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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0815

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001988 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/17/08 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Poll on North Korea delisting (Mainichi) 
 
(2) Seiron column: Delisting of North Korea from U.S. list of state 
sponsors of terrorism; Realistic military measures should be taken 
into consideration (Sankei) 
 
(3) Seiron (Opinion): U.S. delisting decision based on distorted 
interpretation of domestic law (Sankei) 
 
(4) LDP members expect cabinet shuffle before extra Diet session; 
Prime Minister Fukuda has not unveiled real intention (Tokyo 
Shimbun) 
 
(5) Editorial: We are concerned about the skewed organizational 
logic in Defense Ministry reform (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(6) Letters to the editor (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(7) WTO ministerial to start from July 21: What will come after 
concessions? (Asahi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Poll on North Korea delisting 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 16, 2008 
 
Questions & Answers 
(T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female) 
 
Q: North Korea has now declared its nuclear programs, and the United 
States will delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. The 
Japanese government welcomes this move as helping resolve the North 
Korean nuclear issue. Do you support this stance? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 19  22 17 
No 66  69 64 
 
Q: Do you think the issue of Japanese nationals abducted to North 
Korea is nearing a resolution with the U.S. delisting North Korea as 
a state sponsor of terrorism? 
 
 T P M F 
Nearing resolution 2  3 2 
Far off 47  52 43 
 
(Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "No answer" 
omitted. 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted July 12-13 over the 
telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit 
sampling (RDS) basis. Answers were obtained from 1,060 persons. 
 
(2) Seiron column: Delisting of North Korea from U.S. list of state 
sponsors of terrorism; Realistic military measures should be taken 
into consideration 
 
SANKEI (Page 13) (Full) 
 
TOKYO 00001988  002 OF 010 
 
 
July 16, 2008 
 
Former Ambassador to Thailand Hisahiko Okazaki 
 
It may be premature to discuss the results of the latest six-party 
talks at this state. 
 
One reason for that is because all observers are in agreement that 
North Korea's nuclear report is not complete. There is no consensus 
reached on a method of verifying the credibility of the report. 
Whether the U.S. will actually remove that country from its list of 
state sponsors of terrorism will not be known until August 11. 
 
Another reason is that outsiders cannot tell what will result from a 
reinvestigation into the abduction issue, which North Korea has 
promised Japan. If the abduction issue makes major progress, it 
would change the evaluation of the U.S. decision to remove North 
Korea from its terror-sponsoring list. 
 
I have formed my own conclusions about North Korea's foreign policy 
by observing the talks between the U.S. and North Korea since 1994. 
The DPRK has the capability of negotiating by giving in on terms 
piecemeal and then implementing them. 
 
As a result of the talks in 1994, the nation suspended operations at 
its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon in return for receiving 500,000 
tons of heavy oil annually and having light-water nuclear reactors 
built. It has been properly abiding by this pledge for the past six 
years. In the 1999 talks, it pledged to put on hold the launching of 
Taepodong missiles in return for a resumption of humanitarian aid 
and has fulfilled that pledge. 
 
This means that North Korea can make a deal piecemeal in return for 
receiving economic aid, assuming the condition is to place a 
temporary moratorium on the use of nuclear facilities or the 
launching of missiles, instead of abandoning them completely. 
However, it is not known whether North Korea is ready to make 
permanent deals, instead of just making piecemeal concessions. 
 
Disabling Yongbyong facilities for about a year 
 
The U.S. has been able to accomplish the disabling of Yongbyong 
facilities the decisions reached under the Six-Party talks. I hear 
that the point of contention at the talks was whether North Korea 
would agree to disable its nuclear facilities to a degree that would 
require a year for it to resume operations. 
 
The U.S. has explained that the disabling of nuclear facilities by 
North Korea is aimed at the future abolition of such. However, 
scrapping those facilities is a long way off. The situation will not 
change. 
 
