VZCZCXRO4270
RR RUEHAST RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHTM
DE RUEHBJ #3030/01 2190300
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060300Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8999
INFO RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF INTERIOR WASHDC 0730
RUEAEPA/HQ EPA WASHDC
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 9337
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 4241
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 9300
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 9005
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0446
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 7031

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 003030 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV TBIO PREL CH
SUBJECT:  Realizing Mao's Vision of Water for the North in Time for 
the Olympics 
 
REF: 06 Beijing 14816 
 
BEIJING 00003030  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) With the start of the Beijing Olympics set for August 8, 
Northern China's water shortage has received widespread attention in 
both local and international press, with accounts of what the 
Chinese government has done in recent years to address the problem. 
Instead of addressing the water shortage of northern China at the 
source of the problem, the government decided in 2002 to back an 
engineering project larger in scale than even that of the Three 
Gorges Dam:  The South-North Water Diversion Project.  Numerous 
problems have arisen in constructing this project.  The Central and 
Eastern Routes have funding and pollution problems.  As for the 
Western Route, the costs and risks exceed the likely benefits and 
the route has been suspended indefinitely.  If the Chinese 
government wants to solve the ever deepening water crisis, demand 
management practices such as water conservation and improved 
agricultural practices need to be pursued rather than a costly water 
diversion solution. END SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2. (U) Mao Zedong himself first conceived of the idea for 
transferring water from southern China to northern China and, in the 
1950s, the Yellow River Committee (YRC) began initial planning. 
While over 300 plans have been proposed, only three were eventually 
selected by the YRC for development.  The three plans combined now 
comprise the project known as the South-North Water Diversion 
Project (SNWD).  An Eastern Route will divert water from the Yangtze 
River into the Grand Canal at Jiangdu City in Jiangsu Province and 
then cross the Yellow River via tunnel and flow to Tianjin.  The 
Central Route uses the Danjiangkou Reservoir in Hubei Province as 
its source.  Using a series of canals, the water will be diverted 
through Hebei and Henan to supply Beijing.  The Western Route calls 
for diverting water from the Dadu, Tongtian, and Yalong rivers, 
tributaries of the Yangtze River, across the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau 
and through the Bayankala Mountains.  The water would then be 
diverted into the Yellow River to replenish the water stocks already 
flowing eastward to supply Beijing and Tianjin. 
 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN ROUTES PROCEEDING SLOWLY 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) On June 13, 2008, ESTH officers met with officials and 
engineers from the Office of the SNWD Project Commission to discuss 
the current status of SNWD. (NOTE: The SNWD Project Commission 
reports directly to the State Council. END NOTE) The officials 
stated that the construction of the Eastern and Central Routes is 
proceeding smoothly, and that the government is maintaining both 
construction safety and quality standards during the process.  As of 
the date of the meeting, about 60% of the Eastern Route projects had 
been completed; however, there is no definite timing for the 
completion of the Central and Eastern Routes.  The SNWD Commission 
officials said they are currently awaiting the State Council's 
approval of recently-submitted General Feasibility Study Reports for 
each of the routes before they can proceed. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Yang Yong, an independent researcher with the Hengduan 
Mountain Society, a Chengdu-based NGO, told ESTH officers recently 
that the Central and Eastern Routes have had funding problems due to 
local governments along the routes being unwilling to contribute 
resources to the water diversion project.  According to SNWD 
interlocutors, local officials' unwillingness is caused by the 
uncertainty of compensation for ecological damage and the ability of 
provinces along the route to enjoy the benefits of an equitable 
water distribution and pricing policy upon completion of the 
project.  For example, the Central Route goes through Hebei 
Province, but it is unlikely that water will be provided to Hebei, 
thereby offering little incentive for Hebei to help fund the 
project.  In addition, according to press reports, the government 
has ordered farmers to plant cops that consume less water and 
produce les income, such as wheat and corn in place of rice and 
vegetables, instead of allowing them to tap the new waterways. 
(COMMENT: When the rural population is left impoverished and without 
ater while Beijing benefits from a costly waer project, it's no 
wonder there is no suppor from local governments. END COMMENT) 
 
