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DE RUEHBO #3093/01 2381859
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P 251859Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4277
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RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0917
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ AUG 9624
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RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 2200
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 7170
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 2422
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS BOGOTA 003093 
 
CODEL 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD PGOV PREL PTER SNAR CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SENATOR HAGEL AND 
DELEGATION TO BOGOTA AND CARTAGENA - AUGUST 28-31, 2008 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  With U.S. support, Colombia finds itself 
safer, economically stronger, better governed, and more 
democratic than it has been in decades.  Murders, kidnapping, 
and violence are down nationwide.  Increased security has led 
to an economic boom that has reduced poverty by 20 percent 
since 2002, lowered unemployment by 25 percent, and attracted 
record levels of investment.  Almost 48,000 combatants, 
mostly paramilitaries, have laid down their arms and are 
participating in GOC reintegration programs.  The captures or 
kills of key leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), the July 2 rescue of 15 hostages held by the 
FARC including three Americans, and rising desertions have 
weakened Colombia's largest terrorist group.  Consolidating 
recent gains and making further advances on human rights, 
security, and poverty reduction -- while also managing tense 
relations with Venezuela and Ecuador -- represent the 
greatest challenges in the remaining two years of the Uribe 
Administration. 
 
¶2. (U) The GOC is one of our strongest strategic partners in 
the world, and shares our commitment in the Americas to 
greater regional economic integration, security cooperation, 
and democracy. Colombia cooperates with the USG on 
counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations, and has 
already ratified the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Act 
(CTPA).  Our continued commitment to Colombia will help to 
further consolidate recent security and governance gains as 
well as promote economic growth and regional stability.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
CTPA Solidifies Advances: 
Investment, Poverty, and Security 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) President Uribe's democratic security policy and free 
market economic reforms have spurred the economy.  GDP growth 
reached 8.2 percent in 2007 after averaging more than five 
percent annually since 2003.  The economy is slowing this 
year, with recent growth at just over four percent. 
Colombia's trade volume grew more than 65 percent in the same 
period.  The United States remains Colombia's largest trade 
partner (approximately 37 percent of exports and 26 percent 
of imports), though Colombia could shift to greater 
agricultural imports from Canada, which concluded free trade 
negotiations in June 2008, and the European Union when free 
trade negotiations with them conclude in 2009.  In 2007, the 
United States exported some USD 1.2 billion in agricultural 
products to Colombia.  Nearly 93 percent of Colombia's 
exports already receive duty-free access to the U.S. under 
the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), which expires 
December 31, 2008.  U.S. exports to Colombia face an average 
tariff of 12 percent.  Investors from around the world have 
boosted investment in Colombia in anticipation of the CTPA. 
In 2007, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) exceeded $7.5 
billion, 350 percent greater than FDI in 2002. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Colombian Congress ratified the CTPA in 2007 by 
a substantial margin, and it remains the Colombian 
government's highest economic priority.  U.S. rejection of 
the accord would deal a political and economic blow to Uribe 
and his policy of strong ties with the United States. 
Venezuela is Colombia's second largest trade partner, but the 
political and economic relationship has been strained. 
Venezuela has tightened its import regime, blocking some 
Colombian exports, such as autos and clothing. 
 
¶5. (U) Analysts estimate the agreement with the United States 
would add between one and two percent annual GDP growth to 
the local Colombian economy.  This growth would help create 
the new, formal sector jobs that President Uribe needs to 
meet his goal of cutting the poverty rate from 45 percent to 
35 percent by 2010.  Trade-based formal sector growth will 
also provide the GOC with additional fiscal resources to 
shoulder a larger portion of its security costs as USG Plan 
Colombia support falls. 
 