If that is the case, the concession made by North Korea would be to 
disable its nuclear facilities to a degree that would take about one 
year before they could be restarted. If one considers experience of 
the Perry negotiations (1994, 1999), assuming that the (latest) 
talks were aimed just to achieve just that one goal (disabling to 
the extent that it would take a year to restart), I think it could 
probably could have been achieved just by the lifting of the freeze 
on the DPRK's bank account at Banco Delta Asia. 
 
However, only rescissible economic benefits were in fact provided as 
 
TOKYO 00001988  003 OF 010 
 
 
a result of the Perry talks. This time, however, the Six-Party Talks 
paid a higher price than that in order to make North Korea commit 
itself to disabling its nuclear facilities to a certain extent, 
while putting on hold various allegations, such as counterfeiting 
money. 
 
There is only one way to justify such a seemingly excessive 
concession. As the U.S. government has actually conceded, it is 
telling North Korea that the concessions it just made are only the 
first step toward a total elimination of its nuclear programs. 
 
This is the point where my view differs from that of the U.S. State 
Department. I am highly skeptical whether North Korea, which in 
effect declared with its nuclear test in 2006 that it is now a 
nuclear power, will abandon such weapons. I harbor doubts about 
repeatedly making concessions in the hope that North Korea will 
eventually scrap all its nuclear weapons. 
 
Insufficient talks among allies 
 
The U.S. and its allies have successively made concessions, just as 
North Korea desired, including the unfreezing of its account at 
Banco Delta Asia, delisting it from the U.S. list of state sponsors 
of terrorism, and no longer applying the Trading with the Enemy Act 
to it. What else is left to the U.S. as a bargaining chip that North 
Korea might consider valuable enough to convince it to completely 
abandon its nuclear program? Will North Korea appreciate paper 
concessions without substance, such as a peace treaty or a security 
guarantee? 
 
What might be done, if the prospect were obtained that North Korea 
would not abandon its nuclear programs? One answer might be to 
continue to call that nation a part of the "axis of evil" or 
"outpost for tyranny", as did the Bush administration's policy and 
wait for its self-destruction. 
 
Or, carrots and sticks could be used to a maximum extent. It appears 
that the harsh response of Japan and the U.S. to its nuclear test in 
2006 appears to have dealt a significant blow to the DPRK. What 
would have happened if the sanctions had continued for a few more 
years? Doubt still remains that the U.S. might have prematurely 
tried to reap the benefit of the talks without consultations with 
its allies. 
 
If that is the case, they only available way would be continuing to 
strengthen pressure, while crafting a realistic military response 
with an eye on the possibility of North Korea's arming itself with 
nuclear weapons. 
 
It is a glaring fact that the six-party talks this time -- in 
effect, U.S.-China talks and U.S.-North Korea talks -- lacked 
sufficient prior consultations among U.S. allies. If the forum of 
the six-party talks is to be continued, this is a serious challenge 
to deal with. 
 
North Korea's completely abandoning its nuclear weapons is the 
minimum condition for making the six-party talks a permanent forum. 
It is simply weird for North Korea, a de facto nuclear nation, to be 
a member of the six-party talks. 
 
(3) Seiron (Opinion): U.S. delisting decision based on distorted 
interpretation of domestic law 
 
TOKYO 00001988  004 OF 010 
 
 
 
SANKEI (Page 13) (Full) 
July 17, 2008 
 
By Tsutomu Nishioka, professor at Tokyo Christian University 
 
The United States government notified Congress on June 26 of its 
decision to delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. 
Prime Minister Fukuda said on June 24: "We should welcome it (the 
U.S. decision) if it helps resolve the North Korean nuclear issue," 
stopping short of expressing his opposition to the U.S. decision. 
Families of abduction victims frequently visited the U.S. starting 
in 2001 and succeeded in having the U.S. include the abduction issue 
among the reasons for keeping North Korea on its terror list. Given 
this, it is natural for the families to express strong 
disappointment with Prime Minister Fukuda and the Foreign Ministry. 
 