POLLUTION AND SALTWATER INTRUSION HAMPER EASTERN ROUTE 
 
BEIJING 00003030  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5. (U) Water pollution is a significant concern along the Eastern 
Route, which runs through highly industrial areas of Jiangsu 
Province.  The budget for construction of the Eastern Route is said 
to be 100 billion RMB (14.6 billion USD); whereas its pollution 
control cost is estimated to be 600 billion RMB (87.6 billion USD). 
Pollution control measures in the process of being implemented 
include building urban sewage plants, using recycled water, and 
adjusting industrial practices.  The Office of the SNWD Project 
Commission told ESTH officers they are confident the construction 
will eventually lead to an improvement in water quality along the 
Eastern Route.  (COMMENT: Unless measures to curb pollution at the 
source also are properly implemented, no amount of controls along 
the route will significantly improve the quality of the water being 
diverted. END COMMENT) 
 
¶6. (U) The diversion of the Yangtze River as part of the Eastern 
Route may also cause salt water to contaminate the Yangtze Estuary 
at Shanghai, where the river meets the ocean.  To prevent this, the 
project plans for less water to be pumped during the dry season from 
December to February.  By diverting less water from the Yangtze, the 
Yangtze's water level will be high enough to prevent the ocean's 
salt water from flowing into the river. 
 
OBSTACLES ALONG THE CENTRAL ROUTE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) The Central Route's main problem is insufficient water 
resources at the intended source.  A recent report on the SNWD 
states that the Danjiangkou Reservoir in Hubei Province, the water 
source for the Central Route, can now only divert an estimated 9.7 
billion cubic meters of water, which is lower than the original plan 
of 14 billion cubic meters. 
 
¶8. (U) Pollution is not as serious of a concern for the Central 
Route; however, to prevent any new pollution as the water is 
transported along the route, a Danjiangkou Pollution Prevention and 
Water/Soil Conservancy Project has been initiated.  The project 
intends to maintain Danjiangkou Reservoir's water quality at a 
standard of at least Class II (on China's five-level water quality 
scale, with I being best and V being the worst). 
 
WESTERN ROUTE OVER BUDGET AND STALLED 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The Western Route is currently still in a feasibility study 
and project proposal stage.  According to the original plan devised 
in 2002, inauguration of the Western Route was set for 2010; 
however, this estimate has been postponed indefinitely.  According 
to Yong, in 2007 members of the National People's Congress raised 
concerns about potential geological complications in the Hengduan 
Mountain area and the availability of water resources in Qinghai, 
the proposed water source.  The report prompted the Ministry of 
Water Resources (MWR) to call for postponement of the current work 
on the Western Route.  The current cost estimate for the Western 
Route is 500 billion RMB (73 billion USD).  This is almost double 
the amount budgeted in 2000 of 300 billion RMB (43.8 billion USD). 
 
SEISMICITY MAKES WESTERN ROUTE UNREALISTIC 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (U) It is widely accepted that earthquakes in the Hengduan 
Mountain Region in Sichuan Province pose a significant risk to the 
Western Route.  Yang noted that after the Sichuan earthquake on May 
12, 2008, many of the existing dams and those under construction in 
the Hengduan Mountain region were damaged, despite officials' claims 
that the Sichuan earthquake did not directly affect structures 
within the SNWD project.  Yang believes that due to the proximity of 
the Western Route to the earthquake prone region, another earthquake 
could cause substantial damage to the Western Route if development 
continues.  The total water diversion volume for the project is 
expected to be about 45 billion cubic meters per year.  With such 
quantities of water being shifted, changes in pressure on the 
bedrock below can result in induced seismicity.  Yang said that 
several geologists around the world believe the Zipingpu Dam may 
have triggered the Sichuan earthquake in May; this suspicion is due 
to the close proximity of the earthquake's epicenter to the dam's 
reservoir, a distance of five kilometers.  In addition to seismic 
activity, there is also potential for flooding.  Most of the 
reservoirs along the Yellow River are small and insufficient for 
 
BEIJING 00003030  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
handling the increase in reservoir storage capacity needed during 
flood season.  If heavy rains cause the flow of the Yellow River to 
increase beyond available reservoir storage capacities during flood 
season, there will be an increased risk for widespread flooding. 
 
