support of a UN peacekeeping mission to take over 
the African Union (AU) mission in Darfur and against Sudan assuming 
the AU Chairmanship in January 2007. During the January 2008 AU 
Summit in Addis Ababa, President Kikwete was elected AU Chairman for 
the next 12 months.  While still in Addis, he worked to garner 
Africa's support for a strong Security Council statement against the 
deteriorating situation in Chad. 
 
¶9. (SBU) President Kikwete pledged to Secretary of State Rice in 
September 2007 to send three peacekeeping battalions to Darfur; one 
battalion has been trained under the Department of State's ACOTA 
program.  Tanzania has also been supportive of our policy in Somalia 
and joined the Somalia Contact Group.  At the United States' behest, 
President Kikwete swiftly voiced his support for Ethiopia and the 
need for an African peacekeeping mission to be put in place. 
Tanzania has long played a constructive role in the Burundi peace 
process and a lead role within SADC on Zimbabwe.  However, Tanzania 
has been quiet on Zimbabwe since the flawed second round of the 
presidential election. 
 
U.S. Strategic Priorities 
-------------------- 
¶10. (SBU) The USG's strategic priorities in Tanzania are: 
 (i) building the GOT's counterterrorism (CT) capacity. 
(ii) strengthening Tanzania's democratic institutions and 
accountability, through parliamentary capacity building and 
anti-corruption efforts. 
(iii)improving education by combating HIV/AIDS and malaria, and 
increasing access to school for underserved children, such as Muslim 
girls; 
(iv) improving health by combating HIV/AIDS and malaria. 
 (v) spurring economic growth through significant investments in 
transport, energy and water infrastructure, policy reform and 
improved natural resource management; and 
(vi) influencing public opinion, especially among Tanzania's 
Muslims, who tend to view U.S. policy as anti-Islam. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The USG supports these strategic priorities with active 
diplomatic engagement and a generous foreign assistance program. 
Although Tanzania enjoys the support of numerous donor countries, 
the U.S. is one of the top donors in Tanzania in dollar amounts.  In 
FY08, the total USG bilateral assistance will amount to nearly USD 
400 million, including presidential initiatives such as PEPFAR and 
PMI.  Taking into account the U.S. share of contributions from 
multilateral donors such as the World Bank and African Development 
Bank, U.S. assistance will total USD 662 million in 2008.  This does 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000536  003 OF 005 
 
 
not include major private U.S. benefactors such as the Gates 
Foundation.  Other major bilateral donors include the U.K., Norway, 
Sweden, and the European Union. 
 
¶12. (SBU) To ensure that corruption does not undermine development 
efforts, we are sharply focused on supporting President Kikwete's 
anti-corruption campaign.  The Kikwete administration has taken 
steps to combat corruption, appointing a new Director General of the 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and passing two 
new pieces of legislation: the Anti-Money Laundering Bill and the 
Anti-Corruption Bill.  While pleased with passage of these bills, we 
are disappointed that the Anti-Corruption law does not adequately 
safeguard the independence of the PCCB.  A steady drum beat of 
corruption allegations featured in the press over the past year have 
involved many of Tanzania's senior leaders; no major official has 
thus far been brought to justice for their alleged actions. 
However, with respect to the Bank of Tanzania, President Kikwete 
fired the Governor in January 2008, and announced an investigation 
of the Central Bank's activities with the report due in June.  Delay 
in the report's release and President Kikwete's announcement in 
August that action against implicated parties would be deferred have 
been disappointing. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In the wake of the 1998 Embassy bombing, we are actively 
engaged in furthering counterterrorism (CT) cooperation with the 
Tanzanian government.  The Mission has an integrated strategy 
involving modernization of Tanzania's law enforcement as well as 
winning the hearts and minds of the Tanzanian people.  Our work in 
Pemba--a majority Muslim island--exemplifies this strategy.  We have 
knit together cultural preservation projects to repair mosques, 
self-help projects to improve rural livelihoods, and significant 
USAID malaria control and education programs.  MCC will rehabilitate 
and improve up to 36 kilometers of rural roads in Pemba under the 
Compact.  In addition, CDC is providing HIV prevention and treatment 
services at the central hospital in Pemba.  USAID and the Combined 
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) have partnered to build 
and furnish a primary school and the Mission has plans to inaugurate 
an American Corner in Pemba to advance Islamic outreach efforts. 
Another key component of the Mission's strategy is helping the 
government establish its own national, interagency CT Center to 
collect, share and analyze CT data. 
 
Zanzibar's Political Impasse 
---------------------------- 
¶14. (SBU) In his December 2005 inaugural address, President 
Kikwete pledged to address Zanzibar's "political problem," 
which involves the bitter divide between two political 
parties - CCM and the Civic United Front (CUF)- and between 
Zanzibar's two islands--Unguja and Pemba.  In 1995, 2000 and again 
in 2005, the Zanzibar elections were marred by 
irregularities.  A National Democratic Institute observer 
team reported "serious problems in Zanzibar's urban region 
where 40 percent of the registered voters reside."  While 2005 did 
register some administrative improvements and 
violence was contained, the elections still concluded in an impasse. 
 CUF contested the elections and refused to recognize President 
Karume's government. 
 
¶15. (SBU) In January 2007, official reconciliation talks finally 
began between the CCM Secretary-General Makamba and CUF's 
Secretary-General Malim Seif Hamad.  However, nearly eighteen months 
later, the talks appear to be at a stalemate. 
 
