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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #2800/01 2141620
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADBFD2EE MSI9645-695)
P 011620Z AUG 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3948
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8295
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0776
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 2092
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 6414
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 7108

UNCLAS BOGOTA 002800 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y ADDED SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV EAGR PTER SNAR CO
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 
AND USAID ADMINISTRATOR HENRIETTA FORE - AUGUST 5-6, 2008 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Fostered by targeted U.S. assistance, Colombia 
finds itself safer, economically stronger, better governed, and more 
democratic than it has been in decades. Rates of murder, kidnapping, 
and violence nationwide, particularly against union members, have 
fallen dramatically.  Increased security has led to an economic boom 
that has reduced poverty by 20 percent since 2002, lowered 
unemployment by 25 percent, and attracted record levels of 
investment.  Almost 48,000 combatants, mostly paramilitaries, have 
laid down their arms and are participating in GOC reintegration 
programs.  The captures or kills of key leaders of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the July 2 rescue of 15 hostages 
held by the FARC including three Americans, and rising desertions 
have weakened Colombia's largest terrorist group.  Consolidating 
recent gains and making further advances on human rights, security, 
and poverty reduction, while also managing tense relations with 
Venezuela and Ecuador, represent the greatest challenges for the 
remaining two years of the Uribe Administration. 
 
¶2.  (U) The Government of Colombia is one of our strongest strategic 
partners in the world, evidenced by the GOC's commitments to 
complement and facilitate USG security, counter-narcotics 
operations, and social and economic development efforts throughout 
the country.  Its economic growth potential complements the nature 
of our trade relationship with Colombia, evidenced by the strong 
support for the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Act (CTPA).  Our 
continued commitment to Colombia will help to further consolidate 
recent security and governance gains as well as to promote 
Colombia's economic growth and promote regional stability.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------- 
U.S. Assistance 
--------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Since 1999 under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more 
than USD 5.5 billion in assistance, including USD 950 million in 
economic and social assistance.  USG security assistance combats 
drug trafficking and terrorism through training, equipment, and 
technical assistance.  It supports Colombian military aviation, 
essential for all programs - civilian or military - outside 
Colombia's major cities.  USG social and economic aid, roughly 40% 
of the FY 08 USG contribution under Plan Colombia, focuses on 
alternative development, displaced and other vulnerable communities, 
human rights and democratic institutions, and reintegration of 
demobilized fighters. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In January 2007 the GOC presented a Plan Colombia 
"consolidation strategy" pledging a Colombian investment of USD 78 
billion through 2013.  The proposal emphasizes the importance of 
building social cohesion, and allocates substantial resources to 
help strengthen local governance, protect human rights, and assist 
displaced people, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous communities.  It 
also aims to reintegrate more than 48,000 demobilized ex-fighters 
and deserters and to promote Colombia's licit exports. The GOC seeks 
funding from the United States and European countries to complement 
its own resources. 
 
¶5.  (U) Congress increased economic and social assistance from USD 
140 million in FY 07 to USD 215 million in FY 08, while security 
assistance was reduced in FY 08.  With additional resources, USAID 
is launching a new biodiversity program, increasing its assistance 
for victims of the conflict, enlarging its support to 
Afro-Colombians and indigenous communities and significantly 
expanding its assistance to the GOC in its effort to consolidate 
Colombia's conflict zones that were formerly controlled by armed 
groups.  Food aid assistance is also increasing from USD 6 million 
per year to USD 10 million in FY 08 through USAID'S Food for Peace 
support to the World Food Program. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Government of Colombia a True Partner 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) (%}Ql#zevelopment.  The joint 
efforts under Plan Colombia exemplify that cooperation as proven by 
GOC funding during the past year of over USD 12 million into USAID 
contracts on joint initiatives.  All aspects of the USG's assistance 
program in Colombia, designed and implemented with the GOC 
counterparts, seek gradual "Colombianization", or nationalization, 
of the programs as a mutually agreed objective of both governments. 
We hold recurring meetings with counterparts to track the progress 
of their initiatives, the results of which are passed to and 
commented on by President Uribe. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) We are providing substantial planning assistance and 
social and economic development aid to support the GOC's 
post-conflict consolidation efforts throughout the country and most 
recently in the Department of Meta.  The result of that assistance 
is a new model for "clearing and holding" territories that have been 
under the control or influence of illegally armed groups for 
decades.  Under the GOC's leadership, the approach integrates 
security and military operations and illicit crop eradication with 
immediate social and economic assistance and government services. 
The GOC plans to expand this approach nationwide. 
 
