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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA1061, BRAZIL'S NEXT GENERATION FIGHTER COMPETITION TAKES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA1061 2008-08-05 14:57 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #1061/01 2181457
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051457Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2221
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0381
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0440
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0069
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6474
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2563
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//SAF/IA//
RUENAAA/NAVY IPO WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001061 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA, PM/RSAT, USDOC FOR 
MAC/ADRISCOLL/LFUSSELL/MCAMERON, FCS/PWILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR BR ETTC
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S NEXT GENERATION FIGHTER COMPETITION TAKES 
OFF 
 
REF: BRASILIA 847 
 
Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske.  Reason: 1.5(d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  Meeting the July 31, deadline for 
responses to Brazil's request for information (RFI) on a next 
generation fighter aircraft (FX2), Boeing and Lockheed Martin 
submitted their proposals on July 30 and 31 respectively. 
The Brazilian Air Force (BRAF) is expected to review the 
proposals of the six competing aircraft and announce a short 
list by the end of August.  As noted in reftel, benefits to 
the Brazilian economy, particularly its aerospace industry 
will be decisive in the fighter competition.  Both U.S. 
companies have included substantial packages for industrial 
cooperation but are taking widely different approaches.  Both 
expect strong competition from the French, Russian and 
Swedish competitors and will seek appropriate USG advocacy. 
Post strongly supports providing advocacy for US competitors 
once approved by Washington agencies.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  BOEING.  Boeing provided information on its F18 
Super Hornet, highlighting the aircraft's performance record 
and potential for upgrades to keep it among the world's 
leading combat aircraft for the next several decades. 
Boeing's proposal included an extensive section on the 
technology transfer potential and on possibilities for 
industrial cooperation.  While Boeing could not be specific 
on the cooperative activities it would pursue, it did provide 
a list of potential Brazilian partners and of possible 
projects in which they could participate.  It also provided 
examples of how other F18 users contribute to the production 
of their aircraft.  Most importantly, Boeing offers opening 
for broad cooperation with Embraer, not only on military, but 
on civilian aircraft as well.  As Embraer specializes in 
regional jets that Boeing does not produce, such a 
partnership would allow both companies to utilize their 
respective strengths.  As BRAF officials have indicated in 
the past that benefits to Embraer will be key, Boeing's offer 
should be attractive.  (Note:  Embraer is a private sector 
company, but the only Brazilian aircraft manufacturer and 
considered a national asset.)  After an initial review of the 
Boeing submission, the BRAF team overseeing the process told 
the Boeing rep that the submission was "just what we were 
looking for." 
 
3.  (C)  LOCKHEED.  Lockheed Martin faces a more difficult 
road with its F16.  In Brazil's aborted FX1 competition, the 
F16 was deemed not to meet Brazil's requirements, and many 
Brazilian Air Force officers believe it is too old an 
aircraft to compete with the other candidates.  Lockheed is 
offering a newer, more capable F16, but the real appeal of 
the plane will be that it would establish a relationship with 
Lockheed that would carry over to eventual purchase of the 
F35 Joint Strike Fighter.  Many Brazilian pilots have said 
openly that the F35 would be their preferred long term 
aircraft, but its availability would be after Brazil must 
replace its aging fleet.  The F16 would provide a capable 
option until the F35 could be available.  Lockheed's offer 
will also be attractive to Brazil because it would lead to 
construction of a manufacturing and/or assembly facility for 
the F16 in Brazil, delivering a direct economic benefit over 
the life of the aircraft in Brazilian service.  The BRAF team 
called the Lockheed proposal "impressive," but noted that 
because it was a late addition to the competition, they are 
least familiar with the F16.  This could prove a disadvantage 
among the top level staff who will make final decisions.  On 
the other hand, Lockheed's offers of co-production were 
well-received as was the potential for Brazil to become a 
regional service hub for other South American countries 
operating smaller numbers of F16s. 
 
4.  (C)  OTHER COMPETITORS.  Post does not have the details 
of the proposals of the other competitors, the Russian SU35, 
the Swedish Gripen and the French Rafale.  Brazilian contacts 
have indicated that the French and Russians have both been 
active in lobbying for their planes in advance of their 
formal submissions.  BRAF sources have told embassy officers 
that they would not prefer the Russian plane as they believe 
 
it has reliability problems and because the Russians are 
perceived as suppliers of last resort.  Lockheed reps have 
said that they expect a strong proposal from Saab, to include 
a substantial offset package, based on the Swedish company's 
past activity. 
 
5.  (C)  COMMENT.  The two U.S. proposals could both provide 
Brazil with capable aircraft and strong economic benefits. In 
effect, they offer Brazil a choice between the shorter term 
advantages of indigenous production of an aircraft with a 
limited shelflife and a potential long term relationship that 
would go well beyond the FX2 program.  As noted in reftel, 
how Brazil views the economic advantages will be key in its 
decision making.  U.S. competitors will also have to overcome 
a presumption that U.S. technology transfer policies are too 
restrictive and have indicated that they will request USG 
assistance in this regard.  Providing Defense Minister Jobim 
with familiarization flights on both aircraft during his 
recent visit to the U.S. and with briefings on tech transfers 
has been a step in the right direction.  With a relatively 
short period in which to make submission, competitors have 
put together impressive proposals.  It is likely that the 
BRAF has compressed the normal process for RFIs in order to 
have its "short list" of aircraft together before the 
Minister for Planning unrolls the new national defense 
strategy on September 7 out of concern that the planning 
document will limit its options in selecting new fighters. 
SOBEL