P 070951Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9050
INFO DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
NOAA NMFS WASHDC
NSF WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
USEU BRUSSELS
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
NRC WASHDC
AIT TAIPEI 7042

UNCLAS BEIJING 003055 
 
 
STATE FOR OES/SAT, EAP/CM, ISN/MDSP AND T, AND FOR ISN/NESS R. 
DELABARRE, P. COMELLA 
USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL/FREDRIKSEN, YOSHIDA, BISCONTI, AND BALLOU 
USDOE FOR NNSA/SCHEINMAN, BIENIAWSKI, HUIZENGA, AND KROL 
USDOE FOR NE/SPURGEON AND MCGINNIS 
USNRC FOR ROSALES-COOPER 
USDOC FOR 4420/ITA/MAC KASOFF 
TOKYO FOR DOE ATTACHE CHERRY 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP TPHY PREL CH
SUBJECT: CHINA BUILDING INDIGENOUS NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION 
CAPACITY, EDGING OUT WESTINGHOUSE 
 
REF: A. 2008 Beijing 1137, B. 2008 Beijing 1136, C. 2008 Beijing 
2863 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: At a meeting convened by the DOE China Office, 
Westinghouse China provided an update on China's nuclear reactor 
program, including progress at the Westinghouse AP1000 sites, plans 
for new reactors, and an assessment of China's overall current and 
future capacity to build new nuclear power plants (NPP). 
Westinghouse representative Gavin Liu noted that because China's 
technical capacity is increasing, the longer it takes to start the 
next round of AP1000 reactors, the less scope will be available for 
Westinghouse.  Following construction of the first two AP1000s, 
China should be able to indigenously produce most components for the 
next two plants except for the primary coolant pumps and 
instrumentation and control system.  Three Chinese manufacturers 
have already acquired or are in the process of acquiring 
capabilities to produce heavy nuclear forgings including reactor 
pressure vessels, two of which will rival the capabilities of Japan 
Steel Works.  Liu believes that China's forging and component 
manufacturing capacity will need to be dedicated to internal 
projects for the next two decades, after which China can turn to the 
export market.  Although the CPR-1000, the Chinese-built reactor 
based on a copy of Framatome reactor technology at Daya Bay and Ling 
Ao, which has been broadly adopted throughout China and is becoming 
Westinghouse's main competitor, can be built quickly and 
efficiently, it uses decades-old technology and, according to 
Westinghouse, is 100 times less safe than the revolutionary passive 
design of the AP1000.  End Summary. 
 
New QA/QC Standards for Importers 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Westinghouse is currently building four reactors at two 
sites in China, Sanmen and Haiyang, for a consortium led by the 
State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC).  Other Chinese 
partners are the China National Nuclear Corporation and China Power 
Investment Corporation (CPIC).  For the first two reactors, the 
control rod drive mechanism (CRDM), reactor coolant pumps, and 
instrumentation and control circuitry (I&C) will be provided by 
Westinghouse.  Doosan of South Korea will provide the reactor 
pressure vessels (RPV) and steam generators (SG).  Primary coolant 
piping will either be supplied by an Italian firm or one of three 
potential Chinese suppliers who are currently submitting samples for 
testing.  Liu noted that since the contract was signed last July, 
China's nuclear regulator, the National Nuclear Safety 
Administration (NSNA), has implemented new standards for foreign 
firms to be licensed to import nuclear components into China. 
Foreign vendors must submit an application that includes proving 
they have successfully built the components in another country, but 
do not have to provide samples.  (Comment: This new requirement is a 
response to problems with Russian-supplied equipment at Tianwan NPP, 
specifically with components that had never been manufactured 
before.  End Comment.) 
 
Equipment Localization Plans 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) A local Chinese manufacturer has been selected to build 
the steel containment vessels, but has not yet been able to obtain 
required construction certifications from NNSA.  Liu believes the 
delay is a combination of the manufacturer having difficulty 
supplying sufficient samples of the steel and welds, and limited 
resources of the regulator.  This is currently the only construction 
delay.  Ansaldo Nucleare, originally one of Westinghouse's 
 
 
subcontractors, is now out of the picture, as they intended to 
source the containment vessel in China anyway. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) For the second two reactors, the customer is responsible 
for procuring most of the equipment (Westinghouse will still supply 
the primary coolant pumps and the I&C system).  As part of the 
technology transfer portion of the contract, Westinghouse will 
provide technical drawings and specifications so that SNPTC can 
place orders locally for the equipment. 
 
