VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0807/01 2401035
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271035Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8601

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000807 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/RD/SCA, DS/DSS/ITA AND SCA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CASC CE MARR PTER
SUBJECT: EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING 08/27/2008 IN WAKE OF 
LTTE AIR TIGER ATTACK IN THE EAST 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: AmEmbassy Colombo convened a meeting of the 
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on August 27, 2008 to 
discuss post's security posture in light of an attack on a 
Sri Lanka naval base in Trincomalee, Sri Lanka. The attack 
occurred during the evening of August 26, 2008. GSL police 
and military sources informed the Embassy that the air wing, 
or "Air Tigers," of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) bombed the base at approximately 21:30 hr. local time. 
The EAC concurred that the actual threat did not, at this 
juncture, warrant revisions to post's security posture or the 
security advice to the general American community. End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On August 27, 2008, AmEmbassy Colombo convened an 
EAC meeting.  Present for the meeting were the Ambassador, 
Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, Regional Security Officer, 
Political Officer, Economic Officer, Public Affairs Officer, 
Consular Officer, Management Officer, International 
Broadcasting Bureau Station Manager, USAID Acting Director, 
Officer in Charge of the Office of Defense Cooperation, 
Defense Attach Office's Operations Coordinator and the 
Marine Security Guard Detachment Commander. The agenda items 
for the meeting were: 
 
-- The attack on the naval base in Trincomalee, which the GSL 
attributed to the LTTE Air Tigers 
 
-- Post's security posture in light of the attack 
 
-- Security posture for two groups of USG Amcit personnel who 
were in Trincomalee 
 
-- Possible revisions to post's advice to the general 
American community 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to GSL sources, the Sri Lanka Navy base in 
Trincomalee (approximately 200 miles northeast of Colombo, on 
the East coast) came under attack at around 21:30 hr. local 
time (12:00 EDT) on August 26. Sources stated that at least 
two light aircraft overflew the base and dropped two 
improvised explosive devices, one of which exploded. GSL 
interlocutors claimed that the aircraft belonged to the "Air 
Tigers," as both the LTTE and the GSL refer to the LTTE's air 
wing. These sources believed that the intended target was a 
troop transport and supply ship. According to Navy officials, 
anti-aircraft fire prevented the Air Tigers from reaching the 
troop ship. The planes vectored toward a barracks for 
enlisted personnel and dropped bombs on the barracks. One 
bomb exploded, while the other reportedly failed to detonate. 
Publicly, the GSL has stated that 10 or 11 people were 
injured. However, some AmEmbassy officers received reports 
that casualty figures were higher and that some seamen may 
have been killed. 
 
¶4. (SBU) At the time of the attack, there were two separate 
groups of American citizen personnel in Trincomalee on 
official USG business. One group (five people from USAID's 
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, or "OFDA") were lodged 
in a hotel located about five miles from the naval base, 
across Trincomalee Bay. The second group (two Raytheon radar 
technicians) was housed on the Navy base itself. The Embassy 
first learned of the attack when the OFDA officers contacted 
their AID control officer to report that a fire fight had 
erupted in Trincomalee. Although the OFDA personnel were not 
endangered by the attack, hotel staff chose to move them into 
another area of the facility. Although the Raytheon 
technicians were actually on the base, Embassy personnel 
learned that the technicians had not been too close to the 
attack site and were apparently in no danger, though they 
heard explosions. As of the morning of September 27, the 
Raytheon technicians had chosen to remain on base to complete 
their work. Meanwhile, the OFDA officers had departed 
Trincomalee, not in response to the attack, but rather to 
continue with their scheduled travel to other areas in the 
Eastern Province. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The RSO commented that this incident fit the pattern 
of other LTTE attacks - the Air Tigers flew at night and 
were selective in their targeting. The targets were military 
ones, vice civilian, even though there are many potential 
civilan targets located in Trincomalee town and surrounding 
areas. The RSO further opined that it was reasonable to 
assume that as the noose tightens on the LTTE in the Northern 
Province (the Sri Lanka Army reports that it is within 12 
kilometers of Kilinochchi, the LTTE's de facto capital), the 
terrorist organization would conduct reprisal attacks in 
other areas of Sri Lanka. Reprisal attacks and diversionary 
tactics are also standard operating procedures for the LTTE 
when it seeks to relieve pressure on the North. Therefore, 
this attack was another in a long series and did not indicate 
 
a change in tactics or an increased threat to either the 
official or expatriate American communities. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The EAC concurred that the true threat remains being 
in the wrong place at the wrong time - i.e. in proximity to 
an LTTE attack on a GSL military, political, economic or law 
enforcement target, and thus becoming an unintended victim of 
the attack. The EAC agreed that this attack did not represent 
a change in LTTE tactics. Therefore, there was nothing new to 
report to either the official or expatriate American 
communities. Accordingly, the EAC decided that it was not 
necessary, at this time, to either revise post's security 
posture or amend the security advice that post provides to 
the general American community. The EAC further decided that 
official Americans may continue travel to Trincomalee for 
business purposes without waiting for approval from the RSO 
and DCM. The restricted travel policy will continue to 
proscribe personal travel to Trincomalee for the official 
American community for the foreseeable future. The Ambassador 
agreed with the EAC's recommendations. 
 
¶6. (U) Post will continue to monitor the security environment 
and will report further developments, if any, septel.  POC 
for this message is RSO Michael V. Perkins, who may be 
contacted at 94.11.249.8885, 94.11.249.8888 (MSG Post 1 after 
regular business hours), perkinsmv@state.gov (unclassified 
email), or perkinsmv@state.sgov.gov (classified email). 
BLAKE