Some critics, though, say that abductee families and supporters are 
overly dependent on the U.S. Such criticism is based on a 
misunderstanding. The media played up the news of Washington's 
delisting decision this time, but in 2003, when the U.S. government 
added the abductions to the reasons, this news was not prominently 
taken up. That is why many Japanese people think mistakenly that the 
U.S. had already included the abductions among the reasons when the 
North was designated as a sponsor of terrorism in 1988 and later 
removed the issue from the conditions in response to a request by 
Pyongyang. 
 
The U.S. is required to refrain from offering economic aid, 
excluding humanitarian aid, to the countries on its blacklist and to 
oppose any aid plans by international financial institutions, its 
investment destinations, for the countries. 
 
To take a certain country off the list, the president needs to 
submit to Congress a report that can show that the nation: (1) did 
not offer support for international terrorist groups over the past 
six months; and (2) guarantees that it will not offer support in the 
future. The delisting decision goes into effect 45 days after the 
submission of the report. 
 
The U.S. designated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in 
1988 for such reasons as the incident of the bombing of a KAL 
airliner the previous year. The first case of an abduction 
recognized by the Japanese government occurred in 1977, but the U.S. 
State Department never cited the abductions as a reason for 
designating North Korea as a sponsor of terrorism in annual reports 
on international terrorism submitted by the Department to the 
Congress -- at least it did not until 2003, when abductee families 
called for the U.S. government's help in resolving the issue. 
 
The idea of delisting North Korea surfaced suddenly in 2000. At that 
time, there was a movement for the Asian Development Bank to extend 
loans to North Korea under the lead of South Korea. To join the 
movement, the U.S. needed to take the North off the list. In a move 
to delist that nation, the Clinton administration even issued a 
joint antiterrorism declaration with Pyongyang. This move was 
suddenly suspended with the launching of the Bush administration. 
Seeing that, abductee families and supporters, including this 
writer, began efforts in 2001 to persuade the U.S. to include the 
abductions among the reasons for listing North Korea as a terrorism 
sponsor. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001988  005 OF 010 
 
 
The U.S. State Department defines "a terrorist act" as "a violent 
act against civilians by a group under a state government or by 
agents, based on systematic and political motives and also an 
intention to affect ordinary people." Based on the definition, North 
Korea's past abductions of Japanese nationals are naturally labeled 
as "a terrorist act." 
 
The problem is that a series of abductions occurred from the late 
1970s through the early 1980s, and no case has been reported 
recently that would meet the condition of "within six months" after 
the series of abductions. When considering the fact that many 
abduction victims have yet to be returned to Japan, however, it can 
be even interpreted that the terrorist act is still going on. Based 
on this view, Japan has continued to urge the U.S. to properly apply 
its relevant law, emphasizing that the abductions are still an 
ongoing terrorist act. 
 
In response to Japan's repeated request, Deputy Secretary of State 
Armitage clearly said: "The abduction issue should be one of the 
reasons for designating North Korea as a state sponsor of 
terrorism," during his confirmation hearing at the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in February 2003 and when he met in March the 
same year with representatives from Association of the Families of 
Victims Kidnapped by North Korea, the National Association for the 
Rescuing of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea, and the group of Diet 
members dealing with the abduction issue. He referred to the 
abduction issue in the report on international terrorism released in 
April 2004. Although some newspapers have insisted that the U.S. 
government has made no other pledges than just saying it would 
"consider it," their assertion is not correct. 
 
But under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Bush 
administration changed its policy and began to say that a solution 
of the abduction issue is not a precondition for delisting Pyongyang 
under U.S. law. The U.S. notified Congress of its delisting decision 
by revising its interpretation of domestic law not for the sake of 
Japan, a U.S. ally, but for the sake of North Korea, a sponsor of 
terrorism. That is why many Japanese are seriously concerned that 
the foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance has been undermined. 
 