¶11. (U) Yang noted that along the Western Route, pollution does not 
pose a major concern because there is not much industry along the 
route.  What is of greatest concern is the mineral content of the 
water; for example, mercury levels currently exceed standards deemed 
safe for human consumption. 
 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE WESTERN ROUTE 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) With the Western Route now suspended indefinitely, Yang 
Yong described to ESTH officers an idea for an alternative water 
source for the Western Route.  The alternative source would be water 
from melting glaciers in the Kunlun and Qilian Mountains, on the 
border between Qinghai and Gansu Provinces.  The volume of water 
from the melting glaciers is estimated to be 25 billion cubic meters 
per year, or 36 billion cubic meters per year total including 
melting snow.  (NOTE: Both these volumes are larger than the Western 
Route's total planned water diversion volume of one billion cubic 
meters per year. END NOTE) Currently, only ten percent of this water 
is being collected and used, with the rest seeping into the desert 
or evaporating in southern Xinjiang.  In addition, scientific 
reports show that there is ground water in the Taklimakan Desert 
south of the Tarim Basin.  These water sources are currently being 
explored to determine suitability for supplying local populations. 
Yang stated that scientists from the Institute of Ecology and 
Geography working in southern Xinjiang are quite familiar with the 
melting glacier and ground water resources, but their input is 
rarely sought or adopted by SNWD officials nor by the Yellow River 
Commission, which historically has been protective over its control 
of the SNWD. 
 
CULTURAL SITES 
-------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) In addition to environmental issues, the construction of 
the SNWD project also has social impacts.  While over 700 cultural 
heritage sites will be affected by the SNWD project, only 50 million 
RMB has been approved to protect 45 sites along the Central and 
Eastern Routes.  As for the Western Route, since Tibetans consider 
the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to be a holy land, and any alteration of 
the mountains, lakes, and natural environment is strictly forbidden 
by Tibetan Buddhism, its construction could lead to conflict with 
the indigenous population. 
 
EMERGENCY WATER LINE FOR THE OLYMPICS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) Five hundred thousand additional visitors are expected in 
Beijing for the August 2008 Olympics.  Since none of the main SNWD 
routes will be completed in time for the Olympics, the potential for 
water shortages is being addressed with the construction of a 
short-term emergency line from four reservoirs (Wangkuai, Xidayang, 
Gangnan, and Huangbizhuang) in Hebei Province to Beijing, which has 
already been completed and performance tested.  A test operation was 
scheduled for June 24, 2008.  Although results of this test have not 
been officially reported, the emergency line is not currently in use 
and reportedly will be tapped only when normal supplies become 
insufficient.  According to press reports, Guangting and Miyun, 
Beijing's two largest reservoirs, currently store more than one 
billion cubic meters of water.  Officials estimate that Beijing will 
need 200 to 300 million cubic meters of water for visitors during 
the Olympics.  (COMMENT: Because of water from recent rains, Beijing 
will not likely experience a water shortage during the two week-long 
games, nor will there be a need to bring the emergency line into 
action. END COMMENT) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) If Beijing does not implement more stringent water 
conservation methods to address excess demand, no amount of diverted 
water will prevent the northern region's impending water crisis. 
Instead of simply relying on an increased water supply, the Chinese 
government needs to improve demand management across all sectors 
that consume water by promoting more efficient agriculture 
irrigation systems and less wasteful industrial water use practices 
 
BEIJING 00003030  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
through price reforms.  While the Eastern and Central Routes might 
ultimately serve their intended purpose, should China decide to 
continue pursing the Western Route, the project could lead to an 
irreversible drain on government funds with ever-increasing costs on 
top of an already staggering price tag.  Despite assertions that the 
May earthquake did not affect the central government's financial 
support for the SNWD, it is difficult to believe that the budget 
will not at least be trimmed, given that official expenditures are 
being cut at all levels, and that local and provincial governments 
are increasingly being ordered to contribute to the earthquake 
reconstruction cause.  Finally, in the unlikely event that the 
project is completed in its entirety by its original deadline of 
2050, the water crisis may have intensified to such a point that the 
amount of water the project is able to supply will have already 
become insufficient, making it necessary to find an entirely new 
solution. 
 
 
RANDT