VZCZCXRO9944
PP RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #2097/01 2130527
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 310527Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6201
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4641
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2442
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0632
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 9122
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 1496
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 2852
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 9705
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 7095
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUHPSAA/COMMARFORPAC  PRIORITY
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ  PRIORITY
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT  PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 002097 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOD FOR OSD/APSA SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA/GEIS 
DOD FOR OSD/PLANNING MAHNKEN/YOUNG 
JOINT STAFF FOR J5 WEIR/KOSINSKI 
JOINT STAFF FOR J7 ROUNDS/MUTTY/NELSON 
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J3/J5 
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J3/J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2023 
TAGS: PGOV JA MARR PARM PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: DASD MAHNKEN MEETINGS IN JAPAN ON BILATERAL 
PLANNING 
 
TOKYO 00002097  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James Zumwalt. Reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Planning Dr. Thomas Mahnken met with Japanese 
counterparts from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign 
Affairs (MOD and MOFA), Cabinet Secretariat and the Japan 
Self Defense Forces Joint Staff Office (JSDF JSO) on July 17 
to encourage continued progress on bilateral planning. 
During his meetings, DASD Mahnken highlighted the need for 
timely U.S. military access to Japanese civilian air and sea 
ports during a Korean Peninsula contingency. He also pressed 
for the quick completion of surveys of those facilities. 
DASD Mahnken stressed the need for timely decision-making by 
Japan to support a U.S. contingency response and urged Japan 
to include a decision matrix in the next cycle of bilateral 
planning for Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 5055.  He also emphasized 
the need for early activation of the Bilateral Coordination 
Mechanism (BCM), and in particular the Bilateral Coordination 
Center (BCC) that facilitates military coordination, critical 
for effective contingency response.  MOFA and MOD outlined 
the difficulties in conducting certain site surveys and 
reviewed the limits of the central government's authority 
over prefecture and privately-owned ports.  The JSO briefed 
on JSDF military activities during contingencies in the area, 
including the use of civilian air and sea ports to support 
the evacuation of Japanese nationals from South Korea during 
a contingency.  MOD, MOFA, and JSO representatives agreed 
with the need for early military coordination in a 
contingency and said they are moving toward a more ""flexible 
activation"" of the BCC. End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) DASD for Policy Planning Dr. Thomas Mahnken led a July 
17 meeting on bilateral contingency planning with MOD, MOFA 
and JSDF JSO counterparts.  The lead Japanese representatives 
were MOD Deputy Director General (DDG) for Defense Policy 
Ryutaro Matsumoto, MOFA DDG for North American Affairs Koji 
Haneda, Cabinet Secretariat Counsellor Takai Kawashima, JSO 
Operations Division (J3) head COL Shigeki Muto, and JSO 
Defense and International Policy Division (J-5) head CAPT 
Tatsuhiko Takashima.  Representatives from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense's Japan Desk and Policy Planning Office, 
U.S. Joint Staff, Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Forces Japan 
(USFJ), and the Embassy also participated in the day-long 
meeting. 
 
Briefing on U.S. Access to Japanese Air and Sea Ports 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3. (S) At Japan's request, representatives from PACOM briefed 
on the current concept of operations for strategic maneuver 
options and military deployments to Japan in a Korean 
Peninsula contingency.  The presentation focused on 
air-to-air and air-to-sea transload options for passengers 
and cargo, as well as the anticipated U.S. military need for 
access to and logistics support at Japan's civilian airports 
and sea ports during a U.S. military contingency response. 
This PACOM ""transparency briefing"" followed a similar 
presentation by PACOM Deputy J-5 Brig Gen Sam Angelella on 
May 19, 2008, in Tokyo, in response to requests from Japan 
for information on U.S. contingency response plans to support 
the completion of site surveys of 23 Japanese civilian air 
and sea ports. 
 
¶4. (S) The brief included the current estimated number of  
required parking places for aircraft, expected passenger 
throughput and tonnage, fuel requirements, and the planned 
aircraft bed down. PACOM stressed that one of the most 
significant risks to the current contingency plan is not 
having early access to Japan's air and sea ports.  The United 
States will need 24-hour, seven-days-a-week access to Japan's 
air and seaports at least two days prior to the start of 
conflict and will need access to the facilities within 48 
hours after making a request. 
 
