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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002159 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL ET
SUBJECT: PRESS FREEDOM - OPPRESSIVE OR PERMISSIVE: DRL A/S 
KRAMER ENGAGES ETHIOPIAN STAKEHOLDERS 
 
REF: ADDIS 890 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) During his July 23-25 visit to Addis Ababa, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor David Kramer met with media professionals and civil 
society leaders on the state of press freedom in Ethiopia and 
engaged senior Ethiopian Government (GoE) leaders on press 
freedom and the newly passed Mass Media and Freedom of 
Information Law (hereafter the "Press Law").  Media 
practitioners blasted the Law as repressive and lamented 
growing GoE restrictions over the press as one more realm of 
the government's broader systematic closure of political 
space in Ethiopia since 2005.  In stark contrast, Prime 
Minister Meles labeled the Law "permissive" and his senior 
advisor and former Information Minister Bereket Simon 
defended the Law and government dominance over the media 
sector as a defense against the previous pervasive 
environment in which the private press was intent on 
undermining the constitution and calling for "ethnic 
cleansing."  In the face of the now-approved Law, A/S Kramer 
urged GoE interlocutors to adopt an expansive and liberal 
approach to registering journalists and media outlets and 
confirming its professed intent of guaranteeing press freedom 
through implementation of the Law.  End Summary. 
 
A RE-"PRESS"-IVE ENVIRONMENT 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a July 24 roundtable discussion with prominent 
private journalists, participants overwhelmingly argued that 
the private press is fighting against the GoE for press 
freedom which is increasingly in retreat despite significant 
constitutional protections on paper.  Media practitioners 
called the Press Law which Parliament passed on July 1 
"repressive."  While Embassy Addis is still waiting for an 
English translation of the final Law to conduct our own 
review, roundtable participants criticized provisions that 
grant the Information Ministry sole discretion on whether to 
license journalists, that prevent individuals from owning 
shares in more than one media outlet, and that declare the 
defamation and false accusation of government officials to be 
prosecutable matters of the state against which the truth of 
the reports may not serve as a defense.  According to the 
participants, the Law defines biographical information about 
GoE officials as classified, places the burden of proof of 
guilt in judicial proceedings on accused journalists, and 
imposes a maximum penalty of 100,000 birr (approximately 
US$10,000) for violations of the law in contrast to maximum 
sentences for violent crimes, such as rape, capped at a 
fraction of that level.  By targeting the entire supply chain 
of the press process, the Law can be used to hold everyone 
from news sources, to journalists, to street vendors culpable 
for information disseminated.  Unlike many media regulation 
regimes internationally that define actions as permissible 
unless they are expressly prohibited, participants argued 
that the Ethiopian Press Law renders actions prohibited 
unless explicitly permitted.  They further noted that whereas 
other countries make public information available but protect 
private information, in Ethiopia the law makes private 
information releasable while it closes access to public 
information. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Media professionals argued that the Press Law 
reflects only the latest step in the systematic rolling back 
of press freedoms and the broader narrowing of political 
space in Ethiopia since 2005.  Participants cited the 
following examples: 
 
--A Broadcasting Law passed in 2007 prevents private 
ownership of television broadcasting and short-wave radio 
transmission, limiting private electronic media to 
broadcasting via FM stations with a maximum reach radius of 
90 kilometers; 
 
--The 2005 closure of most private newspapers which are yet 
to be reopened (13 of which were forcibly closed and others 
closed in response to indirect pressure, market forces, and 
self-censorship); 
 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002159  002 OF 003 
 
 
--Before the Press Law, media outlets were legally registered 
if the GoE failed to provide a response within thirty days of 
application submission, but now registration is not legal 
until the Information Ministry explicitly registers the 
requesting media outlet; 
 
--The Press Law imposes maximum penalties equivalent to 
US$10,000, whereas the previous law capped them at US$1,000; 
 
--The dual functions of the Information Ministry as both the 
government spokesperson as well as the regulator of the media 
risks undercutting the release of relevant information to the 
public; and 
 
--The Amharic word used in the freedom of information portion 
of the Law to outline the more than 60 subjects barred from 
public disclosure has a double meaning that could be 
interpreted as also barring media coverage of these issues, 
not just barring the GoE's release of such information. 
 
¶4. (SBU) One newspaper editor explained the GoE's approach as 
being driven by the ideology of the "developmental state" 
espoused by the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) party.  The editor argued that under 
the "developmental state," eliminating poverty is the 
priority while anything that impedes that effort, including 
the disclosure of unflattering developments by a watchdog 
press, is secondary.  Further, the state must be powerful and 
dominant, rather than just a facilitator.  Still, media 
practitioners did not reserve their criticism for the GoE. 
Several argued that opposition political parties also do not 
stand for press freedom and protest the watchdog eye of the 
media focusing on them. 
 
