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Viewing cable 08BEIJING3362, EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR ADVOCACY IN CHINA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BEIJING3362 2008-08-29 09:38 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Beijing
P 290938Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9634
INFO DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
NOAA NMFS WASHDC
NSF WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
USEU BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
NRC WASHDC
AIT TAIPEI 7056
UNCLAS BEIJING 003362 
 
 
STATE FOR OES/SAT, EAP/CM, ISN/MDSP AND T, AND FOR ISN/NESS R. 
DELABARRE, P. COMELLA 
USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL/FREDRIKSEN, YOSHIDA, BISCONTI, AND BALLOU 
USDOE FOR NNSA/SCHEINMAN, BIENIAWSKI, HUIZENGA, AND KROL 
USDOE FOR NE/SPURGEON AND MCGINNIS 
USNRC FOR ROSALES-COOPER 
USDOC FOR 4420/ITA/MAC KASOFF 
TOKYO FOR DOE ATTACHE CHERRY 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP TPHY PREL CH
SUBJECT: EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR ADVOCACY IN CHINA 
 
REF: A. 2008 Beijing 3055, B. 2008 Beijing 1137, C. 2008 Beijing 
1136, D. 2008 Beijing 2863 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary and Comment.  Effective advocacy for U.S. nuclear 
suppliers is essential to ensuring access to China's rapidly growing 
civil nuclear power market.  With the exception of the bidding 
process that resulted in a contract for four Westinghouse AP1000 
reactors, all reactor purchases to date have been largely the result 
of internal high level political decisions absent any open process. 
Even the Westinghouse decision was arguably a political one, which 
was quickly followed by subsequent non-competitive purchases of the 
competing French and Russian plants.  China is currently in the 
process of building as many as 50 to 60 new nuclear plants by 2020; 
the vast majority will be the CPR-1000, a copy of 60's era 
Westinghouse technology that can be built cheaply and quickly and 
with the majority of parts sourced from Chinese manufacturers. 
Because both GE and Westinghouse have requested advocacy for nuclear 
sales in China, our efforts have been tempered by the requirement of 
being technology neutral; however, GE's ABWR and Westinghouse's 
AP1000 share one major technology and safety feature that is not 
matched by any of the domestic or international competitors in 
China's market, namely passive safety systems (i.e., no human 
intervention is required, the systems rely on physical phenomena 
such as natural convection).  Pressing for open and transparent 
bidding processes for reactor sales (for complete plants or 
individual major component purchases), as well as advocating for 
China to pursue advanced reactor technology for future sites so that 
it's reactor fleet is not so reliant on aging technology through the 
next half century could be a more effective approach to bolster U.S. 
intrests in China's nuclear market.  Regardless ofhow the United 
States decides to advocate, it should be done continuously and from 
a high level in order to keep up with the French and Rssians.  End 
summary and comment. 
 
Reactor urchases Largely a Political Decision 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2.  (SBU) Throughout the history of China's civil nuclear program, 
China has made a point of only pursuing PWR (pressurized water 
reactor) technology for its nuclear power fleet.  Of China's 
existing reactor fleet, none have been chosen through open and 
transparent bid processes.  (Note: China has one compleely 
indigenous reactor at Qinshan, designed and built by the state-owned 
China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), four reactors at Daya Bay 
that were imported and largely built by Framatome, predecessor to 
French nuclear conglomerate Areva (and direct copies of a 
Westinghouse reactor imported by France in the 1960s and then 
nationalized); two more reactors at Qinshan that are basically 
downgraded copies of the Daya Bay reactors (2/3 of the power); two 
Canadian natural uranium reactors at Qinshan (again purchased absent 
any international or internal bid process, said to have been a 
political decision by various contacts in the Chinese nuclear 
industry); and two Russian reactors at Tianwan (again no bid 
process, again a "political decision") End note). 
 