¶5. (S) Dr. Mahnken stressed that the results of the site 
surveys are necessary to clearly understand the current 
capacity and logistic support capabilities at Japan's 
civilian air and sea ports. This will allow the United States 
to validate its current plans and to be more flexible in 
determining which bases could be used in a crisis.  (Note: 
Japan agreed to conduct these site surveys in the October 
2005 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Joint Statement. 
End note.) 
 
¶6. (S) MOFA DDG Haneda noted that the models for air and sea 
port usage should take into account the ownership of each 
facility, i.e. whether owned and controlled by the central 
government, prefecture, private entity or port authority. 
The models also need to take into account the specific 
authorities the central government has over the facilities in 
peacetime, during a ""situation in areas surrounding Japan"" 
(SIASJ), or after an attack on Japan.  For instance, SIASJ 
only allows the central government to request action of 
prefecture and privately-owned ports, whereas during an armed 
attack against Japan the Prime Minister has the authority to 
move Japan civil/private planes and ships, MOFA and JSO 
representatives noted. 
 
Site Surveys of Civilian Airports and Seaports 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (S) DASD Mahnken thanked his counterparts for completing 
the site surveys of two airports and two seaports, while 
stating the importance of quickly completing the remaining 
site surveys and pressing Japan to provide a timeline for 
completion.  While not providing a timeline, MOFA DDG Haneda 
indicated that the next survey would be at Shimonoseki 
seaport in August.  MOD and MOFA representatives explained 
the difficulty of completing some of the remaining Phase 1 
site surveys due to historical reasons (such as Nagasaki), 
areas that are opposition party strongholds, or the lack of 
central government ownership (Kansai International Airport). 
An additional constraint is that the government cannot reveal 
the purpose of the site surveys to the public. 
 
¶8. (S) MOD asked whether using publicly available data, in 
lieu of visiting the facilities, could satisfy the survey 
requirements.  U.S. representatives said the method for 
meeting the survey requirements is up to Japan, however, the 
data requested by U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is 
what is needed to understand the capacity of each facility. 
Some of the required data can only be obtained by doing 
physical inspections.  DASD Mahnken suggested that Japan 
might start surveys on easier Phase 2 facilities while 
working out the issues over the more difficult Phase 1 
facilities. 
 
JSDF Planning for a Korean Contingency 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) MOD and JSO representatives gave a presentation on 
JSDF activities in a Korean Peninsula contingency, including 
the use of air and sea ports during SIASJ and an armed attack 
against Japan, with a particular emphasis on operations to 
support the transport of Japanese nationals overseas (TJNO), 
equivalent to U.S. non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). 
 Japan plans to send JSDF ships and aircraft to South Korea 
for TJNO during SIASJ, if necessary to augment Japan civil 
air and sea capacity.  Japan would need to get Republic of 
Korea prior approval and MOD would need to be confident that 
transport by JSDF aircraft would be safe, i.e. they would not 
be transiting, entering or departing from hostilities. 
Significant JSDF activities would include convoy support and 
minesweeping, search and rescue operations, and ship 
inspections.  JSO representatives noted that minesweeping 
activities by the JSDF is allowed under SIASJ against 
""abandoned mines,"" i.e. floating mines or mines otherwise 
seemingly dumped off a ship and abandoned.  JSO suggested 
that the ""abandoned mines"" concept would allow Japan the 
flexibility to conduct minesweeping operations but asked that 
the United States not press for further definition of an 
abandoned mine. 
 
Bilateral Planning Schedule for CONPLAN 5055 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) USFJ reviewed the agreed schedule for the next cycle 
of bilateral planning for Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 5055.  The 
current CONPLAN 5055-07 was bilaterally approved in September 
¶2007. The recent bilateral agreement on the tasking for the 
Comprehensive Security Assessment (CSA) and the Subcommittee 
for Defense Cooperation (SDC) Bilateral Planning Framework 
and Guidance will allow detailed planning work to begin on 
CONPLAN 5055-09 in September 2008.  The CSA will be completed 
in March 2009 and the draft CONPLAN 5055-09 and associated 
annexes will be completed in July 2009.  Following draft plan 
completion, a review and approval process will be conducted 
by both sides. The completed CONPLAN 5055-09 should be signed 
in September 2009. 
 
