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Viewing cable 08ADDISABABA2223, ADDIS ABABA RESPONSE - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ADDISABABA2223 2008-08-12 12:40 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXYZ0012
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #2223/01 2251240
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121240Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1671
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUCNFB/FBI DIR WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 002223 
 
DEPT FOR: DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, DS/TIA/ITA, AF/EX, 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PTER ET
SUBJECT: ADDIS ABABA RESPONSE - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE 
QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) FALL 2008 
 
REF: 08 STATE 84414 
 
          ------------------------------------- 
1.  (SBU) POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND DEMONSTRATIONS 
          ------------------------------------- 
 
A. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY CAPABLE 
OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS? 
 
-Yes, there is a sizable Muslim population throughout Ethiopia as 
well as ethnic Somali's.  Generally there is very little if any 
anti-American sentiment among the majority of the population in 
Ethiopia. Only small segments of the general population within 
Ethiopia are prone to extremism. There have not been any 
anti-American demonstrations in Ethiopia for the past several years. 
 
 
B. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY OVER 
THE PAST 12 MONTHS? 
 
-No 
 
C. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? 
 
-No anti-American demonstrations. In July 2008 a group of 
approximately 120 local nationals arrived at the front gate of the 
chancery during business hours and held a peaceful rally regarding 
the political situation in Eritrea.  This group was accompanied by 
local police, read statements and departed the area after 
approximately 30 minutes. This group visited several other Addis 
Ababa locations on the same day, to include; UN, AU, EU and other 
diplomatic missions in an effort to draw international attention and 
support to the situation in Eritrea. 
 
D.  WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION? 
 
-N/A 
 
E.  ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS OR BY DOMESTIC ISSUES? 
 
-N/A, there have not been any anti-American demonstrations in 
Ethiopia during the past year. 
 
F.  ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY PEACEFUL OR VIOLENT? 
 
-In November 2005 there were demonstrations/riots throughout Addis 
Ababa in response to dissatisfaction concerning local elections. 
The Ethiopian police and security services responded with force to 
quell the situation.  Approximately 200 Ethiopian civilians were 
reported to be killed in Addis Ababa. There have not been any 
notable violent demonstrations in Ethiopia during the past year. 
 
 
G. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG 
PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES. 
 
-No, the above demonstrations and riots primarily focused on GOE 
facilities.  Some passing USG vehicles were struck by projectiles 
and sustained minor damage.  There has not been any property damage 
or injuries to USG interests during the past year as the result of 
demonstrations. 
 
H.  IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS EVER PENETRATED OUR SECURITY 
PERIMETER LINE? 
 
-No 
 
I.  HAVE THERE BEEN ANY ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE PAST 
12 MONTHS? 
 
-No 
 
J.  HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? 
 
-No.  The Embassy is located in close proximity (1/2 mile radius) to 
several educational institutions and GOE facilities.  The 2005 
demonstrations/riots in response to dissatisfaction regarding local 
elections occurred within this radius. In early 2007 student 
demonstrations (not directed at the USG) at Addis Ababa University 
(located on the same road as the Embassy) hindered Embassy personnel 
 
coming/departing the compound.  No Embassy locations or personnel 
were directly involved or adversely impacted by this situation. 
 
K. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION? 
 
-N/A.  No anti-American demonstrations within the past year. 
 
 
L. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? 
 
-With the exception of the anti-GOE demonstrations in November 2005 
and Addis Ababa University student demonstrations in early 2007, 
demonstrations and large public gatherings in Addis Ababa tend to be 
peaceful and well controlled. 
 
M. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG 
PROPERTY? 
 
-No.  See Item G above. 
 