Westinghouse Won, Sort of 
------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) China's nuclear power program has only ever had one open 
bidding process.  The three bidders were Westinghouse (the AP1000), 
Areva (EPR), and AtomStroyExport (VVER-1000, same as Tianwan). 
Westinghouse won the contract for four reactors, two each at Sanmen 
and Haiyang.  Subsequently, China announced a $16 billion dollar 
deal with Areva for two EPRs, 20 years of fuel, and unspecified 
assistance on reprocessing fuel, and another deal for an unspecified 
 
amount for two more VVER-1000s to be built at Tianwan (possibly 
linked to sale of enrichment equipment by Russia).  Of the 30 or so 
reactors currently under construction or announced, there are 4 
AP1000s, 2 EPRs, 2 VVERs, and nearly two dozen CPR-1000s, China's 
copy of the Framatome reactors at Daya Bay. 
 
Opportunities for U.S. Companies 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Zhang Guobao of the National Energy Administration (NEA) 
has indicated on numerous occasions he plans to increase China's 
nuclear power capacity goal in 2020 to 50-60 GW (the current goal is 
40 GW).  This is equal to another 10-20 reactors that will need to 
be started within the next five to six years.  The first of these 
will probably be at interior sites (Note: all of China's nuclear 
power is currently on the coast.  End note).  The urgency of 
building plants in interior provinces was highlighted by the 
widespread blackouts caused by the snowstorms this winter. 
Westinghouse has asked for advocacy for these interior plants; China 
has not yet announced any bidding process, and we do not even know 
for sure that there will be one.  (Comment: At this juncture, it 
appears a formal bid process is highly unlikely.  The most probable 
scenario is that a high level decision will be made on which 
technology to pursue, but there will be no full-plant contract; the 
sites will directly procure individual components, lessening 
potential scope for U.S. companies.  End comment) 
 
Potential Market for GE's ABWR 
------------------------------ 
 
5.  (SBU) In response to GE's request for advocacy on nuclear 
technology sales to China, an Embassy group met with Beijing-based 
GE representatives to better understand GE's opportunities in China. 
 GE Nuclear was specifically not invited to bid in the previous 
round because China had no interest in GE's boiling water reactor 
(BWR) technology.  According to GE nuclear representative Jordan 
Duan,  GE China has heard from contacts within China's nuclear 
industry that China is warming up to the prospect of acquiring BWR 
technology, although the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) continues to espouse a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)-only 
platform.  Duan said these industry contacts believe BWR technology 
would be useful to China's nuclear expansion because it will 
increase the number of available vendors from which major components 
can be sourced (CNNC specifically was worried that China's maximum 
capacity for CPR-1000 construction by 2020 is 30 GW), and BWRs use 
fewer major components (no pressurizer, no steam generator).  GE and 
its Japanese partner Hitachi have already built four Advanced 
Boiling Water Reactors (ABWR), with another six under construction 
in Japan and Taiwan, and have a proven 37 month construction 
schedule, compared to at least 48 months for PWRs.  The ABWR is the 
only Gen III reactor currently operating.  Finally, the operating 
ABWRs in Japan were very near the epicenter of a major earthquake 
last year but emerged undamaged and with no radiation releases; none 
of the competing technologies have been tested under such conditions 
(though they are also designed to survive strong earthquakes), Duan 
explained. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (SBU) GE requested strong U.S. Government advocacy to convince 
Chinese officials to look at BWR technology.  Westinghouse is also 
asking for advocacy. A technology-neutral approach that supports 
both GE and Westinghouse could be to advocate that China adopt safer 
and more advanced Gen III reactor technology at a more rapid pace 
(in light of the overwhelming reliance on the obsolete CPR-1000 in 
 
China's construction plans (ref A)).  In order to avoid incidentally 
supporting the French Evolutionary Pressurized Reactor (EPR), the 
only other advanced reactor in play, advocacy efforts should focus 
on the advanced passive safety systems of both the ABWR and the 
AP1000.  Both designs rely on natural physical processes, such as 
natural convection rather than pump-driven coolant flows, with no 
need for external power or human interaction.  The EPR, on the other 
hand, relies on additional layers of active safety systems to 
decrease risk of an adverse event in case one layer fails.  To 
increase opportunities for both GE and Westinghouse, we should also 
strongly advocate that China choose reactor technology for future 
sites through an open and transparent bidding process.  Regardless 
of how the United States decides to advocate, it must be done 
continuously and from a high level if we want to keep up with the 
French and Russians, because ultimately this is both a political and 
economic decision.  End comment. 
 
RANDT 
 
 
NNNN