¶8.  (U) In 2007, a USAID investment of USD 130 million leveraged an 
additional USD 1 billion in resources from the GOC and the private 
sector.  One of the most successful leveraging efforts in the world, 
it remains a key component of U.S. development assistance to 
Colombia.  Further policy reforms and consolidation efforts will 
increase this figure further in the coming years. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Drug Eradication and Interdiction 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Eradication of coca and poppy crops and interdiction of 
cocaine and heroin reached near-record levels in 2007.  President 
Uribe supports greater manual eradication, but recognizes that 
continued aerial eradication will key success.  He seeks a 
complementary approach using both methods.  In 2008, the national 
police and military forces have set a brisk pace for cocaine, coca 
base and marijuana seizures, and are over half way to record-level 
seizure totals.  We continue to work with the GOC to maximize our 
scarce resources to achieve the eradication and interdiction 
targets.  We continue our productive dialogue on how best to 
transfer key tasks from the USG to the GOC. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Trade and Investment Key to Poverty Alleviation and Security 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶10.  (U) President Uribe's democratic security policy and free 
market economic reforms have spurred the economy.  GDP growth 
reached 8.2 percent in 2007 after averaging more than five percent 
annually since 2003.  The economy, decelerating this year, shows 
recent growth slowing to just over four percent.  Colombia's trade 
volume grew more than 65 percent in the same period.  The United 
States remains Colombia's largest trade partner (approximately 37 
perc% BMQH them conclude in 2009.  In 2007, the 
United States exported some USD 1.2 billion in agricultural products 
to Colombia. Nearly 93 percent of Colombia's exports already receive 
duty-free access to the U.S. under the Andean Trade Preferences Act 
(ATPA), which expires December 31, 2008, while U.S. exports to 
Colombia face an average tariff of 12 percent.  Investors from 
around the world have boosted investment in Colombia in anticipation 
of the CTPA.  In 2007, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) exceeded USD 
7.5 billion, 350 percent greater than FDI in 2002. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The Colombian Congress ratified the CTPA in 2007 by a 
substantial margin, and it remains the GOC's highest economic 
priority.  U.S. rejection of the accord would deal a political and 
economic blow to Uribe and his policy of strengthened ties with the 
United States.  Venezuela is Colombia's second largest trade 
partner; but the political and economic relationship has been bumpy, 
and Venezuela has tightened its import regime and blocking some 
Colombian exports such as automobiles and clothing. 
 
¶12.  (U) Analysts estimate the CTPA would add between one and two 
percent annual GDP growth to the local Colombian economy.  This 
growth would add the new jobs in the formal sector that President 
Uribe needs to meet his goal of cutting the poverty rate from 45 
percent to 35 percent by 2010.  Trade-based formal sector growth 
will also provide the GOC with additional fiscal resources to 
shoulder a larger portion of its security costs as USG Plan Colombia 
support falls. 
 
¶13.  (U) Colombia's robust private sector is the backbone of the 
country's economic development.  Its investment in initiatives 
associated with the USG's assistance programs results in high rates 
of leveraging, an example of which is found in USAID's alternative 
development program that mobilizes an average of USD 5 of Colombian 
investment for every USD 1 of USG funds. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Support to Afro-Colombian and Indigenous Communities 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶14.  (U) A congressional soft earmark was listed in FY08 legislation 
 
directing USAID to implement USD 15 million in economic development 
activities in Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.  In order 
to effectively respond to both rural and urban Afro-Colombian and 
indigenous communities, two different approaches will be integrated. 
 In urban areas, USAID will help to create "growth poles" to link 
economic development and basic services around larger urban centers. 
 In rural areas, community consultations will identify economic 
development projects in targeted clusters, creating market linkages, 
and local capacity building to enable communities to respond to 
changing market conditions. 
 
¶15.  (U) On May 19, the GOC launched the Inter-sectoral Commission 
for the Advancement of the Afro-Colombian Communities, with the 
purpose to evaluate the living standards of Afro-Colombians and 
submit recommendations to the GOC to design affirmative action-like 
public policies.  At the request of the Vice-President's office and 
the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, USAID will assist the 
Commission in the implementation of its operational plan by 
supporting a series of outreach events, as well workshops with 
Afro-Colombian communities throughout the country.  The Commission 
also requested USAID support for an assessment of Afro-Colombian 
living conditions to be conducted by Universidad de los Andes, one 
of the top universities in Colombia.  USAID is considering this and 
other requests. 
 
¶16.  (U) USAID is also launching a new three year, USD 11 million 
biodiversity and indigenous groups preservation project in September 
¶2008.  It seeks to enhance governance, enforcement, and economic 
opportunities for in and around Colombia's national parks and 
protected areas, particularly indigenous communities, to create 
buffer zones to decrease illicit crop production. 
 
------------------- 
Democratic Security 
------------------- 
 
¶17.  (U) The establishment of greater GOC territorial control and 
the paramilitary demobilization have created the space for civil 
society and political parties to operate more openly than ever 
before.  The GOC maintains a police presence in all 1099 
municipalities for the first time in history.  Increased security of 
roads and highways have allowed for greater freedom of movement for 
people and commerce.  Murders fell from over 29,000 in 2002 to less 
than 17,000 in 2007, and kidnappings fell from over 2,800 a year to 
less than 600 during the same period.  Local elections in October 
2007 reflected the improved security with over 86,000 candidates 
participating.  The leftist Polo Democratic Party (POA) won 1.2 
million more votes than in 2003, and its candidate won the key 
Bogot mayoral race. 
 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
¶18.  (U) An audacious Colombian military operation led to the rescue 
of the three U.S. contractors and twelve Colombians held by the 
FARC.  The three Americans were captured by the FARC in February 
2003, and were the longest held U.S. hostages in the world at the 
time of their rescue. The GOC worked closely with us on hostage 
issues, and U.S. training of Colombian military personnel 
contributed to the operation's success.  Despite this success, the 
FARC continues to hold hundreds of other hostages. 
 
