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OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0668/01 2072253
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 252253Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4691
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000668 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS KPKO UNSC SO
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL LOOKS TO GET ACTIVE ON SOMALIA 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In consultations on July 23, several 
Security Council members echoed the U.S.'s call for a more 
detailed briefing from DPKO on peacekeeping scenarios by 
August 15.  Council members voiced concern over the size, 
mandate and composition of a potential force, and the options 
presented by DPKO in its upcoming briefing will likely shape 
Council members' thinking going forward.  Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Somalia, 
Ahmed Ould Abdallah, AU Peace and Security Commissioner 
Ramtane Lamamra and Somali Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Jana 
briefed the Council, and were unanimous that the Council 
should authorize an international security force to seize the 
opportunity presented by political progress in Somalia.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) In an open briefing on July 23, SRSG Ould Abdallah 
called on the Council to take "bold, decisive and fast 
action" to show its commitment to improving the situation in 
Somalia.  The SRSG argued that increased international 
security assistance was essential in order for the 
humanitarian situation to improve.  Ould Abdallah praised the 
Djibouti Agreement between the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) and the opposition Alliance for the 
Reliberation of Somalia (ARS), signed in Djibouti on June 9, 
2008 and singled out the Security Council's visit to Djibouti 
as "one of the most important contributions" that convinced 
the parties to commit to a negotiated solution.  He proposed 
that the international community seize the opening provided 
by the Agreement to approve a new international security 
force, which he said would help marginalize groups that 
refused to renounce violence.  The SRSG also urged the 
Council to review UNSC sanctions lists and with a view to 
delisting leaders who had committed themselves to peace. 
 
Council members speak out in support of UN action: 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In closed consultations Ambassador Khalilzad framed 
the debate by stating that the United States supports the 
Somali PM's call for a UN force and asking for further input 
from DPKO on security assistance scenarios by August 15. 
Other delegations seconded this suggestion, with the Chinese 
representative stating that his government "fully shares" the 
U.S. view and looks forward to seeing a workable plan from 
the Secretariat to capitalize on the political success of the 
Djibouti Agreement.  Italy spoke in support of AMISOM's 
rehatting as a UNPKO with an initial focus on Mogadishu. 
Italy said it would be important to hear from DPKO before the 
beginning of AMISOM renewal negotiations and stated that only 
a UNPKO could encourage NGOs to return to Somalia. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Libya encouraged the Council to respond to the AU's 
call for a UNPKO and urged planning now so that AMISOM could 
be enhanced and folded "seamlessly" into a PKO when the time 
was right.  Burkina Faso stressed that the UN's credibility 
in Africa was at stake, urging the Council to "urgently" take 
over AMISOM and "immediately" deploy a UNPKO in order to 
exploit the opportunity created by the political process. 
South Africa spoke in favor of a force that would allow 
Ethiopian troops to withdraw, but emphasized that careful 
planning was necessary.  Vietnam advocated early deployment 
of a UNPKO while Costa Rica said that the international 
community should assume its responsibilities by authorizing 
an international security force. 
 
Europeans wary of UNAMID repeat: 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Other delegations were more cautious in their 
statements, though none ruled out the possibility of an 
international force.  The UK lamented that Somalia had for 
too long languished in the UN's "too-difficult tray," but 
cautioned that the current situation of political progress 
amid increasing instability did not bode well for an 
increased UN presence on the ground.  The UK stressed the 
need for realism, saying that on Somalia, the Council needed 
"serious military advice of the type we lacked on UNAMID." 
Any peace force would be intended to replace the Ethiopians, 
the UK Ambassador said, and should be equipped for the type 
of counter-insurgency fight the Ethiopians are now waging. 
France said that it could support an international 
stabilization force under UN mandate, but that a full-fledged 
PKO would need careful planning from DPKO.  The French 
indicated that one possibility they could support would be an 
operation with a "geographically limited mandate" focusing on 
the Mogadishu region and aimed at restoring a UNDP presence 
in Somalia. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Russia said that it was important to consider the 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000668  002 OF 002 
 
 
AU's request and to prevent a potential security vacuum 
following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, but stressed 
that the parameters and configuration of a potential PKO 
needed to be carefully considered.  Indonesia, occasionally 
mentioned as a potential troop contributing country for a 
Somalia operation, said that the AU's request should be 
urgently considered, but that careful planning would be 
required, including the identification of potential troop 
contributors.  Indonesia went onto say that AMISOM should 
remain at the core of any future force.  Croatia supported a 
"measured and gradual" approach to a stabilization force, 
while the Belgian ambassador quoted the Secretary-General's 
report as stating that deployment of a stabilization force 
would only be possible if the Djibouti Agreement were 
implemented seriously. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The SRSG responded to Council statements, expressing 
his concern that "Somalia is being punished for the 
misbehavior of its leaders in the 1990s" as well as his 
belief that the Djibouti Agreement represents real political 
progress reflective of the will of the overwhelming majority 
of Somalis.  He said he was skeptical of DPKO's planning, 
particularly in light of its estimate that a PKO could 
require 28,000 peacekeepers, saying that such numbers were 
designed to "scare the Council."  Ould Abdallah also gave his 
private opinion that the international community had for too 
long prioritized humanitarian assistance to Somalia while 
neglecting the security situation.  The dirty secret of 
humanitarian aid, he said, is that no NGO can deliver aid in 
Somalia without paying warlords for protection.  Thus, money 
given for aid is ultimately used to buy weapons and sustain 
the power of the warlords in Somalia.  The SRSG said that 
international security assistance would be necessary in order 
to break this cycle, stabilize the security situation and 
allow political progress to take root. 
 
Somali, AU push the Council forward: 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (U) In the Council's open briefing, AU Peace and Security 
Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra echoed Ould Abdallah's call for 
the Council to seize the window of opportunity offered by the 
Djibouti Agreement to authorize a PKO.  Failure to do so 
could allow spoilers to undermine progress, he said.  To 
emphasize the opportunity offered by the agreement, Lamamra 
drew attention to the fact that two members of the ARS were 
included in the Somali delegation on the Council floor. 
While praising AMISOM for its recent force generation 
successes, Lamamra described it as grossly inadequate to the 
challenge at hand.  He called for a UN takeover of AMISOM to 
allow the focus of the operation to extend beyond Mogadishu, 
including a strong naval component to project power and 
safeguard aid shipments. 
 
¶9. (U) The Somali Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Jana also gave a 
short briefing, in which he reminded members that the UNSC 
had been "seized of" the situation in Somalia since early 
1992 and expressed the hope that the cause of a UNPKO for 
Somalia would receive "a major push" at this meeting.  In 
light of the unprecedented reconciliation of the Djibouti 
Agreement, Jana said that all parties in Somalia were now in 
agreement that a UN authorized stabilization force was the 
best hope of the Somali people's 17-year suffering coming to 
an end.  Jana took noted exception to DPKO's projections, 
claiming that the 26,000-strong force proposed by the 
department was "not feasible or necessary."  The FM told the 
council that a much smaller force could be effective in 
reasonable circumstances, and that AMISOM should be the 
nucleus of any future force. 
 
Khalilzad