Risks and Assumptions in CONPLAN 5055 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (S) The United States led a discussion on the risks 
associated with our current assumptions in CONPLAN 5055. The 
focus of that discussion centered primarily on the need for 
timely decision-making and quick establishment of the 
Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM), particularly during 
the early phases of a contingency.  Building on the earlier 
""transparency briefing,"" U.S. participants stressed the need 
to better understand Japan's decision-making, particularly 
when moving from peacetime to SIASJ. 
 
¶12. (S) MOFA stated that Japan does not ""declare"" SIASJ on 
its own behalf, but rather the implementation of SIASJ is a 
bilateral event that allows Japan to provide support to U.S. 
forces.  The U.S. would inform Japan that a contingency 
around Japan is likely and to provide information on the U.S. 
requirements for Japan's support.  MOFA would then forward 
the request to activate SIASJ measures to the Cabinet for a 
decision.  U.S. participants noted that the United States 
sees the implementation of SIASJ as ultimately a unilateral 
decision by Japan.  DASD Mahnken commented that the 
discussion on decision responsibilities and timing warrants  
the development of a decision-making matrix for CONPLAN 5055 
that would track the sequencing of unilateral and bilateral 
decisions needed during a contingency.  (Note: This is a USFJ 
initiative included in the SDC Bilateral Planning Guidance 
for 5055-09 that the Japanese Joint Staff had resisted at 
working levels.  End note.)  Both sides agreed to begin 
coordination on a decision matrix for 5055. 
 
Bilateral Coordination Needed Prior to a Contingency 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶13. (S) Discussions on the need for early activation of the 
Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM) and the Bilateral 
Coordination Center (BCC) included a review of Japan's 
response to North Korea's July 2006 missile test.  The 
Embassy Political Minister Counselor noted that coordination 
of operations and intelligence in the run-up to, and 
following the July 2006 North Korean missile launches, had 
been ad hoc.  Many with a need-to-know in the Japanese 
government had not been informed of intelligence data and 
operational issues.  MOFA representatives responded that 
Japan had not seen a need to stand up the BCM and BCC as 
there had not been any operational issues necessitating 
coordination.  Embassy PolMinCouns responded that there had 
been a clear operational need at that time.  For example U.S. 
and Japan Aegis ships were operating in the Sea of Japan and 
needed to share data and coordinate with one another. 
Japanese government officials also needed to be aware of our 
Navy and MSDF operations.  The creation of the ad hoc 
Azabudai Group, consisting of senior Japanese policy-makers, 
Embassy officials, and USFJ representatives, to deal with the 
crisis at that time is evidence that added bilateral 
coordination mechanisms are necessary. 
 
¶14.  (S) U.S. participants said that political decisions, or 
the delay thereof, in the run-up to a contingency should not 
prevent military coordination between U.S. forces and the 
JSDF.  USFJ Deputy Commander Major General Flock suggested 
the BCC, in some form, be active at all times and continually 
staffed at some minimal level so that it is ready to be fully 
stood-up at a moments notice.  He also suggested that the BCM 
and BCC process needs to be exercised more, especially since 
most current bilateral exercises assume SIASJ or an armed 
attack against Japan has already occurred. 
 
¶15.  (S) Both MOFA and MOD DDGs indicated that the  is moving 
toward a more ""flexible activation"" of the BCC, with DDG 
Matsumoto noting that this would allow BCC activation without 
the establishment of the BCM on the authority of the Japan 
JSO Chief of Staff and the SUFJ Commander.  (NOTE: This is 
senior-level MOD confirmation of a proposal an MOD action 
officer presented to USFJ and Embassy representatives the 
previous week.  The proposal is now under consideration at 
USFJ.  End note.) 
 
¶16. (S) The Japan JSO J-3 operations representative expressed 
support for having the BCC established during peacetime, 
especially since Japan now has ballistic missile interceptor 
capability.  MOFA also noted that whether an entity called 
""BCC"" exists or not during peacetime, the substantive actions 
of the BCC need to occur in peacetime before a contingency 
occurs.  This statement drew agreeing nods from all on the 
Japan side. 
 
SIASJ Under Review 
------------------ 
 
¶17. In subsequent office calls, Director General Takamizawa 
and Director General Tokuchi both mentioned that the current 
SIASJ law was insufficient and the MOD is currently reviewing 
the legal system for SIASJ and how the law could be improved 
to allow for greater flexibility and realism in a 
contingency.  MOD has identified several areas for 
improvement and by August will choose specific areas for 
further study. 
 
¶18. (U) DASD Mahnken cleared this cable. 
 
SCHIEFFER