          ------------------------- 
2.  (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS 
          ------------------------- 
 
A.  IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE 
CONFLICT? 
 
-Yes.  In response to threats to its security posed by extremists 
elements, in December 2006 the GOE initiated on-going military 
operations into Somalia. Ethiopia is also engaged in a border 
dispute with Eritrea. In August of 2008 the United Nations Mission 
for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) ceased operations, primarily as a 
result of inability to resolve this dispute in an effective manner. 
While UNMEE's departure will most likely have little/no notable 
impact on the general security situation within Ethiopia, the 
absence of international observers at the Ethiopia-Eritrea border 
eliminates a mitigating (albeit ineffective) party to reduce the 
possibility of conflict in an area with significant tensions and 
troop presence on both sides of the border.  There have been 
allegations by the Ethiopian Government the Eritrean Government has 
planned or supported terrorist attacks within Ethiopia as well as 
provided support to various anti-Ethiopian groups. The Ethiopian 
government is also currently engaged in an active counter-insurgency 
campaign throughout the Ogaden region, where they have encountered 
difficulties with various ethnic and opposition groups. Ethiopia is 
also experiencing difficulties with internal opposition groups; some 
are armed and have conducted hostile attacks (bombings) within 
Ethiopia during the past year, targeting Ethiopian interests. 
 
B.  IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION OR 
IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR? 
 
-Conflict is primarily limited to the most south eastern 
(Somali-Ogaden region) and northern regions (Ethiopia-Eritrea 
border) of Ethiopia. During the past year there were several 
(approximately 9 to 10) notable bombing incidents in Ethiopia, most 
likely attributed to internal opposition groups. This was a 
reoccurrence of a trend of 40 to 50 similar bombing incidents that 
occurred in Addis Ababa during the period of April 2005 and November 
2006.  A notable change is the latest bombing was the targeting of 
crowded venues during business hours carried out in a manner to 
ensure greater causalities. 
 
C. IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC 
FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION? 
 
-There are no U.S. diplomatic facilities located outside of Addis 
Ababa. Combined Joint Task Force for Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) does 
maintain a presence (uniformed USDOD service personnel) and facility 
in Dire Dawa (South/East Ethiopia).  The Embassy maintains 4 
official locations (Embassy, USAID, CDC and GSO/Warehouse) and 
approximately 115 residential locations spread out over a 7-mile 
radius within Addis Ababa. Some of these locations are located in 
close proximity to the 2005 and 2006 demonstrations and bombings, 
although none were directly targeted or involved. Mission personnel 
travel on a daily basis the road where the May 20, 2008, bombing of 
a local mini bus occurred, resulting in the death/injury of several 
passengers (including one non-official American citizen).  Mission 
personnel also frequent the area of Addis Ababa where the  two April 
14, 2008 gas station bombings occurred. 
 
D. HAVE ANY FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS SIGNALED OR 
DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN ORIENTATION? 
 
-No.  Although some groups associated with the conflict involving 
Somalia and Eritrea are not necessarily favorable towards Americans, 
overt anti-American sentiment rarely manifests itself in Ethiopia. 
 
 
          ------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES 
          ------------------------- 
 
A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL TRAINED? 
 
-Although Ethiopian law enforcement and security services fall short 
of meeting western standards in regards to training, they are 
reasonably competent and professional in comparison to other 
countries in the region and will provide all available 
resources/assistance within their capacity. 
 
B. HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE ELABORATE 
ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING. 
 
-The GOE security services have received training from the USG, to 
include: 
 
- Leadership development, 
 
- Major case management, 
 
- Travel documents, 
 
- Counterfeiting, 
 
- Land border security, 
 
- Protective security detail operations, 
 
- Cyber-crimes, 
 
- Post-blast investigation, 
 
- Physical security of vital installations, 
 
- Preventing attacks on soft targets, 
 
- A variety of courses provided by the International Law Enforcement 
Academy (ILEA) in Botswana, 
 
During the past year an Ethiopian police officer graduated from the 
FBI National Academy. 
 
Ethiopians tend to be enthusiastic students and eager to learn. The 
training provided was appreciated and well received by the host 
country government and the individual students. Future training 
opportunities provided to the GOE will be worthwhile, appreciated 
and applied to good use. 
 
C. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS WIDESPREAD 
CORRUPTION WITHIN THEIR AGENCIES? 
 