------------------- 
Democratic Security 
------------------- 
 
 
¶6. (U) The establishment of greater Colombian government 
territorial control and the paramilitary demobilization have 
created the space for civil society and political parties to 
operate more openly than ever before.  The GOC maintains a 
police presence in all 1099 municipalities for the first time 
in history.  Increased security on roads and highways has 
allowed for greater freedom of movement for people and 
commerce.  Murders fell from almost 29,000 in 2002 to 17,000 
in 2007, and kidnappings fell from over 2,800 a year to less 
than 600 during the same period.  Local elections in October 
2007 reflected the improved security with over 86,000 
candidates participating.  The leftist Polo Democratico Party 
(PDA) won 1.2 million more votes than in 2003, and its 
candidate won the key Bogota mayoral race. 
 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
¶7. (U) A bold Colombian military operation on July 2 led to 
the rescue of three U.S. contractors and twelve Colombians 
held by the FARC.  The three Americans were captured by the 
FARC in February 2003, and were the longest held U.S. 
hostages in the world at the time of their rescue.  The GOC 
worked closely with us on hostage issues, and U.S. training 
of Colombian military personnel contributed to the 
operation's success.  The FARC continues to hold 25 Colombian 
"political" hostages, as well as an estimated 700 economic 
hostages.  The FARC is believed to continue to hold a U.S. 
citizen who was kidnapped in Panama in April 2008, and 
perhaps a Colombian-American dual national kidnapped in 2003, 
although it has never provided proof of life. 
 
-------------- 
Labor Violence 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Labor violence and impunity remain major concerns, but 
the GOC has made dramatic progress.  Since 2002, labor union 
data shows that murders of unionists have fallen by nearly 80 
percent.  In January, 2007, the GOC launched a special $1.5 
million labor sub-unit to prosecute those who commit acts of 
violence against trade unionists.  The unit has 19 
prosecutors and 74 investigators.  Since 2001, the Attorney 
General's Office has prosecuted 94 cases, leading to the 
conviction of 188 perpetrators.  The new sub-unit on labor 
crimes, which began operations in November 2006, resolved 49 
cases, convicting 90 individuals. 
 
¶9. (U) In addition to gains stemming from its democratic 
security policy, the GOC has taken specific steps to protect 
labor leaders and other vulnerable individuals.  In 2008, the 
Ministry of Interior and Justice's $44 million Protection 
Program helped protect more than 9,444 human rights 
activists, journalists, politicians, and other threatened 
individuals, including 1,959 trade unionists.  The murder 
rate for unionists is now lower than that for the general 
population. 
 
--------------- 
U.S. Assistance 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) In January 2007 the GOC presented a Plan Colombia 
"consolidation strategy" pledging a Colombian investment of 
$78 billion through 2013.  The proposal emphasizes the 
importance of building social cohesion, and allocates 
substantial resources to help strengthen local governance, 
protect human rights, and assist displaced people, 
Afro-Colombians, and indigenous communities.  It also aims to 
reintegrate more than 48,000 demobilized ex-fighters and 
deserters and to promote Colombia's licit exports.  The GOC 
seeks funding from the United States and European countries 
to complement its own resources. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more than 
$5 billion in assistance, including $800 million in economic 
and social assistance.  USG security assistance combats drug 
trafficking and terrorism through training, equipment, and 
 
technical assistance.  It supports Colombian military 
aviation, essential for all programs - civilian or military - 
outside Colombia's major cities.  U.S. social and economic 
aid focuses on alternative development, displaced and other 
vulnerable communities, human rights and democratic 
institutions, and reintegration of demobilized fighters. 
 
¶12. (U) Congress increased economic and social assistance 
from $140 million in FY 07 to $215 million in FY 08, while 
security assistance was reduced in FY 08.  With additional 
resources, USAID is launching a new biodiversity program, 
increasing its assistance for victims of the conflict, 
enlarging its support to Afro-Colombians and indigenous 
communities, and expanding its assistance to the GOC's effort 
to consolidate its presence in areas previously controlled by 
illegal armed groups.  Food aid assistance is also increasing 
from $6 million/year to $10 million in FY 08 through USAID's 
Food for Peace support to the World Food Program. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Drug Eradication and Interdiction 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Eradication of coca and poppy crops and 
interdiction of cocaine and heroin reached near-record levels 
in 2007.  President Uribe supports greater manual 
eradication, but recognizes that continued aerial eradication 
is also key.  He seeks a complementary approach using both 
methods.  In 2008, the national Police and military forces 
have set a brisk pace for cocaine, coca base and marijuana 
seizures, and are on their way to record seizure totals.  We 
continue to work with the Colombian government to maximize 
our scarce resources to achieve eradication and interdiction 
targets.  We continue our productive dialogue on how best to 
transfer key tasks from the USG to the GOC. 
 
