VZCZCXRO0241
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0875/01 2410525
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280525Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0341
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0020
RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RXFEAA/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000875 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPAO SR KV
SUBJECT: SERBIA: KOSOVO MINISTRY MEETS WITH UNMIK REP, SERBIAN 
GOVERNMENT WANTS TO BE SEEN AS CONSTRUCTIVE 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Serbian Minister for Kosovo Goran Bogdanovic and UNMIK 
Deputy Head Nicholas Haysom on August 25 discussed the return of 
ethnic Serbs to judicial bodies in northern Kosovo and to the Kosovo 
Police Service (KPS), the third UNMIK-GOS meeting in the past six 
weeks.  Bogdanovic reiterated traditional GOS opposition to the 
transfer of authority from UNMIK to the European Rule of Law Mission 
in Kosovo (EULEX) and maintained that Serb police would have to 
report directly to UNMIK.  Taken together with recent statements by 
Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic and Serb leaders in Kosovo that Serbia 
needs to reach agreement about the international civilian presence 
in Kosovo, there appears to be a newfound dose of pragmatism in 
Belgrade's approach.  The upcoming September 3 visit by President 
Tadic and Foreign Minister Jeremic to Brussels has the potential for 
progress on EULEX: sources tell us the Serbs may lean forward on 
EULEX in exchange for European understanding of Jeremic's ICJ 
initiative at the UNGA.  End Summary. 
 
SEARCHING FOR A RECIPE 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) In the run-up to the Bogdanovic-Haysom meeting, Serbian State 
Secretary for Kosovo Oliver Ivanovic announced that that the goal of 
the discussions with UNMIK was to find a "recipe" for the return of 
Serb police that could then be used for the judiciary and other 
services necessary for the survival of Serbs in Kosovo. 
 
¶3. (SBU) EU sources familiar with the August 25 talks tell us that 
Haysom sought to focus on areas where UNMIK-GOS dialogue can bring 
concrete progress.  He recommended that Serbia come to terms with 
EULEX, preferably through face-to-face contacts, and tested the 
waters whether Belgrade would be amenable to a new UNSCR endorsing 
EULEX, which, although not needed from a legal point of view, would 
provide political cover for a number of stakeholders. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Bogdanovic reportedly stressed that the GOS supports the 
position of Kosovar Serb police who are willing to return to work, 
but only if they would report to UNMIK. He argued that reporting 
within the KPS or EULEX chain-of-command would be tantamount to 
recognizing Kosovo's independence.  Bogdanovic outlined Belgrade's 
preferred sequence of events as a General Assembly resolution on 
referral to the ICJ, agreement on police and courts, and then 
agreement on EULEX, possibly in connection with the next UNMIK 
report to the Security Council in October. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) FM Jeremic's senior advisor Damjan Krnjevic Miskovic, who 
participated in the talks with Haysom, told us on August 27 that the 
Serbian government was intent on achieving concrete results from the 
discussions with UNMIK in order to demonstrate to skeptical Kosovar 
Serbs and others that dialogue produces benefits.  He stressed that 
the people within the GOS handling Kosovo policy now are very 
different than Kostunica and Samardzic; the new team is intent on 
solving problems.  Miskovic emphasized numerous times the need for 
the international community to take Serbia's position into account 
on reconfiguration and the six issues in the UNMIK dialogue.  "The 
Kosovar Albanians have gotten their declaration of independence and 
reconfiguration," he said; "we need something -- what we're asking 
for is miniscule in comparison." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Miskovic said that the Serbian government is eager to 
continue the dialogue with UNMIK and sees both UNMIK Head Zannier 
and Haysom as serious, constructive interlocutors who follow their 
instructions from New York.  Serbia believes it is necessary to 
resolve the situation with the courts and police first in order to 
create a solid foundation for work in other areas.  He noted that 
these competencies should remain under the UN umbrella, adding later 
that "we are not children -- we realize that the UN may eventually 
be present in name only." 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Regarding EULEX, Miskovic said that Serbia has no 
objection to and in fact welcomes the presence of the EU in Kosovo, 
"elsewhere in Serbia," or in the region; the only issue to resolve 
is the legitimization of EULEX by the UNSC.  He stressed that a new 
resolution would not be necessary; other mechanisms such as a 
presidential statement could suffice.  Miskovic appeared to take the 
point that as EULEX was approved by all 27 members of the EU, not 
just those that have recognized Kosovo, it was by definition status 
neutral; he explained that the GOS nevertheless believed the SYG had 
overstepped his authority because he was directing EULEX to replace 
existing pillars rather than to augment them, as was the case 
previously with the OSCE. Serbia would not have objected had the EU 
simply announced that it was expanding Pillar IV, he said. 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000875  002 OF 002 
 
 
JEREMIC: SERBIA HAS ROLE IN RECONFIGURATION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) In an August 21 interview with "Vecernje Novosti," Foreign 
Minister Vuk Jeremic expressed confidence that it was not too late 
for Serbia to influence reconfiguration: "the process of 
reconfiguration of UNMIK began without us, but it should not end 
without us." He added that he believed that it is realistic for 
Serbia to reach an agreement with the UN Secretariat by September or 
October regarding the international civilian presence in Kosovo. 
 
¶9. (U) Jeremic stated that such an agreement would stipulate the 
make-up and the mandate of an international civilian presence that 
would not infringe upon Serbia's sovereignty and would not have the 
authority to implement the Ahtisaari plan.  The agreement would need 
to be confirmed explicitly by a Security Council decision and would 
imply participation of the EU within the UN within the framework of 
the UNSCR 1244.  Jeremic also said that Belgrade already has been 
talking with UNMIK about the possibilities for an agreement. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Vanja Radonjic-Rakic, Counselor with the MFA UN 
Directorate, told us on August 27 that President Tadic, Prime 
Minister Cvetkovic, Deputy PM for European Integration Djelic, and 
Jeremic will discuss the entire range of bilateral issues, including 
the ICJ referral, EU integration, EULEX, and cooperation with the 
Hague Tribunal, during their visit to Brussels on September 3. 
Diplomatic sources in Belgrade speculate that President Tadic may 
make favorable noises about EULEX in Brussels, but in return will 
expect concessions on the EU Interim Trade Agreement and potentially 
even EU support for the ICJ referral. 
 
TRAJKOVIC: FUTURE IS WITH EULEX 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) Rada Trajkovic, Deputy Chairperson of the Serb National 
Council (SNV) of Kosovo, went even further than Bogdanovic and 
Jeremic, announcing that "I can see nothing wrong with the European 
Union assuming, through EULEX, the brunt of responsibility for 
stability in Kosovo," adding that she thinks that Belgrade will 
change its policy toward EULEX after the UN General Assembly session 
in September in order to accelerate Serbia's entrance into the EU. 
 
 
¶12. (U) Trajkovic, who represents Serbs living in enclaves, couched 
her forward-leaning statement by saying that cooperation with the 
international community, including EULEX, is the only means for 
Serbs to deal with repression by Kosovo Albanian institutions, but 
she nevertheless drew the wrath of hardliners such as the Democratic 
Party of Serbia (DSS) and Kosovo Serbs from North Mitrovica. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) There appears to be growing appreciation within the 
Serbian government that it must engage with the international 
community constructively if it wishes to influence events in Kosovo. 
 Belgrade's pursuit of the ICJ referral certainly does not help its 
image in this regard.  But the Serbs will not back down from their 
commitment to an UNGA ICJ referral.  Tadic may just give the 
Europeans what they want on EULEX next week in Brussels in exchange 
for tolerance (or better) of the Serbian UNGA initiative. 
 
MUNTER