VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1230/01 2310943
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180943Z AUG 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9775
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8543
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9750

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001230 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies gave significant 
coverage August 16-18 to the money laundering case allegedly 
involving former President Chen Shui-bian and his family members. 
News coverage also focused on Taiwan's loss to China in last 
Friday's baseball competition in the Beijing Olympic Games; and on 
U.S. swimmer Michael Phelps' history-making with eight gold medals 
in the Beijing Olympic Games.  In terms of editorials and 
commentaries, an op-ed in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" 
discussed the United States' attitude toward the Ma Ying-jeou 
Administration's "diplomatic truce" policy toward China.  The 
article urged the Ma Ying-jeou Administration to work harder in 
communicating with Washington and Beijing to win their support for 
the "diplomatic truce" policy.  An editorial in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" also chimed in by 
urging the Ma Administration to explain clearly Taiwan's overall 
diplomatic strategy before it carries out the "diplomatic truce" 
policy.  End summary. 
 
A) "Can [Ma's] Low-profile U.S. [Transit] Visit Win Washington's 
Support for the Diplomatic Truce Policy?" 
 
Professor Edward Chen of Tamkang University's Graduate Institute of 
American Studies opined in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" 
[circulation: 300,000] (8/18): 
 
"... As of now, the United States has not publicly opposed both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait negotiating a diplomatic truce.  Neither 
may [Washington] necessarily oppose wholeheartedly a diplomatic 
truce across the Taiwan Strait.  It is just that both Washington and 
Beijing have smooth communication channels, so [the United States] 
will have a better understanding than we will in terms of Beijing's 
ideas about diplomatic truce. ... 
 
"When it comes to the issue of diplomatic truce between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait, Taipei and Washington apparently have 
different strategic concerns.  For President Ma, a diplomatic truce, 
if it is achievable, will not only meet Taiwan's national interests, 
but it will also be advantageous for his re-election.  This is why 
Ma has been working with perseverance to push for [his diplomatic 
truce policy].  For the Bush Administration, however, it is 
concerned that, should Taipei insist on pursuing such a policy, it 
will likely have an impact on other economic and trade negotiations 
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.  Nonetheless, if Taipei 
accepts the suggestion [proposed by AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt 
during a meeting with Ma after Taiwan's March 22 presidential 
election] that both sides of the Taiwan Strait negotiate in three 
stages [i.e. in the first stage deal with charter flight matters; in 
the second stage deal with economic and trade cooperation; and in 
the third stage deal with sensitive issues such as a peace accord, 
minimizing military threats, and Taiwan's international space] and 
with Washington encouraging them on the side, it will likely help 
Taiwan to integrate quickly into the developing East Asian economy. 
This is why the United States has been constantly urging both sides 
of the Taiwan Strait to resume dialogue since 2005. 
 
"[Ma's] low-profile transit stops in the United States are not only 
conducive to the reestablishment of mutual trust between Taiwan and 
the United States, but also helpful in creating a good atmosphere 
for cross-Strait negotiations, as [his low-profile transits] are 
less irritating to Beijing.  However, in order to make the United 
States and China agree that both sides of the Taiwan Strait start 
talks on a diplomatic truce, Ma's national security team apparently 
needs to work harder in communicating with both Washington and 
Beijing." 
 
B) "Taking a Stand Is a President's Role" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (8/18): 
 
"... Considering that China has always done all it can to suppress 
Taiwan internationally, it is absurd to pin our hopes on Beijing not 
trying to entice our allies simply because of the so-called 
"diplomatic truce." Predicating the "truce" on China's goodwill begs 
the question of how much trust there is between the two sides, and 
how long that trust, if it indeed exists, will persist. These are 
all unknowable variables. ...  The Ma administration wants to 
abandon the money diplomacy but maintain our allies. What is the 
overall diplomatic strategy that will achieve this goal? As 
president, it is Ma's duty to clearly explain this to the Taiwanese. 
While it is true that his administration has reduced cross-strait 
tension - at least for now - the closer relationship is a problem 
for the US because it is no longer clear where Taiwan belongs. 
Despite this, Ma has not offered an unambiguous explanation, and his 
government policy continues to lean heavily toward China without any 
signs that the government sees cause for alarm or a need to correct 
the situation. 
 
"Still, militarily, economically and internationally, the US remains 
 
Taiwan's most important supporter. The US government is still 
waiting for Ma to react to the rumored freeze on US arms sales to 
Taiwan. A president is supposed to set a nation's primary goals and 
deal with the big issues.  Rather than micro-managing and fiddling 
with trivialities such as saving a few dollars on chartering regular 
aircraft for overseas state visits, Ma should expend his efforts on 
designing the main direction of the nation's future development." 
 
WANG