----------- 
Extradition 
----------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Since taking office, President Uribe has approved 
over 750 extraditions to the United States, including a 
record number of 164 in 2007.  The Colombian Government is on 
pace to break that record, having already extradited 119 
criminals to the United States in 2008, including 15 former 
paramilitary leaders. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Demobilization and Peace Process 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Over 32,000 former paramilitaries have demobilized 
since 2002, and a further 16,000 have deserted from other 
illegal armed groups (about one-half from the FARC).  The 
Organization of American States (OAS) estimates there are 30 
emerging criminal groups with a combined membership of over 
3000 persons.  Reintegration programs and targeted law 
enforcement are working to counter these groups.  Under the 
Justice and Peace Law (JPL) process, many former paramilitary 
leaders have confessed their participation in violent crimes. 
 To date, the JPL process has revealed the location of the 
graves of almost 1,200 paramilitary victims and provided 
information on 3,600 crimes.  Over 120,000 victims have 
registered under the JPL, with the GOC working on measures to 
accelerate the payment of reparations. The Supreme Court and 
the Prosecutor--with GOC support--continue to investigate 
politicians with alleged paramilitary ties.  Approximately 70 
Congressmen, 19 mayors, and 11 governors have been implicated 
in the scandal. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The National Liberation Army (ELN) has negotiated 
with the Colombian government for over two years on a 
cease-fire agreement, but ELN infighting and FARC pressure 
have prevented a deal.  The ELN kidnap civilians to fund its 
operations, but its military capability is declining.  The 
FARC has rebuffed GOC initiatives to engage in any meaningful 
peace talks. 
 
---------------------- 
A Strong Regional Ally 
 
---------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Colombia shares our commitment to promoting 
regional economic integration, security cooperation, and 
democracy in the region.  After Colombia's March 1 air-strike 
killing FARC senior leader Raul Reyes at a camp in Ecuador, 
Venezuela joined Ecuador in breaking relations and deployed 
military forces to its border.  Venezuela called off the 
buildup after reaching agreement with Colombia on March 7 to 
reduce tensions and reestablish commercial and diplomatic 
ties.  Computers found in Raul Reyes' camp have information 
implicating Venezuelan and Ecuadorian government officials in 
providing support to the FARC, as well as an international 
support network for the terrorist group.  President Uribe and 
President Chavez met on July 11 and affirmed their commitment 
to improve ties, but tensions remain over Venezuela's 
ambiguous relations with the FARC. Ecuador and Colombia have 
yet to restore relations. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Cartagena - Two Cities, Separate and Unequal 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (U) You will see two Cartagenas; the beautiful, 450 
year-old walled city which has emerged as a fashionable 
tourist destination, and the impoverished and sometimes 
lawless section, home to some of the poorest people in 
Colombia.  The predominantly Afro-Colombian population, 
combined with its location on the Caribbean, gives the city a 
markedly different culture and pace than land-locked cities 
like Medellin and Bogota.  Cartagena has one of Colombia's 
principal ports, employing thousands, and would benefit 
greatly from the CTPA.  It also has one of the few Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) secure ports in the hemisphere. 
The city has undergone a construction boom, as a result of 
the sharp drop in violence, with more than 40 high rises 
currently under construction.  International cruise ships 
have quadrupled their ports of call in Cartagena over the 
last three years. 
 
¶19. (U) The other Cartagena remains mired in poverty, a 
vestige of historic economic exclusion and the conflict.  The 
citizens in these areas, mostly Afro-Colombians and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), continue to wait for the 
benefits of the economic boom.  Over 50,000 registered IDP's 
live in Cartagena, one of the largest concentrations in the 
country.  Your delegation will visit examples of the efforts 
being undertaken by both the GOC and USAID to bridge the two 
Cartagenas.  Cartagena's newly elected Mayor, Judith Pinedo, 
represents a break from the corrupt city governance that has 
plagued the city for decades. 
BROWNFIELD