¶16. (SBU) CUF leaders remain adamant that their bottom line is the 
formation of a power-sharing government in advance of the 2010 
elections.  CUF leaders have repeatedly emphasized that without a 
government of national unity, the 2010 elections will be neither 
free nor fair; they have warned that their membership is becoming 
increasingly restless and disillusioned with the democratic process. 
 
 
¶17. (SBU) The CCM party, particularly President Karume and his inner 
circle, appears unwilling to implement a power-sharing agreement 
prior to the 2010 elections and have called for a referendum on the 
issues.  However, a referendum election without proper oversight in 
place risks raising tensions in Zanzibar even higher.  While 
President Kikwete has personally monitored progress of the talks, he 
has not yet wielded his position as CCM party chairman or his 
offices as Head of State to successfully broker an agreement that 
would be fair and equitable to both sides. 
 
Military-to-Military Relations 
------------------------------ 
¶18. (SBU) Under the Kikwete administration, the GOT has 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000536  004 OF 005 
 
 
expressed its intent to begin participating in international 
peacekeeping operations.  In 2006, Tanzania became our newest 
partner in the African Contingency Training and Assistance (ACOTA) 
program.  With Kikwete's offer to deploy a peacekeeping brigade to 
Darfur under UN auspices, the Mission's goal is to train three 
Tanzanian battalions by 2009.  The first battalion has already been 
trained, and the training of the second battalion will commence in 
late August 2008.  These battalions will not only contribute to UN 
deployments but will also constitute part of an AU regional standby 
brigade.  (Note: Tanzania demonstrated its intent to become more 
active in peacekeeping by deploying 75 military police to Lebanon in 
January 2007 to help secure the UNIFIL mission.  Under ACOTA, the 
USG will train a third company to rotate into UNIFIL.) 
 
¶19. (SBU) The Tanzanian government has also signaled its desire to 
deepen military-to-military ties with the U.S.  more broadly. In 
December 2006, the GOT gave approval to CJTF-HOA to establish a 
Civil Affairs presence on the Swahili Coast.  The Civil Affairs team 
is carrying out humanitarian projects and helping build civil 
military operations capacity within the Tanzania People's Defence 
Forces (TPDF).  In early 2008, the USG provided logistical 
assistance to support the African Union-led military operation in 
the Comoros Islands. 
 
Health Challenges: HIV/AIDS and Malaria 
--------------------------------------- 
¶20. (SBU) Tanzania faces a mature generalized HIV epidemic, 
with a prevalence rate of approximately 5.7 percent and 1.4 
million people living with HIV/AIDS.  An estimated 440,000 
individuals are clinically eligible for antiretroviral treatment; 
however, available services can support less then half of those in 
need.  In FY 2008, PEPFAR will provide Tanzania with over USD 313 
million to support 
treatment, care, and prevention programs.  The PEPFAR program is on 
track to exceed its original targets: 150,000 
individuals on anti-retroviral drugs; care for 750,000 
individuals, including orphans and vulnerable children; and 
prevention of 490,000 new HIV infections.  Although the U.S. has 
fostered positive relationships with the Tanzanian 
government in the health sector, significant challenges remain 
including: the need for stronger leadership in line ministries; poor 
health infrastructure; a shortage of 
health care workers; a weak government procurement system; and 
allegations of corruption in the public and private sectors. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Malaria is the number one killer of children in 
Tanzania and continues to be a major cause of maternal mortality. 
As a focus country under the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), 
Tanzania will receive up to USD 34 million in FY08 to support the 
delivery of long-lasting, insecticide treated bed-nets, the care and 
treatment of malaria, the malaria in pregnancy program, and indoor 
residual insecticide spraying.  Since 2006, USAID has focused its 
efforts on the isles of Zanzibar, successfully controlling malaria 
on both islands; the program on the Mainland is on track to attain 
the PMI goal of reducing malaria deaths by at least 50 percent by 
¶2010. 
 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
-------------------------------------- 
¶22. (SBU) In February 2008, Presidents Kikwete and Bush signed the 
largest MCC Compact to date, USD 698 million.  The Compact will 
strengthen Tanzania's infrastructure network in three key areas: 
transportation (roads and the Mafia Island airport), water, and 
energy.  It is expected to enter into full force and effect in 
September 2008.  Our message continues to be that a Compact is an 
agreement of reciprocal responsibilities; to sustain it over five 
years, Tanzania must pay heed to its corruption index and be 
vigilant at all levels to ensure transparency and accountability in 
governance. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Tanzania also received MCC Threshold funds--USD 
11.2 million--from FY2005 to 2007.  The Threshold program, which 
closes in September 2008, has focused on, among other things, 
enhancing civil society's capacity to demand anti-corruption reform 
and fighting corruption in public procurement. The program trained 
more than 250 journalists in investigative reporting skills; some of 
these journalists were involved in breaking grand corruption 
stories.  The program also enhanced local-level accountability by 
helping establish a network of more than 63 public expenditure 
tracking committees.  Finally, and most importantly, the Threshold 
program helped the country's procurement regulator carry out several 
audits of the procurement practices of key GOT entities; in February 
2008, one of these audits sparked and informed a Parliamentary 
investigation which resulted in the resignation of the Prime 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000536  005 OF 005 
 
 
Minister. 
 
GREEN