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Viewing cable 08BUDAPEST807, DEMARCHE DELIVERED: U.S. PROPOSAL FOR STRONG NAC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BUDAPEST807 2008-08-11 11:56 2011-02-18 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Budapest
Appears in these articles:
http://rusrep.ru/article/2010/11/29/wikileaks_docs_02/
VZCZCXRO7825
RR RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #0807 2241156
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111156Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3279
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0637
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0249
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000807 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR GEORGIA TASK FORCE AND EUR/CE-JAMIE LAMORE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2018 
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM RU GG HU
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: U.S. PROPOSAL FOR STRONG NAC 
STATEMENT ...

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000807 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR GEORGIA TASK FORCE AND EUR/CE-JAMIE LAMORE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2018 TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM RU GG HU

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: U.S. PROPOSAL FOR STRONG NAC STATEMENT CONDEMNING RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN GEORGIA REF: SECSTATE 85678 Classified By: PolOff Ryan C. Leong, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 

ΒΆ1. (C) Ref talking points were delivered on August 11 to Vilmos Hamikus, Acting State Secretary for Political Affairs at the GoH Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hamikus agreed with the main principals of the talking points, namely the need for a cease fire and cessation of hostilities, however he also noted to Charge and PolOff that a strongly worded response from the EU was unlikely. Hamikus said it was important that any NATO and EU statements be as similar as possible, since Russia would be watching very carefully for gaps between the two for future exploitation. Hungary is in the process of formulating its position for the NAC meeting on August 12 and the EU GAERC meeting on August 13. The GAERC may be attended by GoH Foreign Minister Kinga Goncz. 2. (C) Hamikus said that Russia was "smart enough to go far enough," implying that Russia was in the process of creating enough diplomatic and geographic maneuvering space to negotiate an advantageous position in Georgia. He stated that the Russians likely had an easy negotiating path ahead given the military gains made; the Georgians would unfortunately be in a weaker position and probably be forced to make concessions. Hamikus added that it could only boost Russia's overall foreign and security policy that two potential NATO members (Georgia and Ukraine) could end up in this imbroglio, sidetracking their accession aspirations. 3. (C) Hamikus agreed that the Russian response is entirely out of proportion. Hungary would not object to tough language in either a NAC or GAERC statement. However, Hamikus expected objections to aggressive language against Russia would come from the typical quarters, namely Italy and Germany. He was thankful that the French are currently holding the reins of the EU Presidency as they are "braver" than other EU members. 4. (C) The GoH has not been contacted by diplomatic missions from Russia or Georgia thus far. Hungary has no official diplomatic representation in Georgia at present, as it was in the process of establishing a mission. Levine