MELES: "A PERMISSIVE LAW..." 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) In response to A/S Kramer's assertion that the media 
is critical to the checks and balances necessary for a strong 
democracy, Prime Minister Meles retorted that "the private 
press in Ethiopia is an opposition press."  Meles argued that 
the private press holds similar political views as opposition 
political parties and supports the same kind of actions that 
would undermine the constitution as opposition parties. 
Meles conceded that there is no pro-government press beyond 
the state press, noting that some is "less pro-opposition" 
while others are specifically linked to individual opposition 
parties.  Meles deflected all questions from A/S Kramer 
regarding the recently approved Press Law, arguing that the 
law was submitted directly to parliament without going 
through the cabinet.  Meles rejected any problems that people 
may have with the Law, arguing that "I understand it to be a 
permissive law." 
 
"...EVEN WHEN THE RULE OF LAW FAILS," BEREKET 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) While Meles claimed to be unaware of the details 
regarding the press, his senior advisor and former 
Information Minister Bereket Simon was expansive during a 
July 24 lunch.  Bereket argued that prior to 2005, the GoE 
tried to maintain a hands-off approach to the press. 
Unfortunately, much of the private press was intent on 
undermining the constitution.  Unchecked in their publication 
of extremist rhetoric and misinformation, the press succeeded 
in provoking public resentment toward the GoE, which led to 
the 2005 post-election violence.  Bereket resurrected the 
2005/2006 EPRDF mantra arguing that the press was "preaching 
to kill Tigrayans along the lines of Rwanda-style ethnic 
violence." 
 
¶7. (SBU) A/S Kramer emphasized the constructive role that 
civil society and the media play in a democracy and expressed 
the USG's hope that the Press Law would establish a conducive 
environment for responsible journalism and access to 
information.  A/S Kramer went on to note with concern the 
GoE's closure of 13 newspapers in 2005 and persistent 
refusals by the Information Ministry to register new media 
outlets affiliated with journalists charged in the 2005 
turmoil.  Bereket stressed that the Press Law was subjected 
to an extensive donor-supported dialogue and the first draft 
was improved by input from a USAID-funded media regulation 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002159  003 OF 003 
 
 
specialist.  He further argued that "no complaints about the 
final Law hold water."  Ignoring the fact that most 
opposition parties opposed the Law, Bereket defended the 
consultative process by noting that some opposition leaders 
(Lidetu Ayelu of the CUD-breakaway EDUP-Medhin party) offered 
minor changes to improve it.  Despite the new Law having the 
effect of greatly expanding criminal penalties for the 
publication of certain types of information, Bekeret 
commended the Press Law for stripping the previous criminal 
provisions from the Press Law and redirecting them to the 
Penal Code.  Ultimately, though, Bereket argued that the 
Press Law has increased political space and freedom of the 
press. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Following up on a request from Eskinder Nega (one of 
the journalists arrested in 2005 and charged with "outrages 
against the constitution"), A/S Kramer noted concern that the 
Information Ministry had refused to approve licenses for 
certain new media outlets.  Bereket argued that as long as 
journalists accept the law of the land, they would have no 
problem, but if individuals were previously engaged in 
undermining the constitution, the GoE cannot allow them to 
continue, particularly if the judiciary had found them 
culpable.  EmbOff noted that the High Court not only 
acquitted Eskinder, but dropped all charges against him in 
April 2007 after the prosecution failed to present adequate 
grounds to pursue charges against him.  Bereket argued that 
Eskinder and others charged "used front men to cover their 
criminal writings," manipulated the judicial process, and 
charges against them were dismissed on technicalities. 
Still, he stressed, the GoE knows that he was among those 
journalists most intent on undermining the constitution. 
Bereket explicitly alleged that "their papers called for 
ethnic cleansing."  (Note: The GoE initially charged a dozen 
journalists, editors, and publishers and scores of opposition 
political leaders with capital offenses from "outrages 
against the constitution" to "genocide" in a November 2005 
through July 2007 political trial.  Upon the conclusion of 
the prosecution's case, the Ethiopian High Court dismissed 
all charges against the journalists and all charges of 
"genocide" against all defendants for lack of evidence. 
Several publishing houses were later found guilty on the one 
charge of "outrages against the constitution" as corporate 
entities, but journalists affiliated with them were not.  End 
Note.)  Bereket clearly emphasized that despite having never 
been convicted by a court of law, Eskinder would never be 
licensed to practice journalism again in Ethiopia unless the 
GoE had a guarantee that he and his colleagues had changed 
their ways and would abide by the constitution.  When pressed 
by A/S Kramer on how they could prove such a change, Bereket 
argued that they would have to publicly admit their 
involvement in undermining the constitution and accept 
responsibility for the violence and turmoil they had caused 
before the GoE even considered a new license request. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) A formal analysis of the Press Law by Post (once it 
is available) will shed light on appropriateness of concerns 
over its provisions.  Still, the message from media and civil 
society leaders was clear: the media environment is 
oppressive and an indicator of the broader narrowing of 
political space.  Ethiopia's private press is generally of 
marginal quality and prone to political bias, but improved 
media training offers a preferable remedy over the GoE's 
approach of tighter control.  Bereket Simon is a tremendously 
influential member of the ruling party's central committee. 
His comment that the GoE will take executive action in cases 
where the judicial system provides an incorrect finding (as 
in the case of Eskinder Nega) is alarming and offers an 
insight into the mind-set of Ethiopia's ruling elite.  End 
Comment. 
MALAC