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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA1124, SHOOTDOWN: VISIT TO CINDACTA IV

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA1124 2008-08-22 13:04 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brasilia 
VZCZCXRO6600
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1124 2351304
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221304Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2307
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8376
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6519
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2621
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 
UNCLAS BRASILIA 001124 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND L 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL SNAR MOPS BR
SUBJECT: SHOOTDOWN: VISIT TO CINDACTA IV 
 
REF: A. STATE 54183 
     B. STATE 70837 
     C. BRASILIA 806 
     D. 07 BRASILIA 1868 
 
1.  In late July, a team from MLO Brasilia and SOUTHCOM 
visited CINDACTA IV, the regional air traffic control center 
responsible for almost fifty percent of Brazil's territory 
and controlling the most commonly used routes for drug 
traffickers.  The team reported that the CINDACTA was working 
efficiently and professionally, with modern equipment much in 
evidence.  (Comment: This could be a result of Minister 
Jobim's efforts to ensure that Brazil's air traffic control 
system has the resources to improve its overall performance. 
End Comment)  According to MLO, the controllers there 
demonstrated "excellent awareness" of traffic in the 
CINDACTA's AOR. 
 
2.  In response to questions from the U.S. team, controllers 
were well aware of shootdown procedures but were not 
authorized to share them at that time.  Local controllers 
confirmed that they did not have the authority to order a 
shootdown.  Controllers were able to confirm that no 
shootdown had ever been ordered in their AOR and that the 
chances were remote that one ever would be.  Nevertheless, 
they were able to state that the shootdown law has led to a 
marked decrease in the number of illegal trafficking flights 
in their region, even though intercepts have been infrequent. 
 (Note: In the first half of 2007, the Brazilian Air Force 
reported successful intercepts of all forty suspect tracks 
detected and two forced landings.  End Note) 
 
3.  COMMENT: The situation encountered at CINDACTA IV matches 
our expectations as reported in ref d.  CINDACTAS have no 
shootdown authority of their own.  We are still seeking 
specific information as to Brazil's procedures for ordering a 
shootdown from Air Defense Command Headquarters (COMDABRA) in 
Brasilia. 
SOBEL