-As most African nations, there is some corruption within the GOE's 
law enforcement and security services. Unlike many African 
countries, the level of corruption among GOE security and law 
enforcement services does not stymie efforts to enforce the law, 
ensure general security and public safety.  Corruption within 
Ethiopia can be characterized as petty and cronyism. 
 
D. ARE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF DETERRING 
TERRORIST ACTIONS? 
 
-Generally GOE intelligence services are reasonably professional and 
capable of deterring terrorist actions. The GOE claimed to foil a 
terrorist attack by Eritreans targeting the African Union Summit in 
December 2006.  During 2007 the GOE claimed to foil at least two 
separate terrorist attacks within Addis Ababa by internal opposition 
groups. 
 
E. HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S. EMBASSY 
REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT? 
 
-The GOE intelligence and law enforcement services tend to be 
cooperative to the Embassy's request for information and support, 
within the limitations of their resources and abilities. 
 
F. ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN RECENT 
YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE TO SCORE ANY 
MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES? 
 
-Yes.  In response to threats to its internal security posed by 
extremist elements based in Somalia, in late 2006 the GOE launched 
military operations into Somalia and diminished the capabilities of 
various individuals and organizations involved in terrorism.  During 
2007 the GOE claimed to uncover and foil at least two terrorist 
operations targeting Addis Ababa by internal opposition and Eritrean 
groups. The GOE also reports they have detained some of those 
 
 
responsible for the 2008 bombings. 
 
G. HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND ALLOCATION 
OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUEST FOR PROTECTIVE SECURITY? 
 
-Yes, the Ethiopian government has always proven themselves to be 
cooperative, professional and capable in accommodating any request 
for protective security. 
 
H. HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR 
AIRPORTS (EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD, GOOD/AVERAGE, POOR)? 
 
-Relative to other countries on the continent, security at 
Ethiopia's major airports is good.  Access control and security 
screening measures are vigorously enforced. 
 
I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATIONS CONTROL AGENCIES? 
 
-Customs and immigration controls at Ethiopia's major airports and 
land border crossing are good. 
 
-Ethiopia lacks the resources to adequately ensure the security of 
its large land borders, especially in desolate/remote areas. 
 
-In response to concerns to its security, the GOE has established 
and operates security checkpoints on all major roads leading to 
Addis Ababa. Most commercial and some private vehicles are stopped 
and subject to inspection. While this effort is better then nothing 
and has yielded some success, it is impossible to reasonably inspect 
all vehicles, goods and individuals coming to Addis Ababa. 
 
-The GOE has expressed concern to Embassy officials regarding the 
 
integrity of border security on its border with Somalia.  There are 
reports of trading routes that circumvent major roads and 
established checkpoints. 
 
-The Embassy has encountered problems on a regular basis involving 
the integrity of Ethiopian passports and identity documents.  It is 
not difficult for individuals inclined to do so to obtain fraudulent 
passports and identity documents. 
 
J.  HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? 
 
-Ethiopia has a vast border, neighboring five other African nations 
(Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya).  Border patrol forces 
are reasonably effective at major/formal border crossing areas. 
However, a significant portion of Ethiopia's land borders are 
assessed as open and porous. 
 
          --------------------------------------------- - 
4.  (SBU) INDIGENOUS TERRORISM - ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST 
          GROUPS 
          --------------------------------------------- - 
 
A. ARE THERE ANY INDIGENOUS ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN 
COUNTRY? 
 
-No.  After the December 2006 invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia 
Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups publicly declared Ethiopia to be 
a viable target. 
 
B.  IF YES, HOW MANY?  PLEASE NAME GROUPS. 
 
-N/A 
 
C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE LAST 12 
MONTHS? 
 
-No 
 
D. WHERE ANY OF THESE ATTACKS LETHAL? 
 
-N/A 
 
E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS? 
 
-No 
 
F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY OR RELATED U.S. 
TARGETS? 
 
-No 
 
G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR DO THEY 
OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE? 
 
-N/A 
 
 
H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC 
FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS? 
 