(4) LDP members expect cabinet shuffle before extra Diet session; 
Prime Minister Fukuda has not unveiled real intention 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
July 17, 2008 
 
With the closing of the Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Hokkaido, the 
primary concern in the capital district of Nagatacho is a shuffle of 
the cabinet and the leadership of the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP). The prevailing view in the ruling parties is that Prime 
Minister Yasuo Fukuda will shuffle his cabinet in late August before 
the opening of an extraordinary Diet session. Fukuda has, however, 
reiterated that he has no plans to do so. Since even senior ruling 
coalition members cannot predict the timing and the scale of a 
shuffle, confusion is spreading across the ruling coalition. 
 
Since the close of the G-8 summit, opinion in the ruling camp has 
been that Fukuda will shuffle his cabinet at an early date in a bid 
to form one that could be called his own. 
 
It is not realistic to carry out a shuffle after an extra Diet 
session is convened. The expectation is that the extra session will 
 
TOKYO 00001988  006 OF 010 
 
 
run until December. An ordinary session will be convened early next 
year. The term of the House of Representatives will expire in 
September next year. Given this timeline, the dominant view in the 
ruling camp is that this will be the last chance for the prime 
minister to shuffle his cabinet. 
 
The Fukuda cabinet's approval ratings increased slightly in recent 
opinion polls, with no boost coming from the G-8 summit as Fukuda 
had hoped. This has strengthened speculation that Fukuda has no 
choice but to shuffle his cabinet in order to boost his 
administration's popularity. 
 
Fukuda, however, has not clarified his intention, just saying: "I 
will consider what I should consider." He then started his summer 
vacation yesterday. 
 
Fukuda has not shared his innermost thoughts even with former Prime 
Minister Yoshiro Mori, Fukuda's backer. Mori has complained that 
Fukuda is noncommittal when receiving Mori's advice. A senior LDP 
member sighed as he said: "Nobody has heard from the prime minister 
as to whether he will shuffle his cabinet or not." 
 
With nobody able to read Fukuda, talk continues within the LDP on 
the timing and extent of a cabinet shuffle. 
 
LDP Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Tadamori Oshima on July 15 
advised Fukuda to shuffle the cabinet soon, saying: "If you shuffle 
the cabinet, it will be essential for you to ask new cabinet 
ministers to be ready for posts." A mid-level LDP lawmaker said: "If 
a small number of cabinet members are replaced, it will be possible 
to carry out a shuffle immediately before the opening of the extra 
Diet session." 
 
However, many LDP members favor a major shuffle. A senior New 
Komeito member said: "It should be a major shuffle or none at all. A 
minor shuffle would be the worst." An LDP faction chief stressed: "I 
will obtain one of the four executive posts." 
 
(5) Editorial: We are concerned about the skewed organizational 
logic in Defense Ministry reform 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 5) (Full) 
July 17, 2008 
 
Organizational logic seems to be overshadowing the starting point of 
preventing a recurrence of misconducts by Defense Ministry 
officials. A report compiled by the government's Council on Reform 
of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) gives us a strong feeling that the 
focus of attention in the discussion has shifted before we were even 
aware of it. Can this approach really revitalize the ministry? 
 
MOD was hit by a series of scandals last year, including a bribery 
case involving former Administrative Vice-Defense Minister Takemasa 
Moriya and a cover-up of the underreported amount of fuel Japan 
supplied to a U.S. supply vessel. Because serious doubts have 
emerged about how civilian control should be carried out, the reform 
council was launched to write prescriptions under the lead of the 
Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei). 
 
The report consists of two parts: examinations of the scandals and 
specific proposals. Condemning the Moriya scandal over defense 
equipment procurement as a breach of trust, the report includes 
 
TOKYO 00001988  007 OF 010 
 
 
measures for increasing transparency in procurement by such means as 
producing and disclosing conference minutes. 
 
