VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #1459 2261139
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131139Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7144
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1035
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0485
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS ANKARA 001459 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/SE, ISN/RA, ISN/NESS, SCA/RA, SCA/PPD 
DOE FOR DOE/NNSA SCHEINMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PARM ETTC AORC ENRG IN TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: NUCLEAR SUPPLIER GROUP EXCEPTION FOR INDIA 
DEMARCHE DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 85948 
 
¶1. (SBU) We delivered reftel demarche on August 12 to MFA 
Department Head for Nonproliferation and Disarmament Affairs 
Bora Kerimoglu.  Kerimoglu expressed appreciation for the 
information provided and our offer to respond to any 
questions the GOT might have on the issue, and pledged to 
convey the U.S. position to his superiors.  He said GOT's 
position with respect to the August 21-22 Nuclear Supplier 
Group (NSG) plenary is still under discussion, and declined 
to provide an official GOT position on the question of an 
exemption for India.  Kerimoglu did offer his personal 
assessment that the GOT would be positively inclined to 
supporting the India exemption draft text, and certainly 
would not block consensus if one emerges at the plenary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Kerimoglu asked two questions in response to the 
demarche.  First, he asked whether the U.S. is concerned that 
granting an NSG exception to India might upset the strategic 
balance between India and Pakistan.  He mentioned that a 
representative from the Pakistan embassy had been to his 
office and had voiced strong opposition to any sort of 
exception for India that would allow it to access sensitive, 
dual-use technology.  According to Kerimoglu, Pakistan is 
concerned that granting India access to dual-use technology 
in its civilian nuclear program will eventually help bolster 
India's nuclear weapons program.  We noted that we fully 
appreciate the strategic balance between India and Pakistan, 
and that we had considered this issue carefully before 
proceeding with the bilateral U.S.-India Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation Initiative.  We emphasized that bringing India 
into an international nonproliferation regime would increase 
transparency in India's civilian nuclear program, which 
should help assuage the concerns of its neighbors. 
Furthermore, the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the 
Additional Protocol currently being negotiated will help 
ensure that sensitive technology will not be diverted to its 
weapons program. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Second, Kerimoglu asked whether the U.S. believes 
Iran would point to an exception for India as more evidence 
of the West's double-standard on the nuclear issue.  We 
stressed that it would not be appropriate to compare India 
with Iran, an NPT violator, and noted that Iran continues to 
defy the will of the IAEA and the UNSC despite the generous 
offer made by the P5 plus 1. 
 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
SILLIMAN