Potential Bottlenecks 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Liu noted that China does not currently have the technical 
capability to manufacture cam pumps large enough to meet AP1000 
specifications.  China has the technology to build smaller cam 
pumps, used in nuclear submarines, Liu said, and is working on 
manufacturing larger pumps to eventually use in AP1000s, but will 
not be ready in time for the first four plants.  The other main 
technology deficiency in China's nuclear industry is I&C.  China 
currently has no one capable of integrating I&C technology to build 
a platform for NPP applications, Liu said. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Liu believes the biggest potential bottleneck is human 
resources - coming up with enough trained personnel to build and 
operate all of these new plants, as well as regulate the industry. 
Although the civil construction and engineering industry in China 
has significantly improved, there is almost no cross-pollination 
with the nuclear construction industry, he said.  (Comment: Although 
there currently is a limited field of experienced nuclear personnel 
in China, this will probably not be a showstopper, as China has 
demonstrated in the past a near infinite capacity to draw in and 
train new people as necessary, basically straight from high school. 
This was how China built up a civil aviation industry from scratch. 
End Comment.) 
 
Heavy Forging Capacity to Rival Japan Steel Works 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) China has three manufacturers that are working to expand 
capabilities to produce heavy nuclear forgings - Shanghai Boiler 
Works (SBW) (ref A), Harbin Boiler Co., Ltd, and Dongfang Boiler 
Group.  Dongfang is currently working exclusively for Guangdong 
Nuclear Power Corporation (GNPC) to produce forgings for CPR-1000 
reactors under construction all over China.  Harbin and SBW have 
installed presses which will give them the capacity to make the 
largest forgings, rivaling even the capabilities of Japan Steel 
Works.  SBW, which has received nuclear certifications from NNSA and 
has produced forgings for Daya Bay, Ling Ao, Ling Dong, and Qinshan, 
has installed the largest press in the world at 16,500 tons.  Harbin 
installed a 16,000 ton press produced by China First Heavy Machine 
Works in Qiqihar and is currently working to receive nuclear 
certification from NNSA.  (Note: Harbin has reportedly been 
practicing producing nuclear grade forgings, but none have made the 
grade yet.  End Note)  SBW can provide four complete reactor forging 
sets per year (reactor pressure vessel, steam generator, and 
turbine), Dongfang can supply two to three, and Harbin expects to be 
able to supply two per year.  Liu noted that no one transferred this 
technology to China; they figured it out on their own.  The nuclear 
forging capacity will have to be dedicated to local projects for the 
next ten to twenty years, Liu believes, after which China can look 
to the export market. 
 
Evolution of the CPR-1000 
------------------------- 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) GNPC's CPR-1000, which has been selected for seven sites 
for a total of 22 reactors so far, is basically a carbon copy of the 
Framatome reactors imported at Daya Bay, with upgrades to the I&C 
system and some other minor improvements, Liu said.  The Framatome 
reactors are actually copies of 1960s-era Westinghouse reactor 
technology transferred to the French.  While there was no specific 
technology transfer clause in the Daya Bay or subsequent Ling Ao 
contracts, GNPC learned how to replicate the plants through a series 
of separate projects with the French, including software sales and 
training, Liu said.  China practiced by building Qinshan II, a 600 
MW plant, a 2-loop downscale of the 3-loop Daya Bay plant. 
 