It also calls for the strict observance of regulations and the 
establishment of professionalism to change the mentality of SDF 
personnel. The need to specify such basics tells the seriousness of 
the matter. There is no denying that the policy to deal with 
scandals is designed to please everyone. 
 
The part on organizational reform is superficial. 
 
The report is designed to consolidate the operation of units and 
defense capability buildup functions, while generally keeping the 
overall framework of the Joint Staff Office and the staff offices of 
the three SDF forces intact. To eliminate sectionalism, the council 
has also come up with a plan to establish some mixed units of 
personnel from both civilian and uniformed staff and to strengthen 
the functions of the control tower of the prime minister and the 
defense minister. 
 
Aiming at the strict enforcement of civilian control not by civilian 
officers but by lawmakers is understandable. But how this would lead 
to the elimination of misconduct remains unclear. It also bothers us 
that the council's interest has shifted to organizational reform 
from around the time when Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba proposed a 
large-scale restructuring plan. 
 
Since then, there have been clashes of interests between the 
civilian and uniformed groups who desperately want to defend their 
authority. As the tug-of-war in the ministry has intensified, 
self-reflection of the misconducts seems to have been left behind. A 
council member raised a question about the pitched battle for 
tampering with the reorganization. 
 
It would be preposterous if reform from the people's perspective 
became reform from the MOD's viewpoint. 
 
Although the council has produced its report, the past scandals will 
not vanish like smoke. The public's eye on the ministry remains 
severe. Defense Minister Ishiba will reportedly set up a team later 
this week tasked with crafting concrete plans. Unless MOD presents 
convincible reform plans, it will never be able to restore public 
trust. 
 
(6) Letters to the editor 
 
Maher's remarks ignore Okinawa public 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 5) (Full) 
July 17, 2008 
 
By Takatoshi Oshiro, 70, Tomigusuku City 
 
I believe many people in Okinawa found the Ryukyu Shimpo's July 13 
editorial critical of Maher's comments quite agreeable. U.S. Consul 
General in Okinawa Kevin Maher has made various comments offensive 
to the people of Okinawa regarding the reversed positions of the 
ruling and opposition blocs in the prefectural assembly, a Futenma 
Air Station noise suit and other matters. 
 
Nevertheless, he is a U.S. government spokesperson. His past 
statements have simply exposed the facts that there are issues and 
 
TOKYO 00001988  008 OF 010 
 
 
that he has an unusual personality. The problem here is the U.S. 
government's stance. 
 
It is said that U.S. politics is based on popular will. U.S. 
senators and representatives value the voices of people of their 
constituencies. Their eyes are not directed at their parties or the 
president. It is the foundation of democratic politics. 
 
But when it comes to matters of other countries, their minds do not 
work the same way. They carry things out in defiance of how the 
people of Okinawa think. But they can probably no longer ignore the 
Okinawa public's persistent resistance movement. 
 
Consul general's remarks incomprehensible 
 
By Tetsuhiko Minamoto, 61, Tokashiki Village 
 
Making provocative remarks often, Maher has rubbed the feelings of 
the Okinawa public the wrong way. It is like fingernails across a 
blackboard. U.S. Consul General in Okinawa Kevin Maher is truly an 
interesting person. He has a nice face, but what he says is totally 
incomprehensible. He is either misunderstanding the times, or his 
watch runs backwards. 
 
Aircraft landing at and taking off from Futenma Air Station always 
fly over residential areas. Even former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld described the situation as "too dangerous" in amazement. In 
other words, it would be impossible to build a base in such a place 
in the United States. 
 
Consul General Maher said: "The question is why the city has allowed 
the construction of houses outside the base near its runway." 
 
To us, the big question is why the airfield sits in the middle of 
Ginowan. 
 
The logic presumably is that it is dangerous to build houses near 
the airfield, which was there first. Maher's view is the same as the 
approach-to-danger argument, which is illogical. The base needs to 
get out of Okinawa. 
 