-N/A 
          --------------------------------- 
5.  (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS 
          --------------------------------- 
 
A. ARE THERE ANY OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT 
ANTI-AMERICAN) IN COUNTRY? 
 
-No.  There are several indigenous groups active in Ethiopia 
considered by the GOE to be terrorist organizations (Ogaden National 
Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Front) that are not formally 
recognized by the USG as terrorist organizations.  These groups have 
been reported to carry out attacks on Ethiopian interests and are of 
concern to the GOE. 
 
B. IF YES, HOW MANY?  PLEASE NAME GROUPS. 
 
-See above 
 
C.  HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE LAST 12 
MONTHS? 
 
-During the past 12 months there have not been any attacks in 
Ethiopia targeting American interests; 
 
-In 2007 the ONLF carried out an attack against a Chinese oil 
drilling facility in the Ogaden region, resulting in the deaths of 
approximately 75 civilians.  This attack was carried out after the 
ONLF issued warnings that foreigners who ventured into the 
Ogaden/Somali region to exploit natural resources would be targeted. 
During the past year at least two international U.S. oil companies 
(including one that employs American citizens) have expressed 
intentions of prospecting for oil in this region 
 
D. WHERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS? 
 
-See above 
 
E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS? 
 
-No 
 
F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY OR U.S. RELATED 
TARGETS? 
 
-No 
 
G.  HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REASON OR DO THEY 
OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE? 
 
-The ONLF has primarily carried out attacks in the Ogaden region. 
 
-There is speculation the ONLF or OLF is responsible for the 
bombings that occurred in Addis Ababa. 
 
H.  IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC 
FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS? 
 
-N/A 
         --------------------------------- 
6. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS 
         --------------------------------- 
 
A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT ANTI-AMERICAN) 
IN COUNTRY? 
 
-Yes 
 
B.  IF YES HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. 
 
-Ali Ithad Al Islamia (AIAI) 
 
-Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) - considered by the GOE to be a 
terrorist group 
 
-Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) - considered by the GOE to 
be a terrorist group 
 
C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS WHERE 
U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED? 
 
-Yes.  In 2007 the GOE claimed to have foiled a terrorist attack by 
Eritrean terrorist groups targeting the African Union summit in 
 
Addis Ababa. During a period 2005 and 2006 and 2008 Addis Ababa 
experienced a series of bombings attributed to the OLF.  In 1996 
AIAI placed and detonated bombs at two large hotels and attempted to 
assassinate the GOE Minister of Transportation in Addis Ababa. In 
1996 an Egyptian extremist group attempted to assassinate visiting 
Egyptian president in Addis Ababa.  These incidents took place near 
U.S diplomatic facilities and on routes regularly traveled by 
Mission personnel. 
 
D. ARE THERE ANY SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN 
COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS? 
 
-Unknown 
 
E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY THAT ARE 
SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? 
 
-Ethiopia hosts a large ethnic Somali population, some of whom are 
possibly inclined to support extremists groups affected by the 
Ethiopia military operations into Somalia. 
 
F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT AND SCOPE OF HOSTILE 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA, SUDAN, ETC) IN 
COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS? 
 
-There have not been any anti-American terrorist attacks in Ethiopia 
in recent history. If the above hostile intelligence services are 
present in country, they do not appear to be actively targeting us. 
 
 
G.  HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES 
IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE TERRORIST ELEMENTS. 
 
-Weapons and explosives are readily available in Somalia, and could 
be easily smuggled into Ethiopia through the vast, open and porous 
land border. 
 
-There has been information Eritrea has provided weapons and 
explosives to various groups that do not view Ethiopia favorably. 
 
-Weapons and explosives are available within Ethiopia through 
underground suppliers.  On a recent trip to a local market Embassy 
personnel reported observing live hand grenades for sale at a market 
stall. 
 
- Weapons and explosives are also available within Kenya Sudan and 
Djibouti through underground sources and could be smuggled into 
Ethiopia through the vast, open and porous land borders. 
 
-The bombings that occurred during 2005 to 2008 reportedly 
primarily involved C-4 type explosives. 
 
MALAC