¶9.  (U) CPR-1000 sites planned or under construction: 
-- Ling Dong, Guangdong Province - 2 NPP 
-- Qinshan II, Zhejiang Province - Units 3 and 4 (600MW) 
-- Hongyanhe, Liaoning Province - 4 NPP 
-- Ningde, Fujian Province - 4 NPP 
-- Yangjiang, Guangdong Province - 4 NPP 
-- Fuqing, Fujian Province - 4 NPP 
-- Fangjiashan, Zhejiang Province - 2 NPP 
 
China currently has 11 reactors operating with a total capacity of 
almost 9 GW electric, all located along the eastern coastline. The 
four AP1000s, two EPRs, and 2 planned VVERs (no contract yet) will 
add another 9.2 GW of capacity.  With the 21.2 GW of capacity from 
CP-1000 reactors above, the total announced capacity operating or 
under construction is over 39 GW, close to China's original plan to 
have 40 GW operating by 2020.  The 12 planned inland reactors will 
edge the total nearer to the 60 GW championed by National Energy 
Bureau Minister Zhang Guobao. 
 
CPR-1000 Has Become the AP1000 Competitor 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Although the Westinghouse AP1000 was selected following 
an international bidding process and is frequently compared to 
Areva's EPR, Liu says that Westinghouse sees the CPR-1000 as its 
main competitor in China.  The CPR-1000, which achieved market 
dominance before the completely indigenous CNNC-designed CNP-1000 
even emerged from the R&D phase, effectively killing it off, can be 
built quickly and efficiently using localized components.  The 
Chinese regulator, burned by problems at Tianwan (ref B), has 
advocated slow adoption of new (i.e. AP1000) technology.  Even 
though the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
announced that GenIII technology (code for the AP1000) should be 
used when three inland sites of four reactors each were approved 
following the winter snow storms that paralyzed much of southern and 
central China in early 2008, Liu is concerned that most, if not all, 
of those plants could end up choosing CPR-1000 technology since 
there is no transparency in the decision-making process.  Because of 
the uncertainty, the three utilities are planning for either 
technology. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In addition to concerns about the selection process, 
Westinghouse is worried that the longer it takes for a technology to 
be chosen, the less scope there will be for international partners 
because China is rapidly acquiring indigenous capability. 
Furthermore, continuing delays coupled with the long lead time for 
many AP1000 components could result in local government officials 
pushing hard for CPR-1000 reactors, since faster implementation 
would allow them to take credit sooner for decreasing pollution, now 
a key component of their performance evaluations. 
 
Who's in Charge of Nuclear Energy? 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Although the responsibilities of the new National Energy 
Bureau (NEB) have been detailed, it is not yet a functioning entity, 
Liu said.  There is no clear decision-making process established 
yet, and none of the Vice Premiers have been assigned the energy 
portfolio to date.  The official process is that NEB and NDRC 
together make recommendations which are sent to the National Energy 
Commission of the State Council for final decision; how this will 
work out in reality remains unclear, especially in light of the 
apparent leadership vacuum. Furthermore, although former China 
Atomic Energy Authority Chairman Sun Qin and about ten of his 
employees have moved to NEB (ref C), Liu is not aware of any actual 
nuclear power experts in that group.  (Note: CAEA's nuclear power 
expert was Dong Baotong; we have not yet determined where he ended 
up in the reorganization.  Westinghouse was also unaware of his 
current department affiliation.  End Note.) 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Comment: It has been six months since the NDRC approved 
the 12 inland NPPs and announced they should use GenIII technology, 
and five months since NEB Minister Zhang Guobao announced China 
should increase nuclear power to 5% of the national mix (or 60 GW 
operating, 30 GW under construction), and there still is no decision 
on when to start on the inland NPPs and which technology to utilize. 
 The major government restructuring and devastating May 12 Sichuan 
earthquake are likely largely to blame for the delay, but the impact 
is every day decreasing the likelihood of quicker AP1000 
implementation and reducing the potential scope for Westinghouse 
involvement.  Furthermore, as the CPR-1000 increases market share, 
China is assuring that rather than building a fleet of 
state-of-the-art reactors, they will be burdened with technology 
that by the end of its lifetime will be 100 years old.  Finally, by 
bypassing the passive safety technology of the AP1000, which, 
according to Westinghouse, is 100 times safer than the CPR-1000, 
China is vastly increasing the aggregate risk of its nuclear power 
fleet.  End Comment. 
 
RANDT 
 
 
NNNN