 (By Magiri Yafuso) 
 
Dear Governor Nakaima: 
 
Relocating the residents who live around the base is the best way to 
eliminate the danger of Futenma Air Station. 
 
Best, 
 
U.S. Consul-General Kevin Maher 
 
(7) WTO ministerial to start from July 21: What will come after 
concessions? 
 
ASAHI (Page 6) (Full) 
July 17, 2008 
 
A ministerial of the multilateral trade liberalization talks (Doha 
Round) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) will be held in Geneva 
starting on July 21. Many observers are of the opinion that there is 
a fifty-fifty chance of the meeting reaching an agreement on trade 
 
TOKYO 00001988  009 OF 010 
 
 
liberalization. In order to wrap up an agreement, it would be 
unavoidable for Japan to make concessions to a certain degree.  In 
the agricultural area, there is a possibility of farm products other 
than rice being affected by the outcome of the ministerial. 
 
Increase in imports unavoidable 
 
Rice 
 
Former Agriculture Minister Yoshio Yatsu, a key member of the farm 
policy clique (norin-zoku) in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
spoke at a gathering in Hirakawa-cho, Tokyo July 16 about how to 
handle the WTO ministerial: "I think Japan should walk out of the 
WTO, (if the ministerial comes up with a decision disadvantageous to 
it)." The audience of about 1,000 people applauded his words. About 
1.4 million farm households are a major support base for the ruling 
parties. How to treat rice is a major issue at the Doha Round. 
 
As a result of the Uruguay Round, the WTO adopted a tariff formula 
for rice. At present a 778 PERCENT  tariff is imposed on that 
commodity by Japan. Discussions at the Doha Round are focusing on 
lowering tariffs on agricultural products. It would be difficult for 
Japan to reject tariff cuts, if it wants to see the Doha Round reach 
common ground. Since protecting domestic agriculture is a common 
issue for WTO member nations, the proposal by the chair of the 
agricultural negotiations group provides key items on which high 
tariffs can be imposed. 
 
However, even if rice is designated as a key item, Japan would be 
urged to increase its imports. The chair's proposal calls for 
imports of 3 PERCENT -6 PERCENT  of domestic consumption, according 
to tariff rates reduced. Japan imports approximately 770,000 tons of 
rice from abroad as minimum-access rice (MA rice). Since Japan's 
rice consumption is approximately 8.28 million tons, it would have 
to increase rice imports by 250,000 tons to 500,000 tons. The MA 
rice is used for food processing or as foreign aid. Only about 10 
PERCENT  is used as a food staple. However, a person in charge at 
the JA Zenchu views that if rice imports increase and some portions 
are put on the market, pressure would build to lower rice prices. 
 
Concern about being unable to protect key items that can be treated 
as exception 
 
Rice is not the only agricultural item that becomes an issue in 
negotiations. Regarding key items, which can be treated as 
exception, the chairman proposed that 4 PERCENT -6 PERCENT  of all 
food items be treated as key items, but Japan is insisting on 10 
PERCENT -15 PERCENT . If Japan is to give in, sugar and starch will 
likely be targeted. 
 
Regarding designated tariff quota items, free or lower tariff rates 
can be applied within the designated quota, but higher tariff rates 
are applied for imports exceeding this quota. According to the 
proposal made by chairman of the agricultural negotiations group, 
items that are not designated as such cannot be designated as key 
items. Among Japan's main high tariff agricultural products, sugar 
and starch can be categorized as such items. A source related to an 
agricultural cooperative said, "If Japan cannot give in on rice or 
wheat, then it may have to give up maintaining those items as key 
items." 
 
President Arizuka (76) of the Kawanishi Agricultural Cooperative in 
 
TOKYO 00001988  010 OF 010 
 
 
Obihiro City noted, "Prime Minister Fukuda has committed himself to 
raising Japan's food self-sufficiency ratio. I believe politics will 
tackle this issue properly." 
 
ZUMWALT