-------------- 
Labor Violence 
-------------- 
 
¶19.  (U) Labor violence and impunity remain major concerns, with the 
government making dramatic progress. Since 2002, labor union data 
shows that murders of unionists for political reasons or common 
crime have fallen more than 79 percent.  A resident International 
labor organization (ILO) representative arrived in Colombia in 
January 2007 to help implement the tripartite agreement committing 
the GOC to provide USD 4 million to finance the ILO special 
technical cooperation program and to provide USD 1.5 million a year 
to the Prosecutor General's office. The Prosecutor General operates 
as an independent agency responsible for prosecuting cases of 
violence against trade unionists.  The additional funding enabled 
the Prosecutor General to create a speciI$Q7 
crimes - which began operations in November 2006 - resolved SO 
cases, leading to the conviction of 90 individuals.  For 2008, the 
Prosecutor General has received an additional USD 40 million in GOC 
funds that has allowed it to add 1,072 new positions, including 175 
prosecutors and 200 investigators. 
 
¶20.  (U) In addition to gains stemming from its democratic security 
policy, the GOC has taken specific steps to protect labor leaders 
and other vulnerable individuals.  In 2008, the Ministry of Interior 
and Justice's USD 44 million protection program helped protect more 
than 9,444 human rights activists, journalists, politicians, and 
other threatened individuals, including 1,959 trade unionists. The 
murder rate for unionists is now lower than that for the general 
population. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Demobilization and Peace Process 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (U) Incessant pressure from Colombian security operations makes 
demobilization an attractive alternative to the increasingly dire 
living conditions for terrorists.  The "carrot-and-stick" approach 
employed by the GOC has cut FARC strength in nearly half since the 
beginning of the Uribe administration, dramatically improving 
security conditions across Colombia. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) To date, over 48,000 members of Colombia's illegal armed 
groups (IAGs) have demobilized or deserted ranks.  Of those, over 
32,000 were members of the United Self-Defense Group of Colombia 
(AUC) who demobilized between November 2003 and April 2006 under a 
peace agreement with the GOC.  Another 16,000 have deserted from 
other illegal armed groups (about one-half from the FARC) between 
2002 and 2008 as a result of a USG-assisted Ministry of Defense 
campaign promoting desertion.  Of those, only 7,000 are currently 
active in the GOC Reintegration Program. 
 
¶23.  (SBU) The USG provides crucial assistance to the GOC to 
implement desertion, demobilization, and reintegration programs. 
USAID provides technical assistance, institutional strengthening, 
and implementation support to four peace process components:  1) 
implementation of the legal framework for the DR process; 2) 
monitoring and verification of the DR Process; 3) reintegration of 
ex-combatants including children; and 4) reconciliation and victims' 
reparations. NAS supports the Ministry of Defense's individual 
Demobilization Program (DP) to directly and indirectly reduce the 
numbers, capabilities, and impunity of Colombian narcoterrorist 
organizations, particularly the FARC.  It is almost completely 
nationalized as Colombia has dedicated USD 21.5 million in 2008 and 
the U.S. Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) only USD 
500,000. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) The National Liberation Army (ELN) has negotiated with 
the Colombian government for over two years on a cease-fire 
agreement, but ELN infighting and FARC pressure have prevented a 
deal.  The ELN kidnap civilians to fund operations, but its military 
capability is declining.  The FARC has rebuffed GOC initiatives to 
engage in any meaningful peace talks. 
 
---------------------- 
NEIGHBORHOOD RELATIONS 
---------------------- 
 
¶25.  (SBU) Colombia's commitment to free markets, democracy, and 
close relations with the United States are an exception to trends in 
region.  Following Colombia's March 1 air-strike killing FARC senior 
leader Raul Reyes across the border in Ecuador, Venezuela joined 
Ecuador in breaking relations and deployed military forces to its 
border.  Venezuela called off the buildup after reaching agreement 
Colombia March 7 to reduce tensions and reestablish commercial and 
diplomatic ties.  Computers found in Raul Reyes' camp have 
information that appears to implicate Venezuelan and Ecuadorian 
government officials in providing support to the FARC, as well as a 
wider than thought international support network for the terrorist 
group.  After months of strained relations, President Uribe and 
President Chavez met on July 11 and affirmed their commitment to 
improve ties, but tensions remain over Venezuela's ambiguous 
relations with the FARC.  Ecuador and Colombia have yet to restore 
relations. 
 
BROWNFIELD